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Abstract 
Introduction: Improving health systems requires good governance alongside technical 
interventions. Evidence suggests that strengthening governance results in more responsive 
health systems. Despite receiving increased attention, governance is still a relatively new 
area of health systems and policy research. There is no universally agreed way to define, 
measure or assess health system governance. Little information exists regarding governance 
at sub-national (health policy implementation) level. Assessing governance at different 
health system levels (national, county and health facility) in Kenya is the aim of this study. 
The specific research objectives explored are: 1) factors influencing health system 
governance in Kenya; 2) key stakeholders’ perspectives on health system governance and 3) 
whether the status of health system governance differs with the functionality of health 
facilities. 
Methods: The study employed qualitative research methods, interviews with 39 key 
informants from three levels of the Kenya health system. The study used a conceptual 
framework adapted from previously published tools for assessing governance and draws on 
“institutional analysis” theory to help analyse and interpret the findings.   
Findings: Key factors that influence governance in the health system include devolution, 
rapidly changing political context, constrained health financing and challenges in managing 
the health workforce. The most notable influence appeared to be the impact of devolution 
and frequent health workers’ strikes. Stakeholders shared their views on all six principles of 
governance and these revealed opportunities for abuse of the system, weak enforcement of 
policies and accountability measures, and a lack of participation in policy development. They 
also commented on the lack of improvement in equity in the health system. Careful analysis 
using the new institutional economics theory showed that there were observed differences 
in governance at facility level: fully functional versus not fully functional. The most surprising 
difference was that staff responding to the lack or weakness of formal institutions by creating 
informal arrangements that might circumvent or support the goals of the formal system. 
Fully functional facilities had accountability mechanisms that they self-enforced; by contrast, 
facilities that were not fully functional lacked both self-enforcement and effective third party 
enforcement mechanisms. Norms and practices for controlling corruption were clear in fully 
functional facilities but confused in some not fully functional facilities.  
Conclusions: This study provides an in-depth exploration of what factors influence 
institutional arrangements for good governance and how these were enforced or not. 
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Analysis guided by theory, with a strong emphasis on context, is an important contribution 
to the existing literature on governance. This study critically evaluated existing frameworks 
to assess health system governance from a cross-disciplinary perspective which can inform 
future research on governance. The findings highlight research implications for Kenya at 
policy and operational levels particularly, on the need to monitor health system governance 
over time due to rapidly changing political and socioeconomic circumstances, especially 
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The origins of this study lie in my experience working with public health sectors in low and 
middle-income countries for over 15 years as I believe that good governance is indispensable 
to improve a health system and technical interventions alone are not sufficient. There is 
strong evidence in the literature that strengthening governance results in more responsive 
health systems through increased accountability, enhanced participation, reducing corrupt 
practices, enforcing the rule of law and promoting equity.  
The literature on health system governance is frequently characterised by governance audit 
against benchmark standards, using either rules-based (e.g. policy or procedure exists) or 
outcomes-based approaches (e.g. the policy has been implemented, or the rule has been 
enforced) (Fryatt et al., 2017; Savedoff, 2009). However, there is limited information on 
institutional arrangements and how these can be enforced to improve governance. Both 
rules-based and outcomes-based approaches to assess governance have been critiqued for 
their limitations as they largely depend on how and what you propose to measure (Chhotray 
& Stoker, 2008). Though such assessments provide valuable insights, the approach is 
somehow limited as it often fails to be explicit about the measurement (Chhotray & Stoker, 
2008).  
While the subject of governance has been studied across different disciplines, there are few 
studies that provide an understanding of governance at the operational level. This is one of 
the very few studies which have assessed governance of the health system including at 
health facility level in Kenya. This study sought to elucidate how governance arrangements 
differed with the functionality of a health facility and to generate transferable insights. 
The originality of this study is that it explores health system governance including health 
facilities designated to provide comprehensive emergency obstetric care (CEmOC) in Kenya. 
No previous study has used a theoretical framework to assess health system governance at 
county level and below in Kenya. Hence, in this aspect, this study is unique. Using the 
“institutional analysis” approach to governance, this study provides opportunities to 
highlight stakeholders’ perspectives. Despite the slow progress in the improvement of 
maternal health in Kenya within the last decade, governance has not been studied focussing 
on facilities designated to provide comprehensive emergency obstetric care (CEmOC). This 
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study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first one to explore the views of key stakeholders 
in maternal health.   
This chapter starts by providing an overview on the importance of governance from the 
perspective of international development. It highlights how governance has been 
instrumental in sustainable development globally and described some initiatives of 
governance for development across the world. The chapter then highlights the importance 
of health system governance in Kenya followed by the significance of the study in Section 
1.2. Section 1.3 introduces the research aim and objectives with the research questions set 
out for this study. Lastly, Section 1.4 presents the organisation of the study outlining the 
content of different chapters.  
1.1 Governance for sustainable development 
Governance is a relatively new concept in development. Governance was brought into the 
health system through international development. Governance has received increasing 
attention in development with the landmark report of the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 2004 on the role of governance in service provision. The WHO brought attention into 
health system governance by introducing governance as one of the six health system building 
blocks (WHO, 2007). Health system governance is defined as “the role of the government in 
health and its relation to other actors whose activities impact on health. This involves 
overseeing and guiding the whole health system, private as well as public, in order to protect 
the public interest” (WHO, 2008). Governance rules and functions help policy and other 
decision makers to achieve health objectives in their countries. The World Bank measures 
governance performance in countries around the world annually using public expenditure 
tracking surveys. Likewise, USAID has been investing significant resources to improve 
leadership and governance of health systems to achieve better health outcomes in low-and 
middle-income countries in its programming over the last 25 years (USAID, 2017). 
In their systematic review, Ciccone et al. (2014) highlighted that governance has a direct, 
positive relationship to health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries. The review 
identified three key governance mechanisms which have improved health outcomes: 1) 
decentralised decision making which enhanced local responsiveness; 2) participation and 
inclusiveness; and 3) strengthened social accountability. Health outcomes were measured in 
terms of maternal mortality ratio, neonatal mortality rate, under-five mortality rate, 
nutrition status of infants, immunisation and service utilisation rates.  
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In another peer-reviewed publication, Ramesh et al. (2013) retrospectively analysed the 
contribution of governance in the history of China’s health care reforms since the 1980s. The 
study highlighted that lack of governance measures (voice and accountability) contributed 
to the constraints of the health system reforms in China. A mixed methods study of 
Balabanova et al. (2013) conducted in four countries and one state in India (Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand and the Indian state of Tamil Nadu) identified governance as 
one of the key attributes of success in health systems. The study highlighted that governance 
underpinned all health system functions regardless of their varying definitions. 
Brinkerhoff et al. (2009) and Tawfik-Shuker & Khoshaw (2010) highlighted how good 
governance contributed to improving health systems performance. An evaluation report by 
Brinkerhoff et al. (2009) assessed the progress of health system decentralisation in Rwanda 
by providing evidence on how enhanced local governance contributed to the better 
performance of the health system. Tawfik-Shukor and Khoshnaw (2010) identified an 
association between governance and health system performance in a cross-sectional study 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. The study stressed that developing the preconditions for governance at all 
levels (macro, meso and micro levels) was essential to achieve better health systems 
performance (in terms of resource allocation, health staff appointment and health service 
delivery).  
Olafsdottir et al. (2011) brought the attention to the role of governance in improving health 
outcomes among 46 countries in the WHO Africa Region. The study highlighted the 
importance of the structural impact of health system governance on health outcomes as 
governance was the result of interaction within social structures of a system.  
Menon-Johansson (2005); Rajkumar et al. (2008); and Reidpath (2006) highlighted the role 
of governance in improving health and other development outcomes. Good governance was 
negatively associated with HIV prevalence (Menon-Johansson 2005) but positively related to 
population health (healthy life expectancy, infant mortality rate, GDP and access to improved 
water sources) (Reidpath, 2006). Rajkumar et al. (2008) showed the association between 
governance and health outcomes in 91 developed and developing countries. The study 
highlights that increased public spending does not necessarily improve outcomes in health 
(under five mortality rate) and education (primary school attainment) in countries with poor 
governance. 
World leaders agree that improving governance and its core principles would facilitate the 
achievement of many critical development objectives. Some examples of governance 
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initiatives are: the African Peer Review Mechanism (http://aprm-au.org/), the UN 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(https://eiti.org/) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(http://www.chr.up.ac.za/). Some countries, such as, Mongolia, included an extra goal MDG 
9, on “good governance”. These examples illustrate concerted efforts made to integrate, 
track and measure governance into the country development agenda.  
Reflecting on the experiences of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and progress in 
different countries, governance has been widely recognised as an important part of the 
agenda in post-2015 development. UNDP (2014) highlighted the importance of effective 
governance among institutions within different systems to promote inclusive growth to 
deliver essential public services. Accountability of public officials played a significant role in 
political processes, and hence, key principles of governance such as the rule of law, 
accountability, participation and transparency have been included in the new Sustainable 
Development Goals. The SDG 16 (peace and justice) includes three targets of key principles 
of governance: 1) Target 16.3. Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels 
and ensure equal access to justice for all, 2) Target 16.6. Develop effective, accountable and 
transparent institutions at all levels and 2) Target 16.7. Ensure responsive, inclusive, 
participatory and representative decision making at all levels (Foundation for Democracy and 
Sustainable Development, 2017). 
Good health system governance has the potential to sustain effective health interventions 
as well as provide the capacity to scale up. Governance is an aggregate composed of different 
principles such as accountability, equity and transparency within the political systems in 
which health systems function (Balabanova et al., 2013). Good governance is important for 
functioning health systems (Balabanova et al., 2013). Previous studies highlight how good 
governance has positively contributed to the measures of performance and outcomes of 
health systems. For health policies to be implemented successfully, health systems require 
not only technical inputs but also good governance measures (Mkoka et al., 2014). Therefore, 
governance is increasingly seen as crucial in health systems and expected to lead to improved 
performance of the whole health system and better health outcomes (Siddiqi et al., 2009). 
The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that “good 
governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting 
development” (United Nations, 1998).  
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Despite receiving increased attention, governance is still a relatively new area of health 
systems and policy research (Fryatt et al., 2017). There is a greater understanding of what 
governance is and the role of various governance functions, but there is a lack of research 
examining governance from a wider perspective and how it relates to the health system 
(Brinkerhoff, 2013). Little information exists regarding governance at sub-national (health 
policy implementation) level. Specifically, it is unclear how governance is operationalised at 
the functional level of a health system, that is, health facility level. Examining governance at 
different health system levels (national, county and health facility) in Kenya is the core focus 
of this study. 
1.2 Significance of the study 
 
This is a study of the governance of the Kenyan health system where the recently elected 
government has promised health system reform with a specific focus on devolution. The 
2010 Constitution of Kenya allocated a larger portion of health service delivery to county 
levels with the exception of the National Referral Services. However, devolution depends on 
the capacity of counties to accomplish their responsibilities and make effective use of public 
resources. County health management teams also face the challenge of resource shortages 
(both human and material) and budget constraints. Therefore, the Kenya Health Sector 
Strategic and Investment Plan (KHSSP) 2012-2017 proposes a three-pronged strategy for the 
health sector: partnership, governance and stewardship to address its national health 
agenda.  
This study was conducted as part of a programme of work in Kenya coordinated by the Centre 
for Maternal and Newborn Health at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM) 
funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The Centre supported 
120 facilities: 30 comprehensive EmOC (CEmOC) and 90 basic EmOC (BEmOC) through the 
“Making It Happen” (MiH) Programme. The programme operated in nine countries including 
Kenya, delivering a country adapted competency based training package to improve 
healthcare providers’ capacity to deliver EmOC, strengthening monitoring and evaluation of 
maternal and newborn health (MNH) outcomes, working in close partnership with 
government and stakeholders in each country. Provision of Skilled Birth Attendance (SBA) 
and the availability of Emergency (or Essential) Obstetric Care (EmOC) coupled with Newborn 
Care (NC) are the key strategies that if implemented will reduce maternal and neonatal 
mortality and morbidity. The UN recommends five facilities providing EmOC with at least one 
providing comprehensive EmOC (CEmOC) for every 500,000 population. 
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This study explored governance of health system including facilities providing CEmOC by 
employing qualitative research methods. Following a review of the literature on assessing 
health system governance, this study adopted a governance assessment framework. Using a 
theoretical framework adapted from two previously validated frameworks, this study 
provides an in-depth assessment of governance at three different levels of the Kenyan health 
system (national, county and health facility levels). The study also assessed governance 
between fully functional and not fully functional healthcare facilities providing CEmOC. 
1.3 Aim and objectives of the study 
 
The aim of the study is to explore the situation of health system governance at three different 
health system levels in Kenya focussing on facilities designated to provide comprehensive 
emergency obstetric care (CEmOC). Specific research objectives are: 
1) To explore factors influencing health system governance in Kenya 
2) To explore the perspectives of key stakeholders on health system governance 
3) To explore whether the status of health system governance differs with the 
functionality of health facilities 
The following research questions have been formulated to achieve the research aim and 
objectives mentioned above: 
1) Which factors influence the governance of the health system in Kenya? 
2) How do key stakeholders from Kenya perceive governance of the health system?  
3) Are there any differences in governance between fully functional and not fully 
functional facilities? 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organised into the following sections: Introduction, Background, Literature 
review, Methodology and methods, Findings and Discussion. 
Chapter 1 introduces key features of the study starting with governance and the importance 
of governance for sustainable development globally. It provides the rationale for the study, 
followed by the research aim, objectives, research questions and the way the study has been 
organised. A brief description of the subsequent chapters is provided below.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of Kenya, considering basic demographic and development 
information. It then provides an overview of the newly reformed health system of Kenya 
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describing the environment in which the study took place, particularly the new institutional 
arrangements under the devolved government. Finally, the chapter highlights the 
importance of health system governance in Kenya.  
Chapter 3 presents a review of the existing literature on governance beginning with how 
governance has been defined by providing a cross-disciplinary tour of governance. The 
chapter uses a theory-driven approach to reviewing the literature on governance. The 
chapter first conceptualises and describes governance among different disciplines before 
governance was introduced into the health system. This is followed by a description of the 
methods used to conduct the review, the systematic review method. Afterwards, the chapter 
presents findings from the review: 1) a critique of the different frameworks which can be 
used to assess governance in health systems and 2) how those frameworks have been 
applied. The chapter then discusses the review findings and ends with a summary of the 
review. The last section of Chapter 3 presents the frameworks which have been chosen for 
use in this study.  
Chapter 4 presents the research paradigm, the methodology adopted and methods used in 
this study. It describes the paradigmatic orientation of the study followed by the research 
design. The chapter also presents the aim of the study and research objectives to provide 
the rationale for using qualitative research and the approaches used in this study. It then 
presents the study methods and procedures employed under each of the three research 
objectives, research validity, transferability and reliability, the researcher’s positionality, 
practical reflections and the ethical aspects considered in this study.  
The findings of this study are presented in three chapters: Chapter 5,6 and 7. Chapter 5 
covers the first research objective: to explore factors influencing the governance of the 
health system in Kenya. The chapter describes the context in which health facilities have 
been governed in Kenya. The findings in this chapter have been constructed based on the 
accounts of respondents, reflecting the context in which they operate the health system on 
a day-to-day basis. Hence, the chapter begins with devolution describing how devolution 
presents opportunities for governance but compromises the capacity of county level 
government. It then illustrates the context of governance highlighting how political, 
socioeconomic and cultural contexts shape the way people govern the health system in 
Kenya.  
Chapter 6 covers the second research objective: to explore the perspectives of key 
stakeholders on health system governance. It includes information collected from interviews 
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with key stakeholders using a governance assessment framework. The chapter illustrates 
how key stakeholders in Kenya viewed health system governance particularly in relation to 
specific operational principles of governance: participation, strategic vision, the rule of law, 
accountability, equity and control of corruption. Hence, while Chapter 5 explores “macro” 
institutional factors, this chapter focuses on the “meso” and “micro” factors, offering a 
holistic account of the governance of the health system. This chapter presents information 
collected from interviews with key stakeholders using a governance assessment framework 
adapted for use in this study.  
Chapter 7 covers the third research objective: to explore whether the status of health system 
governance differs with the functionality of health facilities. The chapter starts by presenting 
the functionality of CEmOC facilities as measured in terms of signal function availability. To 
do so, the included facilities were grouped according to their level of functionality using the 
“nine signal functions” based on information collected under the “Making it Happen (MiH)” 
programme described in Chapter 4 (Methodology). Using the UN criteria, if a facility 
performs all the nine designated signal functions of CEmOC, it is regarded as a fully functional 
facility. Similarly, facilities performing less than nine signal functions belong to the group of 
not fully functional status. The interview data collected at facility level was analysed 
thematically using the approach laid out in Chapter 4. These themes were then interpretively 
analysed in view of the data that describes arrangements for good governance using the 
institutional analysis framework outlined in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 8 presents a discussion of the results presented in five parts, structured in line with 
Doherty and Smith (1999)’s recommendation on structured presentation of discussions for 
scientific research. The first section of this Chapter summarises the main findings of the 
research. The second section relates the findings to the wider literature. The third section 
explores strengths and limitations including areas for future research and recommendations. 
Under the strengths section, the methodological contributions of the study and its relevance 
to Kenyan health system are highlighted. The last section ends the study with concluding 
remarks.   
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This chapter presents a brief description of the background of the country under study, 
Kenya. The chapter starts by considering basic demographic and development information 
and then provides an overview of the newly reformed Kenyan health system from three key 
aspects: human resources for health (HRH), intelligence and information, and financing of 
the health sector. Following this, the chapter describes the key contextual environment in 
which the study took place, particularly the history of devolution including the new 
institutional arrangements under the devolved government. Section eight highlights the 
importance of health system governance in Kenya followed by the chapter summary.  
2.1 Kenya at a glance 
The Republic of Kenya is a large country (580,000 km2) situated in the east of Africa with a 
400-kilometre long coastline on the Indian Ocean. The country is bordered by Ethiopia and 
Sudan to the north, Somalia to the northeast, Uganda in the west and Tanzania to the south 
(Figure 1). Kenya is administratively divided into 47 counties and 297 sub-counties outlined 
in the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The country Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is USD 
1380 (the World Bank, 2017) and is classified as a lower middle-income country by the World 
Bank. 
Kenya has three main cultural groups: the Bantus, the Cushites and the Nilotes and more 
than 42 ethnic groups with diverse cultures. English and Swahili are the official national 
languages while over 60 languages are spoken throughout the country. Kenya has a total 
population of 43.2 million (Global Health Observatory, 2014) and nearly 80% of the 
population lives in rural areas. Most land in Kenya is arid or semi-arid and sparsely populated 
(Government of Kenya, 2014); the main economic activity is agriculture (25% of GDP) with a 
strong industrial base (13% of total GDP) (Government of Kenya, 2014). Kenya has a diverse 
physical environment with two distinct regions: the lowlands and highlands as altitude plays 
an important role in the human settlement and agricultural activities. The country has 
savannah grasslands and woodlands, tropical rainforests and semi-desert environments. 
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The population growth rate in Kenya is high with a 2.4% annual growth rate and a very high 
dependent proportion (42.37%). Table 1 presents key health and development indicators of 
Kenya (KDHS, 2014). The indicators highlight that the health situation in Kenya requires 
further improvement as there has been stagnation or worsening of some of the indicators 
over the last decades despite improvements in some indicators such as the under-5 mortality 
rate and infant mortality rate (Figure 2). In addition, there are significant differences 
between geographic areas and genders.  
Table 1: Key development indicators of Kenya 
Selected key indicators National 
Budget allocated to health sector (of total government 
budget) (Fiscal Year 2014/15) 
4%* 
Life expectancy at birth  58  
Prevalence of underweight children under-5 11% (12.1 for boys, 9.8 for girls) 
Net attendance ratio in primary education 86.6% (85.5 for men, 87.6 for women) 
% of children under one immunised against measles 87.1% (87.9 for boys, 86.2 for girls) 
Population with improved drinking water sources  85.7% (urban), 57% (rural), 66.9% 
(total) 
Population with improved sanitation facilities 30.5% (urban), 21.6% (rural), 24% 
(total) 
Sources: KDHS (2014), *MOH (2015) National and county health budget analysis report 
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2.2 Information on counties  
 
This section describes key socio-demographic and health characteristics of the six counties 
included in this study. Detailed explanations of the rationale underlying the choice of 
counties are described under Section 4.4.1 (Study population and sampling) in Chapter 4 
(Methodology and methods).  
The six included counties varied in terms of socio-economic status, level of urbanisation, 
health service provision and service utilisation (Table 2). Nairobi county, the national capital, 
is an urban city and relatively prosperous compared to the other five counties. Makueni and 
Kitui counties are the poorest among the six included counties as the number classified as 
living in poverty is 22% which is below the national average (19%). The literacy rates for 
women in reproductive age in all counties are higher than the national average (87.8%). It is 
highest in Makueni county (96.9%) and the lowest in Kitui county (91.7%).  
Table 2. Summary of socio-economic and selected key indicators from six counties 



























Area in km2 581313.2 30496.5 6208.2 8008.8 695.1 7495.1 17933.1 
Poverty level 19.0% 22.2% 19.8% 22.2% 6.9% 12.1% 10.2% 
% of urban population 29.9% 14.0% 52.0% 12.0% 100.0% 46.0% 7.0% 
Literacy rate of women 
aged 15-49 years 
87.8% 91.7% 95.3% 96.9% 96.5% 94.0% 94.0% 
Staff absenteeism  15.5% 13.5% 21.3% 21.9% 7.0% 14.4% 19.9% 
Mean availability of 
maternal health tracer 
commodities 
28.0% 23.0% 63.0% 29.0% 23.0% 32.0% 27.0% 
% of women receiving 
ANC from a skilled 
provider (2014) 
96.0% 98.0% 99.0% 98.0% 98.0% 96.0% 92.0% 
Delivery with skilled 
attendants 
61.8% 46.2% 63.4% 54.6% 89.1% 69.5% 40.3% 
Contraceptive prevalence 
rate 
58.0% 57.3% 75.9% 80.3% 62.6% 56.8% 47.8% 
All basic immunisation 
coverage aged 12-23 
months’ old 
79.0% 69.3% 93.4% 92.0% 81.2% 79.2% 66.4% 
Sources: KDHS (2014), Government of Kenya (2014) 
 
In regard to health service provision, Nairobi, the national capital, had the lowest rate of staff 
absent (7%) while Makueni had highest (21.9%) followed by Machakos (21.3%) and Narok 
(19.9%). The availability of maternal health tracer commodities was lowest in Nairobi (23%) 
but highest in its neighbouring county, Machakos (63%).  
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In regard to service utilisation, 99% of women in Machakos received antenatal care (ANC) 
from a skilled provider while only 92% of women in Narok did. Similarly, 93.4% of children 
under two years old were immunised in Machakos while only 66.4% received immunisation 
in Narok. 89.1% of women in Nairobi delivered with a skilled attendant while only 40.3% of 
women in Narok received skilled attendance during childbirth. Similarly, Narok county had 
lowest contraceptive prevalence rate (47.8%) while Makueni (80.3%) and Machakos (75.9%) 
counties had higher contraceptive prevalence rates compared to other counties. 
2.3 Kenya newly reformed health system 
The following section provides an overview of the Kenyan health sector. The section starts 
with the country health status highlighted by key health indicators. This is followed by the 
examination of three health system inputs which are critical for the functioning of a health 
sector: HRH, intelligence and information, and health financing. 
Improvements in health status have been marginal in the last few decades according to the 
Kenya Service Provision Assessment Survey (2010) led by the Ministry of Medical Services 
and the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation. The disparity in health indicators still exists 
between different gender groups and by place of residence. According to the WHO-Global 
Health Observatory (2014) and the latest Kenya Demographic Health Survey (KDHS, 2014), 
the country’s progress on MDGs 1, 4 and 6 were marginal while there was no progress on 
MDG 5 (Figure 2).  
For instance, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) has reduced marginally from 506 (614-
398)/100,000 live births in 2004 to 362 (471-253)/100,000 live births in 2014 (KDHS, 2014). 
There have been some improvements in IMR, U5MR and NMR (Figure 2). However, there 
have been no improvements in the MMR since the 1990s (WHO, 2014). Noncommunicable 
diseases such as cardiovascular, respiratory, digestive diseases, cancers and psychiatric 
conditions also represent 50-70% of total hospital admissions and account for half of all 
inpatient mortality. Gender disparities across the country still persist with a gender 
development index of 0.628 in the central region to 0.401 in the northeastern region (MOMS 
and MOPHS, 2012). 
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Figure 2. Trends in key child health indicators over the last ten years 
 
Source: KDHS (2014) 
 
2.3.1 Human resources for health  
 
The critical shortage of HRH is a significant challenge in Kenya as in many sub-Saharan 
countries (Ministry of Health, 2014b). Kenya falls short of the minimum threshold for the 
number of healthcare staff (23 per 10,000 population) as the current rate is 13 per 10,000 
population (Ministry of Health, 2014b). According to a study conducted by Transparency 
International, the shortage of skilled healthcare providers is worse in rural areas where there 
was 50% to 80% understaffing in provincial and rural health facilities (Ministry of Health, 
2014b) (Transparency International-Kenya, 2011). In a more recent survey “PETS-Plus”, only 
four out of 46 counties in Kenya met the national benchmark of 8.7 nurses per 10,000 
population (Onsomu et al., 2014). Similar findings were observed for doctors’ availability as 
it ranged from 0 (in Mandera) to 2 (in Nairobi) doctors per 10,000 population. The same 
survey reported staff absenteeism ranging from 7% (in West Pokoto) to 65% (in Trans-Nzoia) 
which consequently affected the quality of care provided; only 64% of clinicians could 
correctly diagnose seven different conditions in Kilifi while this was 84% in Makueni (Onsomu 
et al., 2014).  
The Health Services Census conducted by the Ministry of Health (MOH) in 2013 identified 
gaps in not only numbers but also the skills mix of human resources across all cadres and 
different areas of specialisation (MOMS and MOPHS, 2012:127). The Census noted that 
management of human resources was still manual thus many aspects of human resource 
management were not efficient and there is the inability to promote and appraise staff 
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key areas in which the current health sector needs to invest: strategic recruitment of staff; 
training and skills upgrading of existing staff and developing a robust information system on 
human resource management (MOMS and MOPHS, 2012).  
Under the current HRH arrangement for recruitment and discipline of health staff, county 
health departments have the authority to hire and fire staff. A medical superintendent (MS) 
from the hospital level has the authority to reprimand staff but cannot dismiss them for 
discipline issues. In severe cases, the case will be referred to the County Department of 
Health and the County Public Service Commission, who have the authorities to suspend or 
dismiss health staff.  
2.3.2 Intelligence and information 
 
In Kenya, the health information system (HIS) is supposed to collect and report health 
information from the facility to district, county and through to national levels. The health 
system assessment (2010) reported that information collected at the facilities was rarely 
used in those facilities who viewed collating and reporting as a duty. Similarly, data reported 
at the national level was not fully used to inform health policy and planning processes 
(Luoma et al., 2010). There are other issues such as accuracy and transparency of the 
information collected and reported. The local government offices also complained that the 
information received from the national and sub-national levels was inadequate for their 
planning purposes (Luoma et al., 2010).  
On the other hand, the information produced by the MOH was not well disseminated as only 
the reports available on the MOH website were available, and the majority of the health 
sector reports were not publicly available. Only a few low-level healthcare facilities had 
access to their Annual Operational Plan (AOP) while most dispensaries have never seen the 
AOP (Luoma et al., 2010).  
In Kenya, professional bodies had a historical role in advocacy through the government 
although they did not have a formal role in health policy development. There have been 
efforts to improve communication between healthcare providers and policy makers to 
ensure accountability and inform policy decisions. The Community Based Health Information 
Management System (CBHIMS) project has made information available to both community 
and health officials in some parts of the country. The agency called AfriAfya (African Network 
for Health Knowledge Management and Communication) was established in Kenya in April 
2000 to improve the communication of health knowledge among communities including 
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rural and other marginalised groups. CBHIMS received assistance from the AfriAfya on the 
use of PDAs (personal digital assistants) to improve the existing data collection system which 
was paper-based and needed to be completed manually. AfriAfya created opportunities for 
networking among organisations to improve communication technology for community 
health and development by sharing best practices and lessons learnt in their various projects. 
They also worked closely with the ministries of health to influence the policy makers in 
adopting the modification of the systems.  
2.3.3 Health financing 
Healthcare in Kenya is chronically under-funded (Korir et al., 2014). Total expenditure on 
health has increased from USD 17 to 40 per capita (slightly above 4% of total GDP) during 
the last 10 years due to contributions from government and donor resources (MOMS and 
MOPHS, 2012). The national and county health budget analysis report (MOH, 2015: vi) has 
tracked the budget allocation for the health sector and shows that this has increased from 
3.4% of the national budget (KSH 36 million) in 2013/2014 to 4% (KSH47 million) in 
2014/2015.  
According to the new Constitution, 15% of national revenue should be allocated to fund the 
devolved functions of county governments including health (MOH, 2015, p-vi). Kenya has to 
revise the Abuja target which is to spend at least 15% of its total expenditure on health 
(MOH, 2015: vii). 
However, there is no real increase regarding health system resources as private (clients’ out 
of pocket) health financing is still one of the main contributors. Among three main sources 
of health care financing, private financing accounts for 35.9% while the government and 
donors contribute 30% each (MOMS and MOPHS, 2012). There is no recent information on 
health financing and the existing data was collected before devolution (Munge et al., 2017). 
The problem with health financing in Kenya is not only low spending on healthcare, but the 
allocation of budgets to public facilities has been uneven, with relatively more funds 
(approximately 70%) allocated to secondary and tertiary facilities compared to primary 
healthcare facilities (Health Action, 2011). Therefore, facilities need to charge user fees to 
provide quality health services particularly in cases where there is no other source of income. 
However, evidence showed that user fees and out-of-pocket payment are significant barriers 
to the use of healthcare services in Kenya (MOMS and MOPH, 2010). The Government has 
also committed to provide universal health coverage to its citizens by the year 2030. 
Therefore, in 2013, the government took decisive action and instituted two health financing 
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policies: 1) the abolition of user fees in public health centres and dispensaries and 2) free 
maternity services (FMS) in all public health facilities (Republic of Kenya, 2013).  
In Kenya, a variety of user fee policies have been implemented since the country gained 
independence in 1963 (Figure 3). In 2004, the government set a ceiling on user fees of Kenya 
Shillings/KSH10 (USD0.10) in dispensaries and KSH20 (USD0.20) in health centres (known as 
the 10/20 policy) with an exemption for children under five years of age (U5C), for the poor 
and designated conditions such as malaria and TB. In addition to these exemptions, all fees 
for maternity care (uncomplicated births) at public healthcare facilities were abolished in 
2007. The government simultaneously introduced the Health Sector Services Fund (HSSF) 
which transferred funds directly to health facilities to compensate for the loss of revenue as 
a result of the removal of user fees. The HSSF was officially launched in 2010 by the 
Government of Kenya, financed using domestic resources with the aim of pooling public and 
donor resources, and, to avoid the bureaucratic decision making process used in the past to 
request funds (Ramana et al., 2013). The funds were managed locally by the health facility 
management committee (HFMC) composed of community members (Waweru et al., 2013). 
There were no clear guidelines and institutional procedures for the HSSF in the devolved 
health system (Waweru et al., 2013). 
Figure 3: History of user fees policy in Kenya 
 
 
The other financing scheme, NHIF (National Hospital Insurance Fund), was established in 
1996 to finance health care in public and private facilities (Ramana et al., 2013). The scheme 
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is mandatory for workers from formal sectors earning more than KSH1000 per month. By 
June 2010, the NHIF had 2.8 million principal members with 6.6 million beneficiaries 
(approximately 18% of the country) (Ramana et al., 2013).  
In June 2013, the government introduced two additional policies to reduce the financial 
burden of access to health care: the abolishment of user fees for all health services in public 
health centres and dispensaries (primary care level); and free maternity services (FMS) at all 
levels of care in the government health sector (primary, secondary and tertiary) (Kenya 
Ministry of Health, 2015). These policies, FMS policy in particular, were part of a national 
strategy to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality, alleviate poverty and realise the MDG 
targets (Kenya Ministry of Health, 2015). 
The MOH circular explaining the services which were included as part of the FMS was 
published on 1st April 2014 although the policy was announced in July 2013. The circular also 
stated that health centres/ dispensaries and hospitals would be reimbursed KSH2500 and 
KSH5000 respectively based on the reported numbers of deliveries conducted. The MOH 
used the two existing financing mechanisms to reimburse facilities for providing FMS: the 
health sector service fund (HSSF) for health centres and dispensaries; and the hospital 
management service fund (HMSF) for hospitals. Some of the payments were channelled 
through county revenue accounts while some were transferred directly into facility accounts 
(MOH, 2015). According to an assessment conducted by the MOH in 2015, 25% of surveyed 
facilities reported having missed reimbursements for the FMS while there were instances 
when these had not been received for 4-5 months.  
The Government of Kenya introduced the FMS policy when the health system was 
undergoing new political and administrative decentralisation (devolution). Hence, 
devolution has been an important determinant in implementing the new financing policies 
of Kenya health system. The following section describes devolution of the health system and 
factors influencing it.  
2.4 Devolution of the health system 
In 2010, the majority of Kenyans voted to adopt a new Constitution in a referendum, sparking 
another round of decentralisation in the country. The 2010 Constitution devolved political, 
administrative and financial functions to 47 newly created administrative units called 
“counties”, based upon the 1992 district framework (The Republic of Kenya, 1992). County 
governments were elected locally to perform new functions with formula-driven funding 
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from the national government and limited locally generated revenue (Williamson & Mulaki, 
2015). Counties can also receive grants for priority services from the national government.  
The primary purpose of devolution was political, to increase local autonomy and reduce 
ethnic and regional tensions (Sihanya, 2011), at the same time improving efficiency in service 
provision, increasing citizens’ input and local participation in decision making. Schedule 4 of 
the Constitution provides guidance on the services that county and national governments 
should provide.  
The health sector was devolved as part of the new Constitution in 2010. This involved 
allocation of essential health service delivery to county governments with the national 
government providing technical support to the county governments, managing provincial 
general hospitals (now changed to national referral hospitals) and drafting health policies. 
However, it was unclear who was responsible for the procurement mechanisms; the 
management of HRH; and with regard to the amount and processes of financial transfers as 
these were not defined at the beginning of devolution (Williamson & Mulaki, 2015).   
According to the Transition to Devolved Government Act (2012), the initial plan was to enter 
into a three-year transition period to devolve services to the county governments including 
assessment of capacity and system. However, county governors and assemblies petitioned 
the President to devolve authority and resources to the counties more rapidly, once they 
were elected in March 2013 (Commission for Implementation of the Constitution, 2014). 
Consequently, the Transition Authority devolved services to the counties under the Gazette 
Notice Number 137 on 9th August 2013 (The Republic of Kenya, 2013).   
2.5 History of devolution in Kenya 
 
Kenya has a long history of decentralisation since it gained independence from the British 
colonial government in 1963 (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2010). At that time, the colonial 
government proposed a system of ethnic and tribal-based regional governments (Institute 
of Economic Affairs, 2010). To maintain political stability, the Kenya National Africa Union, 
then the dominant political party, dropped the proposition and established a unitary state 
with eight provinces comprising of 175 local authorities (The Republic of Kenya, 1977). Under 
this structure, power was concentrated at the centre with the Ministry of Local Government 
overseeing the managements of local governments (NORAD, 2009). However, local 
governments did not have much authority for decision making though they were responsible 
for service provision (Kunnat, 2009).  
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Kenya made several attempts to decentralise authority to the local government structure 
described above (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2010). Significant changes included the 
creation of six Regional Development Authorities for planning and coordination of activities 
in the 1970s and 1980s (KHRC, 2010) and the Rural Development Strategy, which placed 
districts at the centre of priority setting (Barkan and Chege, 1989). However, these 
developments were regarded as de-concentration of central level administrative staff as they 
did not empower local administrative staff and did not create clear roles and responsibilities 
for local government units (Williamson & Mulaki, 2015).  
In the 1990s, the World Bank started to fund local governments directly under its Local 
Government Reform Programme (Esidene, 2008), which gave them more responsibility for 
service provision, without changing decision making authority (Williamson & Mulaki, 2015). 
This resulted in more confusion about decentralisation rather than improved administrative 
efficiency and clearer lines of authority (Barkan & Chege, 1989). Some authors believed that 
vertical funding mechanisms led to unsuccessful decentralisation (KHRC, 2010). For example, 
a decentralised level could have up to 13 distinct vertical funding mechanisms, creating 
confusion. Over time, efforts towards decentralisation in Kenya were not successful, and 
thus the country has remained highly centralised (Ndii, 2010).   
2.5.1 Functions devolved 
The devolution of Kenya’s health system is ambitious. It absorbs three previous systems of 
administration: provincial, district and local government administrations incorporating them 
into a two-tier system comprising the 47 newly created counties overseen by the national 
Ministry of Health. According to the new Constitution, the newly formed counties are 
responsible for three levels of care: county referral services; primary care services and 
community health services while the national government is responsible for all national 
referral services (Figure 4). The current national health policy (2012-2030) defines national 
referral services as facilities providing highly specialised services and all tertiary level referral 
facilities. County referral services include hospitals managed by the relevant county and are 
composed of the former level four and district level hospitals (both public and private 
facilities). Primary care services include dispensaries, health centres and maternity homes 
(both public and private providers). Community health services include any community-
based demand creation activities that need to be managed at the higher level of the health 
system.  
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Figure 4: Kenya newly reformed health system 
*Source: Kenya Health Policy 2012-2030 (p-13) 
 
The fourth schedule of the Kenyan Constitution provides guidance on the distribution of 
functions between national and county governments including the health sector. The 
national government is responsible for policy formulation, technical assistance to county 
governments and management of national referral services. Following the “Transition to 
Devolved Government Act 2012”, the responsibilities of counties to provide essential health 
services were formally transferred from the national government on 9 August 2013. KSH210 
billion (one-third of the total devolved budget) was designated for health in the financial year 
2013/2014 (Williamson & Mulaki, 2015). However, functions such as procurement 
mechanisms, management of Provincial General Hospitals and financial transfer procedures 
and amounts are not defined in the Fourth Schedule.   
The Constitution also specifies that the transfer of functions from national to county 
government should take no more than three years (KPMG, 2013). Yet, this involves 
establishing an institutional and management structure to coordinate and manage the 
delivery of health services and mandates in counties that range from 100,000 to over 3 
million population per county.  
National Referral Services
Facilities that provide highly specialised services & 
includes all tertiary referral facilities.
County Health Services
Hospitals managed by a given county comprised of the 
former Level 4 & district hospitals (public & private 
providers)
Primary Care Services
Former Level 2 (dispensary), Level 3 (health centres) and 
maternity homes (public & private providers) 
Community Health Services
All community-based demand creation activities, the 
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The National Health Policy (2012-2030) guides the health sector in achieving national health 
goals while implementation of the policy is planned through 5-year mid-term strategic plans. 
The overall aim of the policy is to attain universal health coverage in critical services, with 
targets including 16% improvement in life expectancy; 50% reduction in annual mortality 
from all causes; and a 25% reduction in time lost to ill health by 2030 (MOMS and MOPHS 
2012: 15). All the health policy targets, new health system orientations and devolution 
require that good health system governance is in place to ensure success (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Framework for defining Kenya Health Policy Directions 
 
Source: Kenya National Health Policy 2012-2030 (p-13) 
 
 
2.6 Factors influencing the devolution of health system 
 
Using Bossert’s (2015) framework of decentralisation, four key factors influenced the 
devolution of the Kenyan health system: 1) capacity of the national government, 2) capacity 
of county government, 3) accountability mechanisms in place and 4) decision space which 
the county government received (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Factors influencing devolution of the Kenya health system 
 
Adapted from Bossert (1998) 
 
2.6.1 Capacity of the national government 
 
For the county governments to respond to the newly devolved responsibilities efficiently, 
national government plays a key role supporting the smooth transition of duties to county 
governments. Characteristics of the national government such as its capacity (administrative 
and technical) to support the county governments; motivation and goals; role and influence 
are instrumental to achieving the objectives of the newly devolved health system (Bossert, 
1998).  
2.6.2 Capacity of the county governments 
For a devolved government to be efficient in policy making and implementation, county 
governments should be equipped with adequate resources and capacity (administrative and 
technical) (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 1998). Hence, the characteristics of the devolved 
government such as its capacity to innovate and implement; motivation and goals of the 
county governments; roles and influence are instrumental (Bossert, 1998). In reality, 
counties have different baseline capacities, and historical developmental challenges exist, 
meaning some have further to go than others before they are ready to manage services. 
2.6.3 Accountability mechanisms in place 
Under the devolved health system, there are multiple interactions of actors within the health 
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different health system stakeholders are responsible for their actions. Hence, the structures 
for public accountability mechanisms such as county health management teams, district 
health management boards, facility boards and health centre management committees are 
becoming instrumental in the newly devolved health system.  
2.6.4 Decision space  
With the health system devolution, there is a transfer of responsibility and authority from 
the national to the county governments. Although the county governments wield a 
considerable level of authority due to their independence, they are not completely 
autonomous (Sumah et al., 2016). The “decision space” is defined as the range of effective 
decision making choice allowed by the central authorities (national government) to the local 
authorities (county government) (Bossert, 1998). There are two forms of decision space: 
formal decision space allowed by the rules and regulations which can be enforced; and 
informal decision space which is the actual exercise of authority from what is defined by the 
rules (Bossert, 1998). In the Kenyan health system, three functional areas of decision space 
have been affected by devolution: 1) service organisation; 2) HRH; and 3) financing (Mitchell 
and Bossert, 2010). Table 3 describes the decision space map of three functional areas which 
county governments were given within Kenya health system. Using the decision space 
approach of Bossert (1998), this table does not aim to quantify the formal decision space but 
to provide virtual characteristics of its ranges within three functions of Kenyan health sector.  
The county governments receive moderate decision space to set up the health service 
organisation although they have to follow national programmes within the national norms 
and standards. The county governments also receive moderate decision space in the 
procurement of medicines, supplies and equipment although the procurement should be 
with Kenya Essential Medical Supplies Authority (KEMSA). However, the county governments 
receive full autonomy to manage Level 2 and 3 health facilities (former district and provincial 
hospitals) and to contract organisations such as private providers and laboratories. 
Regarding insurance plans for a service organisation, the county governments have the 
discretion to create, manage or regulate insurance mechanisms with the National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) which is a parastatal organisation. 
Regarding HRH, the county governments receive a wide decision space with full authority to 
hire and fire staff and to decide basic salaries and allowances within the national standards 
and set up terms of employment.  
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
41 | P a g e  
 
For health financing, the county governments receive a wide decision space to prepare own 
budgets although the budgets are subject to approval from the National Treasury. The 
county governments received an equitable share which is composed of a majority of county 
resources and is untied. The county governments are also responsible for tax administration 
while the national government set broad guidelines on county tax resources.   
 
Table 3: Decision space map of the devolved health system in Kenya  
Health sector 
functions 
Decision space Description of county government’s responsibility and 
authority 
Narrow Moderate Wide 
Health service organisation 
Required 
programmes 
   Modify implementation of national programmes and 
need to follow national programmes such as removal of 
user fees, FMS1 policy. 
Hospital 
autonomy 
   Counties have full autonomy to manage Level 2 & 3 
facilities 
Insurance plans    Options to create, manage or regulate insurance 




   Contract with organisations to deliver specified services 
Procurement of 
goods 
   Procure medicines, supplies & equipment locally from 
KEMSA2 
Human resources for health 
Salaries 
 
   Decide basic salaries & allowances within national 
norms 
Contracts    Handle some human resource management functions 
locally. Able to contract staff 
Civil service    Determine terms of employment (recruitment, 








   Determine budgetary allocations for planning, 
budgeting & execution though subject to approval for 
National Treasury. 
1FMS=Free maternity services policy  
2KEMSA=Kenya Essential Medical Supplies Authority 
 
2.7 Challenges to devolution 
 
The existing literature highlights that county governments have limited legislative experience 
and lack the required systems to manage resources efficiently (Williamson & Mulaki, 2015). 
Services were devolved very quickly and some outstanding questions from the health sector 
remain unanswered. Hence, the World Bank described Kenya’s devolution as “one of the 
most ambitious implemented globally” (The World Bank, 2017). Like many developing 
countries which have undergone decentralisation, the capacity gaps of county governments 
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have been a major issue. Kenya is no exception; only a few counties have the administrative 
capacity to absorb the available funds and plan for effective use of these funds (Williamson 
& Mulaki, 2015). Although the national government originally planned to use the three-year 
period for transition, there was no plan for training or mentoring to close the capacity gaps 
(Williamson & Mulaki, 2015).  
Some initial challenges such as the management of provincial general hospitals and 
procurement mechanisms have been resolved. However, there were still unresolved 
problems in the management of HRH (for instance, staff transfer, payment of salaries and 
terms of services). County governments are paying the salaries of the health workers 
seconded to them while the human resource files remain in Nairobi, leaving counties with 
limited information to manage the health workers fully (Williamson & Mulaki, 2015). Thus, 
there have been disputes over the supervision of health works leading to delayed salaries 
and strikes (Williamson & Mulaki, 2015).  
2.8 Why is governance important for the Kenyan health 
system? 
 
The Kenyan health sector is guided by the long-term Kenya health policy (2014-2030) and a 
five-year strategic plan, the Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan (KHSSP). The 
2nd KHSSP (2013-2017) refers to governance and defines it in the same way as WHO and 
other international bodies. To improve the governance of its health system, a draft Kenya 
Health Law has been developed together with multiple health legislations relating to 
different health functions and the establishment of guidelines and structures for governance 
at different implementation levels. Under the comprehensive Bill of Rights in which every 
Kenyan has the right to health, 47 counties are responsible for health service delivery and 
allocation of resources. This new orientation requires restructuring and strengthening of the 
health system to align with the Constitution. The Health Bill is in the process of being updated 
and will consolidate all health-related legislation. The 2nd KHSSP recognises that many 
national referral institutions are still not autonomous as they are still under the direct 
management of the National Ministry.  
Within this devolved health system, good governance is crucial at different levels of the 
health system as the accountability structure has changed with increased responsibilities 
because of devolution. Existing evidence highlights a need to balance decentralisation and 
governance to achieve health system objectives as governance is often overlooked (Mitchell 
and Bossert, 2010). The Government of Kenya acknowledges the importance of governance. 
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Thus, in their 2nd KHSSP, “health leadership and governance” is included as one of the seven 
areas of investment for the country (MOMS and MOPHS, 2013).  
The 2nd KHSSP recommends improving the stewardship role of the Ministry of Health through 
the implementation of the Government agenda. The Kenya health policy 2012-2030 was 
developed to guide MOH stewardship role. The recent merging of the two ministries: the 
Ministry of Public Health/Sanitation and the Ministry of Medical Services into the Ministry of 
Health will also allow for the reduction of unnecessary conflict in implementing stewardship 
functions. However, there are existing and forthcoming challenges to achieve coordinated 
stewardship. 
There is evidence that the Kenya health sector has made major efforts to strengthen 
governance of its health system together with key stakeholders. A “Code of Conduct” for the 
ministries of health (Ministry of Medical Services, Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation) 
has been developed and is in use. The Government of Kenya has set up several joint financing 
agreements with donors to reform its health sector and different mechanisms to improve 
stakeholder participation in health policy, planning and development. However, it will take 
further time to set up the legislative processes needed to manage and coordinate the 
targeted operational plans. 
Thus, understanding the governance of the Kenyan health system at different 
implementation levels becomes crucial. Health system governance was assessed as part of 
the health system assessment carried out in Kenya by the USAID Health System 20/20 project 
in 2010. The project assessed the whole health system and governance was included as one 
of the health system building blocks defined by WHO: health financing, human resources, 
governance, medical products management, health information systems and health service 
delivery. The assessment was conducted at the national level. No additional assessment of 
governance of the Kenyan health system at either national or sub-national level has been 
conducted since the recent devolution.    
2.9 Chapter summary 
There is little information available regarding governance at different levels of Kenya’s health 
system since devolution. Specifically, the situation of health systems governance at the 
county level or below. This study examines governance of the health system in Kenya where 
its new government has promised health system reform with a specific focus on devolution. 
The government realised devolution into action by integrating into the KHSSP (2012-2018) 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
44 | P a g e  
 
proposes a three-pronged strategy for improving its health sector: partnership, governance 
and stewardship.  
Given the factors mentioned above, this study seeks to explore the situation of governance 
at three different levels (national, county and facility) in Kenya focussing on facilities 
designated to provide comprehensive emergency obstetric care (CEmOC). To the best of our 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. Literature review 
This chapter presents a review of the existing literature on governance. To be specific, this 
chapter starts with how governance has been defined by providing an overview of 
governance across disciplines. Governance in health systems is a less developed concept 
compared to the discourse of governance within other disciplines. The concept of 
governance is diffuse, all-encompassing, context specific and complex. To address those gaps 
and to better understand the potential of health system governance, it requires a broader 
engagement within the literature on governance. That is, there is a need to go beyond the 
health systems, specifically it is imperative to understand the theoretical foundations of the 
literature on governance. Therefore, this chapter uses a theory-driven approach to reviewing 
the literature on governance.  
It uses the systematic review method to identify the relevant literature on health system 
governance with specific search strategy, inclusion and exclusion criteria and narrative 
review method to synthesise the findings. Using the systematic review method provides 
clear information on how literature is selected for inclusion in the review in a transparent 
manner. This review method also allows for the periodic update of the search until the time 
of thesis submission.  
The chapter first describes what governance is and how it has been conceptualised in 
different disciplines. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter set out the key background to the 
development of the concepts of governance. Section 3.3 then describes how governance is 
defined specifically in relation to health systems. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to 
an extensive review of the literature, carried out as a systematic review, to identify key 
concepts and principles that inform the application of existing frameworks to assess 
governance in health systems. Section 3.4 describes the methods used to conduct the 
systematic review. Section 3.5 presents findings starting with the critique of different 
frameworks which can be used to assess governance in health systems in Section 3.5.1, 
followed by Section 3.5.2 which presents the findings relating to how those frameworks have 
been applied. Section 3.5.3 discusses the review findings, and Section 3.5.4 draws out the 
main conclusions from the review. The chapter ends by presenting the frameworks chosen 
to inform the research process in this thesis.  
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3.1 What is governance? 
Governance is defined as the rules (both formal and informal) of collective action and 
decision making in a system with diverse players and organisations while no formal control 
mechanism can dictate the relationship among those players and organisations (Chhotray 
and Stoker, 2009). Some authors criticise the concept of governance for being too vague 
(Schneider 2004: 25), and there is confusion over how best to conceptualise it (Kohler-Koch 
and Rittberger 2006:28). Governance has been discussed in many disciplines such as political 
science, economics, social science, development studies and international relations using 
different theories. Governance matters as it is concerned with how different actors in the 
world function and operate and the reasons behind their decisions.  
3.2 Governance across disciplines: An overview 
3.2.1 Governance in political science  
Political scientists believe that governance is not a science which can be “adequately 
captured by laws, statutes or formal constitutions” (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). Governance 
is a system level concept (macro level) in which networks drive systems or societies. A 
network involves multiple nodes (organisations) with many linkages collaborating on 
different activities (McGuire, 2010: 437). The assumption is that passing a law or decree from 
a formal authority cannot ensure the engagement of key actors and negotiation is the key to 
the success of governance within networks (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). A further tenet 
among political scientists is that there are not enough tools to hold people accountable as 
governance is characterised by complicated policy networks and responsibility is diffused 
and shared among many stakeholders (Stoker, 2006).  
There is no single theory of governance in political science as different scholars have used 
various theoretical lenses to examine governance (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009: 26). However, 
political scientists tend to use five key theoretical threads in examining governance: network 
management; delegation and incentive creation; the way interests are created and 
communicated in governance; the theory of bounded rationality; and cultural, institutional 
theory. Recent developments in governance in political science are the increasing role of 
non-governmental actors and how they share the responsibilities with government actors 
(Salamon, 2011: 1611).  
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3.2.2 Governance in new institutional economics  
Governance in new institutional economics focuses on the role of institutions, which shape 
interactions among actors within those institutions (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). The key 
concept is that individuals make rational choices based on the information available to them, 
so in most cases their behaviour is predictable. Further to this, it is assumed that the choices 
made by individuals are partially influenced by the cultural and historical context of their 
environment (North, 1994: 18).  
Choices are made within the context of institutional rules that shape and govern what is 
decided (North, 1994). The word “rules” in new institutional economics has its definition. 
Ostrom (1986) defined rules as the instruction (explicitly or implicitly) to achieve an order 
within defined situations. This concept of governance has received support from other 
disciplines including political science.  
New institutional economists perceive governance as actions which secure voluntary 
cooperation among key actors. Two key concepts within the discipline of new institutional 
economics are “transaction costs” and “collective behaviour”. Ronald Coase (1960) 
highlighted the concept of transaction costs which are the results of incomplete information 
and associated costs (search costs, information costs, bargaining costs, decision costs, 
policing and enforcement costs) to accomplish a transaction. This concept was further 
strengthened by Douglass North (1990) who argued that “institutions are formed to reduce 
uncertainty in human exchange to help reduce the transaction costs”. Based on empirical 
evidence of her own work, Elinor Ostrom (1990) also presented the theory of “common-pool 
resources” which analysed how individuals governed and behaved collectively especially in 
conditions of under-governance. Indeed, new institutional economics is interdisciplinary in 
scope as its concepts are the result of cross fertilising different disciplines such as historians, 
social science, political science and economics (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009).  
 
3.2.3 Governance in development studies 
 
The concept of governance was brought into development studies in the 1990s as there was 
increased recognition of the importance of governance and of the influence of politics on the 
development processes and outcomes (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009: 97). Some failed 
examples of universal free market policies in Africa, Asia and South America highlighted there 
was a need to consider governance structures and processes in development. Hence, 
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governance has received attention in international development, particularly due to the 
movement towards “good governance” in international aid (Lockwood, 2006: 54).  
The World Bank has played a central role in bringing governance into the development 
agenda, introducing the concept of “good governance” in 1989 in a landmark report on 
sustainable growth in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1989: 60). The report encouraged 
many donor countries to be “selective” in providing support to countries with “good policy 
environments” (Chhotray & Stoker 2008). The central argument of governance in 
development is that countries with good governance can effectively rationalise and absorb 
the international aid in more cost-effective and transparent ways (World Bank, 1989). 
Governance in development is perceived as a western concept as good governance is based 
on the experiences of Western contexts (Draude, 2007). As a consequence, it shapes the 
development field significantly. Many donor organisations started to propose measures 
which prescribe conditions for democratic political systems within the recipient countries. 
Therefore, governance has been used as a political tool in international development in many 
ways, although this is often denied (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). 
After the promotion of “good governance” in international development for two decades, 
there have been some critiques of the approach. Kelsall (2011) highlighted the reasons why 
many development programmes adopting the good governance agenda failed to provide 
services effectively or efficiently. Similarly, Booth and Cammack (2013) believed that the 
good governance approach in development oversimplified the concept of governance as the 
focus has been on “principal-agent” theory that assumes problems are caused by 
“asymmetry of information” between the principal and the agents. Booth and Cammack 
(2013) believed that “principal-agent” theory becomes insufficient to solve governance, 
which is a form of collective action. Levy (2014) also shared the same perspective that the 
good governance approach promoted in the World Development Report (2004) from the 
World Bank oversimplified the concept of accountability. The author (Levy, 2014) seems to 
equate governance and accountability, yet they are separate as accountability is a 
component of governance. The principal-agent approach underestimates the potential for 
improvement in service provision as public accountability concept is promoted without 
considering other complementary measures such as context, political leadership, top-down 
pressure and citizens’ interest for improved performance (Levy, 2014). Indeed, a summary 
report from the World Bank acknowledges that the importance of power and politics in 
promoting public accountability as generalised and a one size fits all approach to 
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accountability will not be successful (Devarajan et al., 2011 cited in Booth and Cammack, 
2013).  
3.3 How is Governance defined in health systems? 
 
In relation to health, governance was introduced in the World Health Report in 2000, where 
the World Health Organization (WHO) defined it as ‘stewardship’ and called for strategic 
policy frameworks combined with effective oversight, regulation, incentives and 
accountability. This definition is based on the ideology that a health system can be influenced 
by transparent rules, governed by effective oversight and strong accountability (WHO, 2007). 
More recently, health system governance has been described as ‘an aggregation of 
normative values such as equity and transparency within the political system in which a 
health system functions’ (Balabanova et al., 2013). Governance has received increasing 
attention in the last few decades alongside efforts to strengthen health systems and improve 
health service delivery. Prominent international development partners advocate governance 
as the “most important factor” for poverty alleviation and development (UN Secretary 
General, United Nations 1998).  
More recent definitions of governance seem to recognise the importance of informal actors 
that influence health systems (Siddiqi et al., 2009; Fattore & Tediosi, 2010). Employing the 
institutional analysis approach, Siddiqi et al. (2009) defined governance as “institutions” or 
the rules that shape behaviour and “organisations” which operate within the rules 
(institutions). The institutions composed of both formal and informal rules to carry out key 
functions of a health system. Similarly, the definition of governance by Fattore and Teddiosi 
(2010) include formal and informal laws which ‘direct, administer and control the health 
system’.  
Some studies also consider the context in which key actors of the health sector interact in 
their definitions of governance. For instance, Dieleman et al. (2011) define governance as 
‘the rules that distribute roles and responsibilities among key actors and shape the 
interactions among them’. Dieleman et al. (2011) highlight that most definitions of health 
systems governance focus on aspects of managing systems, and do not explicitly address the 
underlying context of governance.  
Loewenson (2008) believes that research is needed both to explore the principles of 
governance in greater depth and to describe and assess governance more generally to 
identify ways of improving health systems. There is a multitude of frameworks for assessing 
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governance in health systems; these have been developed to try to operationalise and assess 
governance at different levels of a health system. Hence, the summary and critique of 
existing frameworks become essential to understand whether and how they might inform 
the assessment of governance at the operational level of a health system (the health facility). 
In so doing, it is believed that the frameworks can provide direction on what to consider in 
assessing governance for this study. Duran & Saltman (2016) noted hospital governance 
depends on three interrelated levels: macro-level (health system within which the health 
facility operates); meso level (institutional decision making) and micro-level (hospital 
management focussing on day-to-day operations). 
The systematic review discussed below describes and critiques these frameworks and how 
they have been applied in different health systems. The review aims to contribute to the 
knowledge of health system governance through a theory-informed critique.   
3.4 Systematic review of health system governance  
This systematic review was published in a peer review journal, Health Policy and Planning on 
3rd of March 2017 (Pyone, et al., 2017) (Appendix 1). 
3.4.1 Aim and objectives of the systematic review 
 
A systematic review was conducted to identify key concepts and principles that inform the 
application of existing frameworks to assess governance in health systems. The review had 
two objectives:  
1) To identify frameworks that assess health system governance, describe and critique 
how the concept of governance and the theories underpinning it have been applied 
to health systems globally. 
2) To identify how frameworks have been used to assess governance in health systems. 
3.4.2 Search strategy 
Two inclusion criteria were developed in order to meet the review objectives. For the first 
objective, the review included any report or peer reviewed journal article that reported 
frameworks for assessing or defining health systems governance. For the second objective, 
only articles reporting research or application of governance frameworks (Table 4). The 
review was limited to articles reporting on governance frameworks which can be applied to 
the health sector, irrespective of discipline. The search was limited to English language 
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articles between January 1994 (the year when the World Bank introduced the term 
Governance) and July 2017. 
 
Table 4: Inclusion criteria used to select papers for each stated objective 
 
 
The search included five electronic literature databases (Scopus, Medline, CINAHL, Global 
Health Database, Cochrane Library) using keywords combined with the Boolean operators 
(AND, OR). For example, the keywords for governance (governance, leadership, 
accountability, stewardship) were combined with terms relating to the health system 
(healthcare system, healthcare industry, healthcare reform, health system strengthening) 
and terms for frameworks (model, framework, indicator, definition, measure). All the terms 
were searched in abstracts, keywords, subject headings, titles and text words. The medline 
database was searched first and this search strategy was then adapted for use with other 
databases.  
Although Medline is part of the Scopus database, the Scopus database was included as it has 
the largest number of abstracts and citations from different disciplines worldwide. Scopus 
also contains the EMBASE database, and it employs different indexing styles than Medline. 
Scopus also has a specific feature that uses quotation marks “— “,to capture search terms in 
phrases. This saved time by excluding records that were not relevant and not within which 
are not within the scope of this review. For instance, when “health system governance” is 
searched with quotation marks, the search will not capture other irrelevant records which 
are not within the scope of the review such as “health”, “health system” alone. The search 
strategies used in each database, including search terms, search strings and results, are 
outlined in Appendix 2.  
In addition to the database searches, the review also included searches of online archives of 
specific journals publishing research on health systems and policy including Health Policy and 
Objective Inclusion Criteria 
1. Identify frameworks that assess 
governance, describe and critique how the 
concept of governance and the theories 
underpinning it have been applied to 
health systems globally. 
Studies (descriptive, reports of international 
organisations and research institutions) describing or 
reporting on frameworks developed for the 
assessment, conceptualization or description of 
health systems governance. 
2. Identify research that explores 
application of governance frameworks to 
health systems. 
Studies (descriptive, observational, intervention 
studies) that describe the use of governance 
frameworks in the context of health systems or 
services. 
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Planning and Health Policy using “health systems governance” as the key search terms. Web 
portals of institutions including the Basel Institute for Governance; the World Bank and 
USAID Leadership, Management and Governance Project were also searched. Furthermore, 
the reference lists of studies that met the inclusion criteria were searched and the authors 
of identified frameworks were contacted to ask for any unpublished reports considered 
relevant. Responses were received from four out of the five authors contacted and useful 
insights and information were gained on how the authors have applied those frameworks.  
3.4.3 Assessment of quality of included studies 
 
For objective one, the review did not appraise studies reporting frameworks for defining or 
assessing health systems governance, as these were largely descriptive reports. For objective 
two, the review included articles reporting empirical research and assessed the quality of 
these studies using simple criteria based on published checklists (Crombie, 1996). Because 
of diverse study designs, the appraisal of the studies was based on: the description of the 
study (aim, participants, methods, outcomes); the methods (appropriate to the aim, 
selection of participants, valid and reliable data collection methods, and adequate 
description of analysis) and presentation of the study findings. For qualitative studies, the 
assessment included questions about appropriateness and reliability of analysis. For those 
reporting quantitative data, the studies were assessed on the reporting and study 
description including statistical information.  
The review identified a total of 18 empirical studies of which 16 studies were peer-reviewed. 
Among the 18 empirical studies, as per the above credibility criteria, ten were rated as high 
quality, five as medium and three as weak (Appendix 3). All studies provided adequate 
descriptions regarding the background information of the study such as aims, study 
participants, methods employed and their intended measures. Fifteen studies employed 
qualitative methods (interviews, focus group discussions) while one used a quantitative 
method (survey) and three were mixed methods studies. Among them, only 14 studies 
provided information on how study participants were selected. Fourteen studies provided 
information on methods of data analysis. Among 16 studies which used qualitative methods, 
quotes were included in 11 studies, and only two studies (the three conducting statistical 
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3.4.4 Synthesis of review findings 
 
As governance originates from many different disciplines, the review undertakes an in-depth 
analysis offering a theory-informed critique of the frameworks and the literature on 
governance, extending beyond health systems. The findings of included studies were 
synthesised using narrative synthesis which is useful in synthesising different types of studies 
without losing the diversity in study designs and contexts (Wong et al. 2013, Barnett-Page & 
Thomas, 2009, Lucas et al. 2007). Included studies were summarised by the objectives 
presented in the results section, and by grouping them by the discipline from which the 
frameworks originate.  
3.5 Description of included studies 
 
The following section presents findings from the systematic review and is divided into two 
sections: 1) description and critique of governance frameworks by grouping them into the 
disciplines from which the frameworks originate and 2) how those frameworks have been 
applied in the health system.  
 
The review identified a total of 373 articles through database searches and 39 through other 
sources, of which, 39 met the inclusion criteria (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Overview of frameworks identified in the review 
Disciplines Name of the framework (underlying 
theory if any) 
Application in empirical research 
(Author, year) (Country) 
New institutional 
economics 
1. Multilevel framework of Abimbola 
et al. (2014) (Theory of common pool 
resources) 
1. Abimbola, Olanipekun et al., 2015 
(Nigeria);  
2. Abimbola, Olanipekun et al.,2016 
(Nigeria); 
3.Abimbola, Ukwaja et al., 2015 
(Nigeria) 
2. Accountability framework of Baez-
Carmago (2011) (Principal-agent 
theory) 
No 
3. Social accountability framework of 
Baez-Carmago & Jacobs (2013) 
(Principal-agent theory) 
No 
4. Analytical framework of health 
sector governance & private sector of 
Balabanova et al. (2008) 
Balabanova et al. (2008) 
(Afghanistan, India & Uganda) 
5. Brinkerhoff & Bossert’s framework 
(2008, 2013) (Principal-agent theory) 
1. Mutale et al., 2013 (Zambia) 
2. Vian, 2012 (Vietnam) 
3. Vian & Bicknell, 2013 (Lesotho) 
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Disciplines Name of the framework (underlying 
theory if any) 
Application in empirical research 
(Author, year) (Country) 
4.Ramesh et al., 2013 (desk review) 
6. Accountability framework of Cleary 
et al. (2013)  
(Principal-agent theory) 
No (only literature review) 
7. European Commission (2008) 
(Principal-agent theory) 
No 
Political science & 
public 
administration 
1. Health work’s accountability 
framework of Berlan & Shiffman 
(2012) 
No (only literature review) 
2. Accountability assessment 
framework of Brinkerhoff (2004) 
No 
3. Patron-client relationship 





1. Framework of Islam et al (2007) No 
2. Health development governance 
framework of Kirigia & Kirigia (2011) 
No 
3. Framework of Mikkelsen-Lopez et 
al. (2011) 
1. Marais & Petersen, 2015 (South 
Africa)  
2. Petersen et al., 2017 (Ethiopia, 
India, Nepal, Nigeria, South Africa & 
Uganda) 
4. Ibrahim index of African governance Olafsdottir et al., 2011 (secondary 
data analysis) 
Multi-disciplinary  1. Governance framework of Baez-
Carmago & Jacobs (2011) 
Baez-Carmago and Kamujuni (2011) 
(Uganda) 
2. Governance assessment framework 
of Siddiqi et al. (2009) 
1. Siddiqi et al., 2009 (Pakistan) 
2. Abdulmalik et al., 2016 (Nigeria) 
3. Hanlon et al., 2017 (Ethiopia) 
4. Marais & Petersen, 2015 (South 
Africa) 
5. Mugisha et al., 2016 (Uganda) 
6. Petersen et al., 2017 (Ethiopia, 
India, Nepal, Nigeria, South Africa & 
Uganda) 
7. Upadhaya et al., 2017 (Nepal) 
8. Yuan et al., 2017 (only desk 
review) 
3. Cybernetic framework of Smith et 
al. (2012)  
(System theory) 
Smith et al. 2012 (Australia, England, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland) 
4. Vian (2008)’s framework to identify 
corruption in the health sector 
(Theory of institutional analysis-
North,1990) 
No 
5. George et al. (2016)’s accountability 
framework  
Erchick et al., 2017 (Nigeria) 
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Nineteen papers specified frameworks for assessing governance and 18 empirical research 
using frameworks to assess health system governance.  
One previous review on governance (a non peer-reviewed report) was identified. The review 
was conducted to inform the development of a framework which would be specifically used 
in surveys of the countries included in the Health Systems 20/20 project (Shukla & Lassner, 
2012). The report provides an overview of the current literature on governance in the health 
sector. The authors discuss ten principles termed ‘enablers’ in detail and outline existing 
frameworks; highlighting how effective governance is associated with health outcomes in 
three country-level studies. 
3.5.1 Description and critique of governance frameworks 
 
The review identified a total of 19 frameworks to assess governance in health systems; of 
these, seven frameworks were developed based on theories from new institutional 
economics; three informed by political science and public management discipline; four from 
the development literature and five multi-disciplinary approaches (Table 5 and Appendix 4). 
(This differed slightly from the published review paper, Appendix 1, which identified 16 as 
three articles have been added since the paper was accepted for publication in October 
2016.) 
3.5.1.1 Frameworks originating from new institutional economics  
 
Seven frameworks conceptually originate from New Institutional Economics: Abimbola et al. 
(2014); Baez-Carmago (2011) and Baez-Carmago & Jacobs (2013); Balabanova et al. (2008); 
Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008); Cleary et al. (2013); and EC (2008). Among them, six (Baez-
Carmago, 2011; Baez-Carmago & Jacobs, 2013; Balabanova et al., 2008; Brinkerhoff and 
Bossert, 2008; Cleary et al., 2013 and EC, 2008) use “principal-agent” theory while Abimbola 
et al. (2014) uses Ostrom’s theory of “common-pool resources”. 
Principal-agent theory 
In “principal-agent” theory, a “principal” hires or contracts an “agent” to undertake a service 
(Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). Agents may have similar as well as different objectives from 
those of the principal. Agents, usually have more information than the principal, providing 
them with an advantage to pursue their own interests at the expense of the principal. 
Fundamentally, the theory looks at how much of the value that the agent produces should 
go back to him/her in the form of incentives i.e. the agent (healthcare provider) produces 
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certain services for the principal (the government), for which the agent expects some form 
of payment (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). 
Those frameworks assume that governance is the result of interactions among principals and 
agents with diverse interests. Two key assumptions using “principal-agent” theory are 1) 
incentives and sanctions for different key actors to be accountable for their functions; and 
2) information asymmetry and power difference among different groups. Healthcare users 
are normally regarded as “principals” while the state and healthcare providers are “agents” 
providing healthcare services to users (EC 2009, Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2008, 2013, Baez-
Carmago, 2011, Baez-Carmago & Jacobs, 2013 and Cleary et al., 2013).   
The framework by Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008; 2013) is based on a World Bank (2004) 
accountability framework. The framework depicts three principal-agent relationships: 
government and healthcare providers; healthcare providers and citizens; and government 
and citizens (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s health governance framework (2008) 
 
Source: Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008) 
 
The other framework using the “principal-agent” theory is the governance framework of the 
European Commission (2008). The EC (2008) framework aims to assess governance at sector 
level specifically in the context of development and aid assistance worldwide. The EC 
framework considers the importance of context and assessment starts with context analysis 
and stakeholder mapping. Similar to the framework by Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008; 2013), 
the EC framework considers power, interactions and functions of stakeholders as core 
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governance issues, but also includes principles of participation, inclusion, transparency and 
accountability. Among different principles, the framework focuses on accountability among 
different stakeholder groups. Although the framework is intended to be used for 
development and aid assistance, it does not include citizens among the defined clusters of 
stakeholders. The EC (2008) framework has a ready-to-use tool with detailed instructions. 
Examples from previous EC projects globally are provided with suggestions on how to 
improve governance. While the authors do not empirically test the framework, they suggest 
how it might be applied it to a fictional country in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Baez-Carmago (2011) and Baez-Carmago and Jacobs (2013) proposed an analytical 
framework of “social accountability” by adapting the World Bank accountability model 
(World Bank, 2004). Using the “principal-agent” theory, Baez-Carmago (2011) presented 
incentives and sanctions within two routes towards accountability: short (direct) and long 
(indirect) routes. Direct accountability is most suitable in the competitive market where 
citizens can “voice” their preference or choose other alternatives (exit). On the other hand, 
with indirect accountability, the link between citizens and healthcare providers is considered 
‘indirect’ as the government agent is involved in the accountability relationship; citizens hold 
the government agent accountable either through political representation (votes), and the 
government holds healthcare providers accountable to deliver healthcare services. Direct 
accountability has received the most attention as it can be promoted either through citizens’ 
participation in service planning or voicing concern about service providers’ performance 
(voice) or through citizens’ choosing other providers (exit). However, it is important to be 
careful about applying the concept of direct accountability to health care in settings where 
market competition fails to provide healthcare services to the most vulnerable groups. The 
authors include tools for key informant interviews.  
“Health sector governance and the private sector” framework of Balabanova et al. (2008) 
uses principal-agent theory focussing on the role of private sector in a health system. The 
principal concept of the framework assumes that with the increasing role played by the 
private sector, the government should take the stewardship role to protect the public 
interest by working together with the private sector. The framework includes a set of 
indicators of progress based on three key areas to assess the role of government in relation 
to the private sector - protecting public interest; working with private sector and learning 
from each other. The framework uses two principal-agent relationships: between the private 
sector and government, private sector and donors and government and donors in terms of 
three key principles: the rule of law, participation/rule of engagement and accountability. 
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Although they have placed citizens or service users central to their framework, the 
relationship between citizens and three groups of key stakeholders is not clarified. 
Another framework using “principal-agent” theory is the accountability assessment 
framework for low-and middle-income countries developed by Cleary et al. (2013). By 
adopting the Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008) framework, the authors emphasise the 
accountability pathways among three groups of key actors (politicians/policy makers; 
healthcare providers and citizens). The Cleary framework claims to assess both external and 
internal accountability mechanisms via three critical factors: resources, attitudes and values. 
The authors highlight that adequate resources are critical for proper health system 
functioning while it is important to understand the attitudes of healthcare providers and 
policy makers without neglecting the values of citizens. 
Theory of common-pool resources 
This review identified one framework which uses theory derived primarily from new 
institutional economics; Ostrom’s theory of “common-pool resources” (Ostrom, 1990). This 
theory describes governance as an autonomous system with self-governing networks (or 
systems) of actors (Stoker, 1998). The theory assumes that actors in self-governing networks 
can not only influence government policy, but can also take over some of the business of the 
government (Stoker, 1998). Ostrom’s theory focuses on creating different institutional 
arrangements to manage open resources which are finite. Communities can form self-
organized networks or systems composed of interested actors who will develop incentives 
and sanctions to manage the resources on their own (Stoker, 1998). The theory assumes that 
self-organized systems are more effective than regulation imposed by the government as 
there will be increased availability of information and reduced transaction costs (Stoker, 
1998). Indeed, the theory postulates that in situations where the government is “under-
governed”, social norms fill those gaps (Olivier de Sardan, 2015). A similar assumption is 
highlighted by Dixit (2009) as civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations 
emerge to fill gaps in functioning when government organisations serve poorly. The theory 
proposes that there are three levels of a common-pool resource problem: 1) an operational 
level where the working rules are set, 2) a collective level where communities set their own 
rules, and 3) a constitutional level from where the set rules originate (Ostrom, 1990:45). 
Using Ostrom’s theory of “common-pool resources”, Abimbola et al. (2014) developed a 
multilevel framework to analyse primary healthcare governance in low-and middle-income 
countries. The authors borrowed the concept of “governing without government” in 
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situations where overall governance situations are not functioning. In such situations, 
communities with similar interests may develop their own rules and arrangements to 
manage the common-pool. Ostrom argued that self-governing arrangements lead individuals 
or groups to cope with problems by constantly going back and forth across levels as their key 
strategy. Abimbola’s framework describes the three collective levels of health system 
hierarchy as: 1) operational (citizens and healthcare providers), 2) collective (community 
groups) and 3) constitutional governances (governments at different levels). A multilevel 
framework is believed to be more effective at assessing governance than a single unit 
assessment. Operational and collective governance can mitigate the failure of constitutional 
governance; although, there is some overlapping of roles and responsibilities. 
3.5.1.2 Frameworks originating from political science and public administration 
 
Three frameworks conceptually originate from political science and public administration 
disciplines: Berlan and Shiffman (2012), Brinkerhoff (2004) and Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 
(2004). None of the frameworks mentions theories on which their frameworks are based. 
The concept of governance for political scientists focuses on “formal institutions, 
accountability, trust and legitimacy” for governance (Pierre and Peters, 2005:5). They are 
interested to see how collective decisions are made among key actors (both government and 
non-government actors) with different power (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). Thus, 
governance theories from political science and public administration focuses on both inputs 
(the processes) and outputs (results of governing networks) (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). 
Berlan and Shiffman’s framework (2011) assumes that healthcare providers in low-and 
middle-income countries have limited accountability to their consumers because of both 
health system and social factors. Oversight mechanisms, revenue source and nature of 
competition are related to the health system while consumer power and provider norms are 
considered under social factors. Their framework helps to identify factors which shape the 
accountability of healthcare providers. Social interactions and norms operating within the 
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Table 6: Berlan & Shiffman’s framework of accountability of health workers 
Factors influencing health 
workers’ accountability 
Description of factors 
Health system factors  
Oversight mechanisms The actors and systems that supervise providers. 
Revenue source How health care is financed. 
Nature of competition The extent to which the private & non-profit sectors are 
involved in providing health care. 
Social factors  
Consumer power Resources, including information, are available to consumers to 
influence providers. 
Provider norms Provider beliefs concerning accountability to consumers 
 
Brinkerhoff’s framework (2004) is also based on accountability and aims to map out public 
accountability mechanisms: financial, performance and political accountability. In this 
framework, performance accountability is defined as agreed upon targets which should 
theoretically be responsive to the needs of the citizens. Political accountability emphasises 
that electoral promises made by the government should be fulfilled. Brinkerhoff highlights 
the need to map out the accountability linkages among key actors and to examine actors’ 
interactions as too few linkages can lead to corruption while too many can undermine 
accountability effectiveness. Together with his framework, Brinkerhoff proposes three 
strategies to strengthen accountability: 1) addressing fraud, misuse of resources and 
corruption; 2) assuring compliance with procedures and standards and 3) improving 
performance. The framework includes an accountability assessment matrix which allows the 
user to rate accountability linkages among key actors. 
The other framework that draws on political science assesses the patron-client relationship 
or clientelism in health systems (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2014). Despite the unpopularity 
of clientelism, it is regarded as an essential principle of governance which can affect 
corruption and accountability mostly at macro/ national level. The purpose of the framework 
is to identify reasons why clientelistic practices persist and the authors use a realist 
evaluation approach comprising of context, actions (mechanisms) and outcomes. Although 
the framework has not been used in the field, the authors present a diagnostic framework 
with sample questionnaires.  
 
3.5.1.3 Frameworks originating from international development 
 
In the development literature, governance focuses on predefined principles which 
development specialists believe to be critical for “good governance” in aid assistance. 
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Governance in development comprises different functions of governance which are 
commonly described as ‘principles’, ‘concepts’, ‘dimensions’, ‘components’ or ‘attributes’; 
terms that tend to be used synonymously. In this study, the term ‘principles’ will be used. 
Accountability is the most frequently cited principle in development followed by control of 
corruption, transparency, participation and inclusiveness.  
The four frameworks identified (Ibrahim, 2007, Islam et al., 2007, Kirigia and Kirigia, 2011, 
Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011) focus primarily on how governance is defined, how it can 
facilitate effective aid policy, and, unlike any of the other frameworks, those in international 
development are concerned with how governance can be measured. Kauffman and Kraay 
(2007) propose measuring governance in two ways using rule-based measures (e.g. policy or 
procedure exists) and outcome-based measures (e.g. the policy has been implemented, or 
the rule has been enforced) (Chhotray and Stoker 2009).  
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2007) was developed by the Harvard Kennedy 
School of Government with support from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The aim of the Index 
is to evaluate the quality of governance in sub-Saharan African countries. The purpose is to 
diagnose governance of African governments as the developers of the Ibrahim Index believe 
that governance is the result of government performance (Rotberg, 2009). Developers of the 
Ibrahim Index argued that the existing approaches to measuring governance are subjective 
as they are based on perceptions or expert judgements. The existing approaches such as the 
World Bank Governance Index, Freedom House measure of democracy and the Anti-
Corruption Index from Transparency International use subjective measures to score 
principles of governance (Rotberg, 2009). Those indices also measure only principles of 
governance using input-based measures which may or may not measure governance 
performance (Rotberg, 2009). The Ibrahim Index developers believe that their indicators are 
objectively set, transparent and output-based measures which can be replicated following 
the same approach. The Index has 57 variables which can be grouped into 14 categories 
summarised into the following four dimensions: 1) safety and the rule of law; 2) participation 
and human rights; 3) sustainable economic opportunity; and 4) human development. 
Islam et al. (2007) present a health system assessment manual which includes a framework 
to assess governance, developed under the Health Systems 20/20 project (USAID). The aim 
is to guide data collection providing a rapid but comprehensive assessment of key health 
system functions based on the WHO six domains of the health system (WHO, 2007). This 
framework groups indicators into general governance (e.g. voice and accountability; political 
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stability; government effectiveness; the rule of law; regulatory quality and control of 
corruption) and health system specific governance (e.g. information/assessment capacity; 
policy formulation and planning; social participation and system responsiveness; 
accountability and regulation). The authors suggest various sources of data for the different 
indicators, including interviews with relevant key stakeholders and desk-based review of 
relevant documents and reports.  
Another framework that attempts to measure governance is the one based upon Siddiqi et 
al. (2009), which also includes principles of macroeconomic and political stability (Kirigia and 
Kirigia, 2011). The authors emphasise that development in health cannot occur without 
political and economic stability in the form of a national economic development plan or 
poverty reduction strategy, a medium-term government expenditure framework, and a non-
violent electoral process. The authors argue that individual and aggregate scores of 
governance are needed to alert policy makers to the areas needing improvement. This is one 
of the few frameworks identified in this review which tries to quantify governance by using 
rule-based measures such as the existence of certain policy or guidelines. The authors 
propose a scoring system that determines whether governance is very poor (0%) or excellent 
(100%) for each function. Kirigia and Kirigia (2011) argue that scoring allows assessors to 
identify areas for improvement, and an index representing the overall governance situation 
in any given country can be calculated. 
The final framework (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011) is based on systems thinking and uses a 
problem-driven approach to assessing governance in relation to an identified problem to 
highlight the barriers to good governance. The framework assesses governance in all four 
levels of a health system (national, district, facility and community) using the established 
WHO Health System Building Blocks and five proposed principles of governance: 1) strategic 
vision and policy design; 2) participation and consensus orientation; 3) accountability; 4) 
transparency and 5) control of corruption (Figure 8). The authors argue that it will be difficult 
to improve governance in the absence of the essential health system building blocks such as 
adequate financing and sufficient medical supplies. The authors developed this framework 
in response to other governance frameworks that provide snapshots of any given 
governance situation, but are unable to identify specific areas of weakness and how to 
intervene. However, despite providing a way to identify barriers to good governance, the 
framework does not easily allow for comparisons between different contexts. 
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Figure 8: The framework of Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. (2011) 
 
Source: Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. (2011) 
 
3.5.1.4 Multi-disciplinary frameworks  
 
Five frameworks appear to be based on principles of more than one discipline (Baez Carmago 
and Jacobs, 2011; George et al., 2017; Siddiqi et al., 2009; Vian, 2008; Smith et al., 2012). 
Three of these (Baez Carmago and Jacobs, 2011; Siddiqi et al., 2009; Vian, 2008) draw on the 
“Institutional Analysis” theory of North (1990), originally derived from new institutional 
economics. The frameworks also seem to reflect predefined governance principles in line 
with the international development literature.  
Theory of “institutional analysis” 
North’s (1990) theory of institutional analysis assumes that markets are created and 
maintained by institutions. North defined institutions as the “rules of the game” and 
organisations as the “players”. Institutions consist of formal rules and informal constraints 
while organisations consist of groups of individuals with common objectives. North’s 
principal argument is that individuals within an institution have certain opportunities which 
are the result of specific formal and informal constraints that constitute the institutions. 
Hodgson’s (2006) examples of institutional arrangements embedded within the social 
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systems are marriage and religion (social arrangements); universities (social organisations) 
as institutions are a form of “social rule-systems”.  
The distinction between institutions and organisations of North (1994) is acknowledged in 
the World Health Report of WHO (2000: 61). The report echoes the definitions of North 
(1994) as it states: “Organisations are the players, for example, individual providers, 
hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and public health programmes. Institutions are the rules 
(formal rules and informal customs) - the socially shared constraints that shape human 
interactions, along with the mechanisms by which these rules are enforced”.  
Using the theory of North (1990), Baez Carmago and Jacobs (2011), Siddiqi et al. (2009) and 
Vian (2008) highlighted that institutional analysis is key to assessing governance to 
understand the institutional arrangement and rules set by the organisations. A mapping of 
the power distribution can be used to identify the key decision makers who affect the 
behaviour of health system actors. 
In addition to the application of North’s theory of institution analysis, Siddiqi et al. (2009) 
propose a comprehensive framework to assess governance based on the UNDP principles of 
governance. This framework includes ten principles, disaggregated into 63 broad questions 
under three relevant domains: context, processes and outcomes. In conceptualising 
governance in this way, the authors suggest that their framework could be used to compare 
governance functions across countries. The framework is intended for use at both national 
(policy formulation) and sub-national levels (policy implementation and health facility levels) 
to assess all essential principles of health systems governance; something which other 
frameworks do not aim to do. The potential for application of the framework at subnational 
level is a unique feature as most other governance frameworks are developed for macro-
level assessment except the multilevel framework.  
Baez-Carmago and Jacobs (2011) propose an “inputs, processes and outputs” framework for 
health systems governance in low-income countries (Figure 9). The authors acknowledge the 
existence of other frameworks to assess health systems but set theirs apart by focussing on 
generating information on the complex context within which the health system operates. 
The framework draws on the values of good governance articulated in the development 
literature, and “institutional analysis” to map out key stakeholders and the power 
distribution among them. The framework is presented as a visual process map of causal links 
between inputs, processes and outcomes, which they believe helps to provide a better 
explanation of governance and easier application of the framework. The authors provide a 
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detailed methodology, tools and procedures for using the framework in practice, but 
acknowledge that their model cannot assess health systems governance in its entirety. It is 
recommended for use in contexts where a problem has first been identified. 
 
Figure 9. Baez-Carmago & Jacobs’s framework (2011) 
 
Source: Baez-Carmago and Jacobs (2011) 
 
Vian (2008)’s framework specifically analyses corruption in the health system from the 
perspective of the government (Figure 10). Vian’s framework draws on North’s principal 
argument that key players in the health system have certain opportunities which are the 
product of formal and informal rules and constraints set by institutions (North 1990). The 
author also employs “principal-agent” theory as the framework considers asymmetric 
information among different actors with diverse interests within a health system. The 
framework assumes that corruption in the health sector is driven by pressures of 
government agents to abuse, the opportunity to abuse and social factors supporting the 
abuse of the system. Therefore, the framework is diagnostic as it aims to identify potential 
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Figure 10: Vian’s framework to assess corruption in health system (2008) 
 
Source: Vian (2008) 
 
George et al. (2016) developed an accountability framework from the viewpoint of 
government officials composed of three counterbalancing axes which mutually reinforce 
each other: axis of power (incentives & sanctions), axis of ability (formal & informal rules) 
and axis of justice (political leadership, community ownership & social equity). The 
framework was developed based on consensus obtained through stakeholders’ workshop in 
Nigeria.  
Smith et al. (2012) describe a “cybernetic” framework for leadership and governance which 
uses systems theory. This theory is interdisciplinary and is concerned with discovering 
patterns in the way systems (including health systems) operate. Smith et al. consider it 
important to view governance as hierarchical (rules and responsibilities for allocating 
resources) and horizontal (both incentives and the market regulate purchasing power, and 
systems produce common values and knowledge through professional norms). Cybernetics 
focuses on how systems use information, and how systems monitor actions to steer towards 
their goals. The framework includes three key principles related to this: setting priorities, 
accountability (inputs into the health system) and performance monitoring (output). The 
framework focused on the leadership principle of governance and was developed for use in 
health systems in high-income countries, so would require adaptation to low-and middle-
income settings. 
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3.5.2 How frameworks have been applied in health systems 
 
Among the 19 frameworks identified that can be used to access health system governance, 
nine (Baez Carmago and Jacobs 2011, Balabanova et al., 2008, Ibrahim Index 2007, Siddiqi et 
al., 2009, Smith et al., 2013, Brinkerhoff & Bossert 2008, Mikkelsen Lopez et al., 2011, 
Abimbola et al., 2013 and George et al., 2016) have been described in 21 publications of 
which 18 are empirical research. Appendix 5 summarises the frameworks applied and groups 
them into different theories.  
Among the 21 publications in which frameworks have been applied, eight use “principal-
agent” theory; three “common-pool resources”; ten institutional analysis approach; one 
“Ibrahim index of governance” and one uses “cybernetics” theory. 
3.5.2.1 Studies which used “principal-agent” theory 
Among frameworks using “principal-agent theory”, Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s framework 
(Figure 7) was most commonly applied in four studies (Mutale et al., 2013, Cleary et al., 2013, 
Ramesh et al., 2013 and Vian et al., 2012) while the other four (Avelino et al., 2013, 
Balabanova et al., 2008, Huss et al., 2011 and Vian & Bicknell, 2013) used a variant of 
“principal-agent” theory. The USAID health system assessment team also used Brinkerhoff & 
Bossert’s governance framework in their manual for assessing health systems. According to 
Health Systems 20/20, the manual is currently used in 23 Health Systems 20/20 projects 
funded by the USAID in countries in Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa, as well as the 
Caribbean Islands (Health Systems 20/20, 2012). 
Mutale et al. (2013) adapted Brinkerhoff & Bossert’s framework to assess governance at 
health facility level in Zambia while Ramesh et al. (2013) used the framework to assess health 
system governance at the national level in China. Ramesh et al. use principal-agent theory to 
identify institutional relationships among principal and agent; capacities of principal-agent; 
information asymmetry and power differences; and incentives which shape preferences and 
behaviour of principal and agent.  
Cleary et al. (2014) adapted Brinkerhoff & Bossert’s framework to assess accountability 
mechanisms of health systems in low-and middle-income countries. Cleary et al. focussed on 
two key areas: 1) identifying incentives and sanctions for health workers to be accountable 
and 2) power differences in both vertical and horizontal accountability linkages within a 
health system.  
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Vian et al. (2012) employed Brinkerhoff & Bossert’s framework to assess corruption in the 
Vietnamese health system. Vian et al. examined institutional arrangements (including 
informal payment mechanisms); how rules against corruption were enforced and 
information asymmetry. The framework also helped the authors identify incentives and 
motivation among key health system actors such as financial incentives for healthcare 
providers to over-treat and profit motivation within the public health system including 
accountability for performance.  
Balabanova et al. (2008) applied their own framework to assess the role of the private sector 
in three countries: Afghanistan, India and Uganda. The authors use the framework for 
diagnostic purposes to highlight the role of the private sector in health system governance 
particularly from the following three aspects: how the government regulates, receives 
contributions for health sector financing and provides a stewardship role to the private 
sector. 
Three other studies (Avelino et al., 2013, Huss et al., 2011 and Vian & Bicknell, 2013) applied 
“principal-agent” theory to assess governance in Brazil, India and Lesotho, respectively. Huss 
et al. (2011) applied a variant of the “principal-agent” model in their assessment of 
governance focussing on corruption in Karnataka State, India. Contrary to the traditional 
application of “principal-agent”, Huss et al. refer to the “state” as “principal” while “public 
service providers” are “agents” to deliver certain services for “citizens”. Huss et al. (2011)’s 
application of the principal-agent theory focuses on the roles and capacities of principals and 
agents within the state health system.  
Avelino et al. (2013) also applied principal-agent theory and focussed on interactions 
between the principal (municipal governments and federal government) and agents 
(municipal health councils), specifically exploring accountability arrangements to avoid 
corruption within the decentralised arrangement. They used the audit data and regression 
analysis to assess capacities of agents (municipals) and institutional arrangements which 
promote accountability such as open electoral process, federal audits and local oversight 
mechanisms.  
All studies used two principal-agent relationships - between citizens and government and 
between government and healthcare providers except Vian and Bicknell (2013) and Mutale 
et al. (2013) who use single principal-agent model (state - healthcare provider and healthcare 
provider – communities, respectively). The studies consider the strategies of how those two 
sets of players (principal and agent) engage and interact to accomplish a collective effort. 
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The studies also highlighted the importance of information asymmetry among principals and 
agents as the agents know about a service in question better than the principal. 
3.5.2.2 Studies which used the “multilevel framework” of governance 
 
Three studies (Abimbola et al., 2015, Abimbola; Olanipekun et al., 2015; 2016) have applied 
the “multilevel framework” of governance developed by Abimbola et al. (2014).  
Abimbola et al. (2015) adapted the “multilevel framework” to identify the effect of 
decentralisation on retention of primary healthcare (PHC) workers in Nigeria. The framework 
was used to assess government, communities and intrinsic health workers’ factors 
influencing retention of PHC workers in the decentralised health system. The framework 
helped identify incentives and motivation of PHC workers and the reasons to remain in post 
despite socioeconomic hardships.  
The “multilevel framework” was also applied in another publication by Abimbola; 
Olanipekun et al. (2015) to provide recommendations to improve health system governance 
at operational level among tuberculosis (TB) patients in Nigeria. The framework was used to 
assess three different levels of governance: constitutional (federal government); collective 
(communities) and operational (healthcare providers at local health market). In that study, 
the concept of Williamson’s Transaction Cost Theory (1979) was used to identify the costs 
incurred by TB patients to receive an appropriate anti-TB treatment from a qualified provider 
within the health system (Abimbola; Olanipekun et al., 2015). Transaction costs are difficult 
to measure. Thus, Williamson suggested considering “the issues of governance 
comparatively”. The central argument of Williamson’s theory is that “high transaction costs” 
can be attributed to governance failure which, requires looking for alternative modes of 
governance to “economise” results (Williamson, 1979). 
In a third study, Abimbola; Olanipekun et al. (2016) used Abimbola’s multilevel framework 
of PHC governance to identify factors influencing policies of posting and transfer of public 
health workers under the conditions when there is a lack of formal national policies to post 
and transfer health workers in Nigeria. The interactions among federal, state and local 
governments are referred to as constitutional governance while factors influencing decisions 
of communities as collective governance and interactions between PHC workers and 
individual community members as operational governance. The framework helps to identify 
different informal mechanisms at multiple levels of the health system and how key health 
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system actors use their power and decision space in posting and transfer of public health 
workers.  
In all three studies, self-governing individuals at three levels of a system are trying to 
overcome a common problem by identifying the ways which are workable for them.  
3.5.2.3 Studies which used institutional analysis approach 
Siddiqi et al. (2009) used their own framework to assess governance of the health system in 
Pakistan and explored governance principles in depth by using qualitative interviews. The 
authors assessed three different levels of the health system - national (policy formulation) 
and sub-national levels (policy implementation and health facility levels). The authors 
highlighted the importance of understanding the socio-political context of a country and 
show that the principles of health systems governance are value driven. Siddiqi et al. also 
emphasise that health system governance can be improved without improving the overall 
governance of a country. 
Siddiqi et al. ’s framework (2009) was adopted in the European Union - funded consortium 
project called “Emerald” to assess mental health system governance in Africa and South Asia 
(Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda) (Abdulmalik et al., 2016; Hanlon et 
al., 2017; Marais & Petersen, 2015; Mugisha et al., 2016; Petersen et al., 2017). The authors 
adapted this framework as it could assess governance at different levels of a health system 
hierarchy. Mikkelsen Lopez et al.’s (2011) framework was also adapted for use in South Africa 
and crosscountry comparison (Petersen et al., 2017) to identify key health system building 
blocks such as financing, HRH, medicines, supplies and equipment impeding governance. The 
authors employed qualitative research methods not only to assess mental health governance 
of individual countries but to compare governance principles across the six participating 
countries.  
Yuan et al. (2017) also employed the framework of Siddiqi et al. (2009) to assess two rural 
health insurance policies in China. The authors used desk review of publications regarding 
the two policies. The aim was to fulfil the research gaps in understanding of the formulation 
and implementation of those two schemes through identifying common features of 
governance. Of the ten Siddiqi’s principles, the authors explored six operational principles: 
policy guidance & vision; system design; regulation & management capacity; accountability 
& transparency; intelligence & oversight and collaboration & coalition building. The study 
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highlights the importance of health system governance in conceptualisation and 
implementation of such schemes.  
Baez-Carmago and Kamujuni (2011) conducted an assessment of the governance of the 
public-sector drug management system in Uganda using the framework of Baez-Carmago 
and Jacobs (2011). The assessment started with institutional mapping which included 
interviews with both the formal and informal sectors of the supply chain in Uganda. Focus 
group discussions were also conducted with healthcare providers, patients and 
representatives of patient advocacy groups. 
Erchick et al. (2017) adopted three-dimensional axes of the accountability framework 
developed by George et al. (2016) to explore the perspectives of government officials 
involved in a routine immunisation programme at Niger state in Nigeria. The authors used 
the three-dimensional accountability axes (axes of power, ability and justice) in developing 
tools for interviews with government officials for diagnosis of accountability challenges 
within the routine immunisation programme.  
3.5.2.4 Studies which used other types of framework 
Smith et al. (2012) applied their cybernetic framework at the national level to seven health 
systems (Australia, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) 
in high-income settings. The framework is composed of three key nodes of governance: 
setting priorities, accountability and performance monitoring which serve as the guiding 
principles in assessing hierarchy, market and network governance. One important lesson 
highlighted by the authors is that competency and capacity at different levels of a health 
system are crucial for successful implementation of leadership and governance model. 
Olafsdottir et al. (2011) used the Ibrahim Index of African Governance to explore the 
relationship between governance and health outcomes in 46 countries from the WHO Africa 
Region. The authors conducted an ecological analysis using secondary data. As the Ibrahim 
Index was initially used to measure governance of a government, Olafsdottir et al. (2011) 
only used two sub-indicators of the Ibrahim Index namely RLTC: Rule of Law, Transparency 
and Corruption and SEO: sustainable economic opportunity.  
3.5.3 Discussion of the review findings  
 
This systematic review brings together the literature on health systems governance, firstly 
by describing and critiquing how the concept of governance and the theories underpinning 
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it have been applied to health systems, and secondly by identifying which frameworks have 
been used to assess health systems governance, and how, globally. A total of 19 frameworks 
were identified, which in principle, can be used at national (policy formulation) and 
subnational (policy implementation) levels of a health system. Frameworks originate mainly 
from three disciplines: new institutional economics; political science and public 
administration; and the international development literature. The most commonly used 
theories which underpin the frameworks originate from new institutional economics and 
include “principal-agent” theory, North’s theory of institutional analysis and Ostrom’s theory 
of “common-pool resources”.  
 
Frameworks that originate from the development literature tend to predefine principles of 
governance and attempt to measure these (e.g. Kirigi & Kirigia, 2011). Most frameworks 
assess overall governance while some of them assess specific principles of governance such 
as accountability, control of corruption and participation. Most frameworks assess 
governance in health systems using the qualitative methodology, based on the premise that 
governance is the result of interactions among different actors within a health system, and 
that studying the reasons for and the extent of interaction can be used to document good 
governance. Other authors propose using mixed methods; collecting data on framework 
indicators (e.g. Mutale et al., 2013) in combination with an in-depth exploration of specific 
problems identified.  
There are three frameworks that have been used to assess governance at all levels of the 
health system; Abimbola et al. (2014), Siddiqi et al. (2009) and Brinkerhoff and Bossert 
(2008). Governance is a practice, dependent on arrangements set at a political or national 
level, but which needs to be operationalised by individuals at lower levels in the health 
system; multilevel frameworks acknowledge this and recognise the importance of actors at 
different levels. Some assessment frameworks explicitly mention the pre-requisites needed 
for the successful application, such as the framework by Baez-Carmago and Jacobs (2011) 
which requires that a governance problem has been identified already, and the cybernetic 
model presented by Smith et al. (2013) requires users’ familiarity with the health system.  
This review also illustrates that health system governance is complex and difficult to assess; 
the concept of governance originates from different disciplines and is multidimensional. 
Governance more generally has been debated and studied from many different perspectives. 
This review attempts to synthesise how these perspectives have led to the development of 
governance in health systems. The critical analysis shows that frameworks for assessing 
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governance may be applicable in one setting but not another. There is no single, agreed 
framework that can serve all purposes as the concept of governance will likely continue to 
be interpreted openly and flexibly. However, for governance principles to contribute to 
health system strengthening in countries, and ultimately to impact on outcomes, it is critical 
to at least assess and monitor if and how governance works (or not) in practice. As each 
health system operates in its context, and different components of governance may need to 
be prioritised over others in different settings and at different times, it is important that any 
governance assessment recognises the circumstances and has a clear purpose. Assessing 
health systems governance can raise awareness of its importance to health policy makers, 
identify problems, or, conversely, document success stories. This can encourage and catalyse 
improvement in health systems. The aim of this review was to provide an overview of 
frameworks available and describe how they have been developed, adapted or applied to 
assess health systems governance in operation. The review recognises that the main utility 
of the synthesis is not to identify features of a single agreed framework, rather the 
frameworks identified and reviewed can help assessors to identify relevant questions to ask 
of health systems governance, and identify elements that could be included in an 
assessment.  
Outside of the limited evidence on how governance can be assessed in health systems, this 
review also highlights examples of how governance has been assessed in other disciplines. 
Both rules-based and outcomes-based approaches to assess governance have been critiqued 
for their limitations as they largely depend on how and what you propose to measure 
(Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). Though such assessments provide valuable insights, the 
approach is somehow limited as it often fails to be explicit about how things are measured 
(Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). This highlights that it is more important but difficult to identify 
what governance arrangements are considered appropriate for a context (prescriptive 
measures) than to judge the governance of a system (diagnostic measures) (Chhotray and 
Stoker, 2009).  
Aside from providing a comprehensive overview and critical evaluation of the literature on 
governance frameworks to inform this study, the findings of this review could help to inform 
discussions among policy makers in countries considering governance as a mechanism to 
support health systems strengthening. The example can be seen in the Emerald project 
where the governance of mental health system was assessed to improve mental health in 
Africa and South Asia. Findings will help decision makers form a view on what governance is, 
and which principles are important in their context. Policy implementers at a more local level 
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may choose and adopt one of the available frameworks or tools to assess governance and 
identify gaps in governance arrangements.   
3.5.4 Conclusion of the review 
A variety of frameworks to assess health systems governance exist, but there are not many 
examples of their application in the literature. There is a need to validate and apply the 
existing frameworks and share lessons learnt regarding which frameworks work well in which 
settings to inform how existing frameworks can be adapted. A comprehensive assessment 
of governance could enable policy makers to prioritise solutions for problems identified as 
well as replicate and scale-up examples of good practice. Governance is not an apolitical 
process, and there are no absolute principles that define governance; it is a diffuse concept 
that cuts across disciplines and borrows from a range of social science theories. However, 
whether it is applied to health systems or political science, governance is concerned with 
how different actors in each system or organisation function and operate and the reasons 
for this. In the context of health systems governance, a multi-disciplinary approach to 
assessment is necessary.  
3.6 Implications of the review findings for the thesis approach  
Previous sections have presented a review of frameworks which can be used to assess 
governance within a health system, and some of which have been applied in health systems 
across the world. A framework is an analytical tool which can be used to identify elements 
and relationships among these elements and can be used to inform analysis (Ostrom 
2005:28). The overarching purpose of conducting the systematic review was to help set the 
thesis topic in the context of related work, but also inform the development of the methods 
and approach taken in this thesis. Specifically, the literature reviewed in this chapter was 
used to a) identify the concepts and principles considered important in assessing governance 
in this study context and subsequent development of data collection tools and b) identify the 
key theories underpinning governance that could provide a structure for analysis and 
interpretation of the data collected.  
Among the above frameworks identified, two frameworks, Baez-Carmago & Jacobs, 2011 
and Siddiqi et al., 2009, were found to be relevant for this study. Both frameworks have been 
applied in health system research (health policy formulation and implementation levels) in 
low-and middle-income countries. Both are multi-disciplinary frameworks originate from 
new institutional economics and international development.  
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Therefore, I further explored the new institutional economics and development literature 
for inspiration on how governance has been studied within those disciplines. I also contacted 
the authors of both frameworks to understand how they had applied them empirically in 
public health settings. After discussion with my supervisors, I then decided to apply those 
frameworks in this thesis.   
The rationale of applying Baez-Carmago and Jacobs’ framework in this study is pragmatic as 
the assessment starts with an identified problem of health system performance. In this study, 
the starting point is the functionality of health facilities which are measured in terms of signal 
function availability. Adapting Baez-Carmago and Jacobs’ framework contributed this study 
with an in-depth understanding of the governance problems. The framework of Siddiqi et al. 
(2009) was also adapted to highlight the importance of hierarchical governance, teasing out 
different levels of a health system: health policy formulation at national and county levels 
and policy implementation at the facility level.  
As the systematic review findings highlight, most frameworks originating from the 
development literature tend to focus on “good governance” and a “government-centered 
approach” with the attempt to measure or quantify governance but without much insight on 
why and how governance functions at different levels. The frameworks adopted in this thesis 
are a departure from that approach as the frameworks are qualitative in nature with the 
possibility to provide more in-depth analysis at different levels of a health system. Both Baez-
Carmago & Jacobs (2011) and Siddiqi et al. (2009) frameworks can be used for in-depth 
analysis of internal workings of different organisations, in addition to the government, within 
a health system including health facilities. This study wanted to explore in-depth the 
principles of governance at different levels of the Kenyan health system. The framework 
adopted in this thesis incorporates six principles of governance (strategic vision; the rule of 
law; participation and consensus orientation; accountability; responsiveness; and equity) 
(Figure 11). The data collection tool, topic guide was developed based on these six principles 
of governance.  
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Figure 11. Framework developed and used in this study 
 
 
Most importantly, the two adapted frameworks use North’s (1990) theory of institutional 
analysis to explore both formal and informal institutions influencing the governance of a 
health system. The institutional analysis approach is pertinent to this thesis as understanding 
context, and institutional arrangements are instrumental in assessing health system 
governance. Hence, this thesis has adopted an institutional analysis approach by considering 
governance as institutions (rules) of the Kenyan health system set by organisations (health 
system players). 
Finally, combining the frameworks originating from two different disciplines, I believe that it 
will provide an in-depth understanding of governance from development perspectives (good 
governance and a government-centered approach) and new institutional economics 
perspectives (governance is the interaction between organisations/the health system 
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4. Methodology and methods 
 
This chapter presents the research paradigm, the methodology adopted and methods used 
in this study. Section 4.1 of this chapter describes the paradigmatic orientation of this study. 
Section 4.2 describes the conceptual framework and relevant theories employed in this 
study. Section 4.3 presents the overall research design providing the rationale for using a 
qualitative research methodology and the approach used in this study. Section 4.4 presents 
study methods and procedures entailed under each of the three research objectives. Section 
4.5 describes measures taken to improve validity, transferability and reliability of the 
research. Section 4.6 presents the researcher’s positionality and reflexivity while Section 4.7 
discusses ethical aspects considered in this study. Therefore, the section below starts with 
the study aim and objectives.  
This study aims to explore the situation of health system governance at three health system 
levels in Kenya focussing on health facilities designated to provide comprehensive 
emergency obstetric care (CEmOC). The following specific research objectives were 
formulated to achieve this aim:  
1. To explore factors influencing health systems governance in Kenya 
2. To explore the perspectives of key stakeholders on health systems governance 
3. To explore whether the status of health system governance differs with functionality 
of health facilities 
The following research questions have been formulated to achieve the above-mentioned 
research aim and objectives: 
1) Which factors influence the governance of the health system in Kenya? 
2) How do key stakeholders from Kenya perceive governance of the health system?  
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4.1 Research paradigm 
 
Every research study falls within a research paradigm depending on the area of research and 
methods chosen to answer the research questions. Paradigms affect the way that a 
researcher conducts a study. A research paradigm is formed by three elements; ontology, 
epistemology and axiology (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Ontology is the nature of reality or 
the nature of being and truth. Epistemology is a theory of knowledge and its justification. 
Axiology is the role of values in the inquiry. These three elements are crucial when 
determining the research approach and methodology.  
 
The intersection of the research designs, philosophical paradigm and specific methods forms 
the research approach and choice of tools to conduct the research (Figure 12). Philosophical 
paradigms are also broadly known as “worldviews”. The research paradigm begins with two 
main epistemological assumptions: 1) qualitative or constructivist or interpretivist approach 
and 2) the quantitative or positivist approach (Creswell, 2013). Currently, there are four 
widely discussed paradigms in the literature: post-positivism, constructivism, transformative 
and pragmatism (Creswell, 2013).  
 





The positivist, later known as post-positivist, paradigm represents the traditional form of 
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positivist research or empirical science (Creswell, 2013). Positivist researchers hold a 
deterministic view in which there is a need to identify the causes which determine the effects 
or outcomes. The positivist researchers intend to reduce the ideas into measurable 
hypotheses thus numeric measures of observations are paramount for positivism. Positivists 
begin the research with a theory and collect data which either supports or rejects the theory 
followed by necessary revisions and additional tests.  
Constructivism or interpretivism is a different worldview from positivism and is typically 
seen as an approach to qualitative research (Creswell, 2013). Constructivism dictates that 
any research depends on the participants’ views of the situation under study. Thus, 
constructivist researchers focus on the interaction among individuals in a specific context 
which shapes their interpretation, and they position themselves in the study. Rather than 
starting from an existing theory, the constructivist researcher generates a theory. The 
constructivist researcher sees the world as formed by a complex, interactive sets of meaning 
and normally data is collected through observations and interviews. 
The transformative paradigm conceives an action agenda which includes political ideology 
with the intention to reform or change the lives of the participants or the institutions 
(Creswell, 2013). Thus, the transformative paradigm focuses on the needs of marginalised 
individuals or groups in society and takes their ideas or help to account when designing 
research questions, collecting the data and analysing the information.  
The other paradigm called pragmatism was developed later in response to the overstated 
divide between quantitative and qualitative methods. Pragmatism focuses on research 
problems and uses all possible approaches to answering the research questions (Creswell, 
2013). Pragmatist researchers consider what and how to research based on their research 
questions using the most relevant methods to understand their research problems. The 
pragmatist researchers see the world as represented by sets of rules and testable theories 
and collect both objective and numeric data to confirm or reject the hypothesis (Mendlinger 
et al., 2008). This research paradigm was originated as a philosophy in the United States in 
the late nineteenth century (Morgan, 2014).  
Among the four paradigms described above, this study uses a constructivist/interpretivist 
approach as it is exploratory to assess health system governance with no predefined 
hypothesis. As described in the literature review, governance is a diffuse concept and context 
specific. Hence, measuring governance is not the aim of this study. Instead, this study sought 
to understand the interactions of key health system actors and their actions in the context 
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of Kenya. The study participants were selected purposely through a known group of policy 
makers and implementers of the health system. The study aims to collect qualitative, 
subjective information in exploring the situation of health system governance in Kenya. Thus, 
the constructivist approach is the most suitable for this. 
4.2 Conceptual framework and relevant theories  
 
Based on the outcome of the literature review, I developed a framework to assess 
governance in Kenya by adapting two existing published frameworks, those of Siddiqi et al. 
(2009) and Baez Carmago and Jacobs (2011). The principles of governance together with the 
concept of institutional approach were adopted from the framework of Baez Carmago and 
Jacobs (2011). The concept of hierarchical governance with three different health system 
levels was adopted from the framework of Siddiqi et al. (2009). This study explored six 
principles of governance in three levels of the health system. Under each principle of 
governance, the same areas were explored slightly different at each health system level. For 
instance, to assess the “rule of law” principle, the framework focuses on how the rules were 
made at policy making level while it focuses on how the rules were enforced, monitored and 
changed for policy implementation level. Table 7 describes the governance assessment 
framework developed and used in this study. This governance assessment framework was 
used to inform the development of the data collection methods and research tools, including 
the topic guides for key informants.  
 
Table 7. The conceptual framework adapted for use in this study 
No. Governance 
principles 
Areas to explore under each principle 
1 Strategic Vision 
 
Are there a clear vision and policies for MNH? If so, what are they?  
How were those policies developed? Who was involved in developing 
those policies?  
How do these policies respond to the MNH needs of the population?  
What have been the challenges after devolution? 
1. Are the implementation mechanisms in line with the stated objectives 
of health policy? 
What is the extent of implementation of the health policy? 
2 The Rule of Law What are the rules for free maternity services? 
How are they enforced? Any non-enforcement of the rules? 
Why? Are there procedures in place for addressing grievances of 
consumers & providers? 
3 Participation and 
Consensus 
orientation 
Who are the key stakeholders in MNH policy making?  
How do those stakeholders share ideas? Are there regular meetings or 
other ways that they can express their interests (and possibly influence 
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Areas to explore under each principle 
policy or programmatic decisions about EmOC)? Did this change after 
devolution? 
Among the stakeholders, who are most powerful in MNH policy making 
in Kenya? Who has the greatest influence in the provision of CEmOC? 
Participation in MNH service planning and delivery – who participates 
and why?  
4 Accountability Understanding roles and responsibilities among key stakeholders in the 
health system since devolution. Any consequences on lack of role 
clarity? 
Do any complaint mechanisms exist? Do people feel empowered to use 
them? Why or why not? 
What are the measures of performance and non-performance? 
What are the rewards for those performing well and repercussions for 
those performing poorly? 
What have been the accountability successes? What are the challenges? 
How might accountability challenges affect the provision of MNH 
services and why? 
What can be done to improve accountability?  
5 Responsiveness What are the challenges in responding to the main health priorities in 
MNH? To respond to CEmOC service provision? 
How can they be improved? 
6 Equity What are the differences in access to care by residence, income, gender, 
ethnicity, religion and others? 
Whether devolution has affected equity and responsiveness of the 
health care? 
Which population groups are using MNH and EmOC services?  
Any policies in place to ensure fair access of MNH services? 
Adapted from: Siddiqi et al. (2009) and Baez Carmago and Jacobs (2011) 
 
To address research question 3, “Are there any differences in governance between fully 
functional and not fully functional health facilities?”, a specific theory (North, 1990) was used 
to provide a way of interpreting the findings. Three constructs of the theory: institutional 
arrangements; enforcement mechanisms; and incentives and motivation have been used. 
The primary purpose of using the theory in analysing research question 3 was to generate 
meaning in the data but without relying heavily on the theory. As described in the literature 
review chapter (Chapter 3), governance is composed of the structures of government and 
healthcare organisations as well as the ways that the rules (both formal and informal) are 
enforced, monitored and changed. The theories from the new institutional economics have 
been increasingly used in governance research. Chapter 3 provides the examples of studies 
which assess governance using the new institutional economics approach.  
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Figure 13 illustrates the theoretical framework used to analyse the data collected for 
research question 3. The figure shows three constructs of the theory combined for use as a 
framework for analysis and illustrates the relationship among them. The following text 
describes in more detail of these constructs and how they operate in relation to governance.  
 
Figure 13. Illustration of the theoretical framework 
 
Institutional arrangements: North defined institutions as “the rules of the game” and 
organisations as “the players of the game”. Institutions consist of formal rules (political or 
legal rules such as constitutions, contracts and property rights) and informal rules (such as 
code of conduct, behavioural norms and conventions). Organisations consist of groups of 
individuals with common objectives. North’s principal argument is that the actions, decisions 
and relations of individuals within an organisation are both enabled and constrained by 
formal and informal rules that constitute the institutions. In this framework, health facilities 
(and health workers who work within them) are referred to as organisations while 
“institutional arrangements” are the configuration of the rules. In this study, there are 
institutional arrangements (rules) for six governance principles. They are the (formal and 
informal) rules for accountability, control of corruption, participation, the rule of law, 
responsiveness and equity.  
Enforcement mechanisms: The rules are enforced by the mechanisms which ensure 
individual or organisations adhere to and abide by the interest of the institutions (North, 
1990; Aoki, 2001). This can occur via self-enforcement such as common beliefs, reputation, 
kinship or via third party enforcement such as legal sanctions, contracts, rules, laws or 
policing (North, 1990). 
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Incentives and motivation: They are instrumental in achieving the organisational objectives. 
Individual health workers may have incentives to institute good governance if incentives are 
aligned to their objectives. North defines motivation as how an individual behaves in certain 
ways as one values the outcome of adopting a new behaviour. In this study, two forms of 
motivation are discussed: intrinsic motivation (health workers adhering to the principles of 
good governance as s/he values them) and extrinsic motivation (health workers’ expectation 
of benefitting something by adhering to the principles of good governance). 
4.3 Research design 
 
A research design is the planned process of a research study which includes a set of 
guidelines connected to philosophical paradigms, research methodologies and methods for 
data collection (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) (Figure 12). The research design provides an action 
plan of how the researcher will proceed from research questions to the findings. Research 
design emphasises the product of research while the research methodology focuses on the 
research process, the methods used to collect data and tools and procedures to achieve the 
research objectives (Creswell, 2013).  
This study used a qualitative research approach as the research begins with assumptions 
and use of theoretical frameworks to inform the research objectives and phenomenon under 
study. Using a qualitative research design, the data was collected and analysed using both 
inductive and deductive approaches (Creswell, 2013: 44). Hence, the research report 
includes the voices and views of study participants, the position of the researcher together 
with the interpretation of the research findings in relation to relevant theory and its 
contributions to the literature.  
Qualitative research explores and understands the meaning of individuals or groups attached 
to the phenomena being studied within a social process. The research involves data collected 
from the participants’ settings while the researcher interprets the findings based on the data 
collected, focussing on individual meaning and highlighting the situation. Qualitative data is 
textual and non-numerical data which tries to capture the lived experience of participants 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). The major characteristics are induction, hypothesis generation, 
subjectivity, the researcher being the primary instrument of data collection and qualitative 
analysis (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This research approach uses a flexible, emergent 
design in which stages of data collection and analysis are conducted concurrently (Morgan, 
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2014). This research approach is also known for the researcher being close to the data and 
usually being the “research instrument” throughout the research process.  
In this study, qualitative research methodology is used to gather a deeper understanding and 
perception of individuals as well as the context influencing health system governance in 
Kenya. By using qualitative research methods, it is feasible to explore factors influencing 
health systems governance at three different levels of the health system and the 
perspectives of key stakeholders on governance. 
Therefore, this study employed a “context-sensitive design”: qualitative research method for 
exploring the situation of governance and “capturing local wisdom” from the study 
participants (Berwick, 2008). Governance of the health system in Kenya requires a greater 
understanding of the nature of the issue and hence, open and generative nature of 
qualitative methods allowed the exploration of health system governance in Kenya. The 
study requires participants’ knowledge and views on governance which may be related to 
their positions within the health system context in Kenya. Using qualitative research 
methods such as face-to-face interviews using carefully framed and responsive questions 
help the participants uncover and relay the intricacy of their responses and views (Ritchie et 
al., 2013). Table 8 illustrates key features of the study design highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research design.  
 
Table 8: Key features of the study design 
Features  
Content area and field 
of study 
Health systems governance in Kenya 
Philosophical paradigm Constructivism 
Conceptual frameworks  A framework developed by adapting the frameworks of Siddiqi et al. 
(2009) and Baez Carmago and Jacobs (2011)  
Relevant theory Institutional analysis theory of North (1990) 
Research methods Qualitative research method: semi-structured interviews with key 
informants, document review, systematic review and analysis of 
secondary data  
Strengths and 
limitations 
-Inductive (governance data emerges from interviews) 
-Deductive (use of a conceptual framework to assess governance and 
relevant theory) 
-Subjective (perspectives and interpretation of the researcher and 
participants) 
-Contextual (detailed understanding of Kenyan health system 
governance) 
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By employing the proposed research design, governance data can be emerged from 
interviews (inductive). On the other hand, the use of the conceptual framework and relevant 
theories allows for deductive analysis in guiding the diffuse concept of governance.  
4.4 Study methods and procedures 
 
The following section presents how the qualitative research methods have been employed 
to answer specific research objectives. Table 9 provides an overview of the study design 
matrix (Maxwell, 2012), reporting the type of research methods used in each chapter of the 
thesis as well as the sampling and analysis methods employed. 
 
Table 9: Research design matrix  









-Document review -32 documents -Descriptive 
analysis of the 
study settings  
Chapter 3 
(Literature review) 
-Systematic review  -39 documents -Theory driven 
approach to 
literature review 
Chapter 5  
(Factors influencing 
governance of the 
health system in 
Kenya) 
-Key informant 
interviews at three 
health system levels 
 
-Document review 
-39 key informants from 







Chapter 6 (Perception 




interviews at three 
health system levels 
-39 key informants from 





Chapter 7 (Governance 
between fully 
functional & not fully 
functional facilities) 
-Secondary data 




interviews at health 
facility level 
-10 CEmOC level health 
facilities in six counties 
 
 
-19 key informants from 
10 health facilities 
Descriptive 







The Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3 describe the data collection and analysis methods used to collect 
primary data from key informants. Sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 explain the rationale and analyses 
used to review the documents and secondary data obtained from the Making it Happen 
programme. 
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4.4.1 Study population and sampling 
 
The study used stratified purposive sampling (Ritchie et al., 2013) to first select facilities to 
include in the research and then to select individuals from the three main participant groups 
for this research. The sample was stratified according to the key characteristics of the 
participants and their level of involvement in the Kenyan health system. Participants were 
purposively selected mainly based on their job descriptions as they were employed in 
positions allowing them to provide useful insights into the research objectives. The first 
participant group represented health workers from the study facilities, the second group 
were key informants working in the health system at the county level, and the third group of 
participants, national level stakeholders, were also selected for interview based on 
purposeful sampling.  
Purposeful sampling is also known as “criterion-based” sampling (Mason 2002; Patton, 2014) 
as sample participants are chosen for their characteristics based on the research questions. 
Although “purposeful” is the most commonly used term, LeCompte et al. (1993) suggested 
that the term “criterion-based” is more appropriate as all sampling is purposive to a certain 
degree (Ritchie et al., 2013). Two main characteristics of purposeful sampling are: 1) sample 
participants are chosen based on their relevance to the research questions, 2) enough 
diversity is considered to explore different characteristics (Ritchie et al., 2013). Since there is 
no straightforward sample calculation as in quantitative research, the precision and rigour 
of a qualitative research sample are defined by its ability to present salient characteristics 
(sometimes called symbolic representation) (Ritchie et al., 2013). The sample size was also 
determined by the saturation of information from the data collected. Teddlie and Tashakkori 
(2009) defined saturation as the additions of more participants does not result in new 
information that can be used in new theme development. 
At the county level, the study was conducted in six counties (Nairobi, Machakos, Makueni, 
Kitui, Nakuru, Narok) from which the study facilities were selected. According to the WHO 
SARAM report (2013), these six counties had a total population of 9.7 million (approximately 
22% of the country) and are served by 2066 health facilities, of which, 38% (784) are public 
health facilities. Basic socio-demographic and health information describing the participating 
counties have been described in Chapter 2 (Background) under Section 2.2.   
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Selection of study facilities  
 
The sampling started with the purposeful selection of health facilities (district and county 
level hospitals) from the “Making it Happen” programme database described in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2. Health facilities were selected based on their performance in relation to the nine 
key signal functions a CEmOC facility recommended by the UN (Box 1). The CEmOC signal 
functions consist of the life-saving treatments and procedures listed in the Box 1 which must 
be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Global experts in maternal health identified 
emergency obstetric care as effective interventions in reducing maternal deaths as it is 
composed of life-saving interventions to prevent direct maternal complications (WHO et al., 
2004; 2009). In order to provide emergency obstetric care, health facilities should have 
adequate medicines, supplies, equipment, infrastructure and trained healthcare providers. 
Hence, the UN’s nine signal functions have been widely used as proxy indicators for 
functionality of facilities which are designated to provide CEmOC services. 
 
Box 1. Signal functions of comprehensive emergency obstetric care (CEmOC) are defined as: 
1) Administration of parenteral antibiotics 
2) Administration of parenteral oxytocic drugs 
3) Administration of parenteral anticonvulsants  
4) Performance of manual removal of placenta 
5) Performance of removal of retained products of conception (e.g. manual vacuum 
aspiration) 
6) Performance of assisted vaginal delivery (e.g. ventouse delivery) 
7) Newborn resuscitation with mask and bag  
8) Performance of obstetric surgery (caesarian section) 
9) Performance of blood transfusion 
 
In this study, if a facility performed all designated nine signal functions of CEmOC, it was 
regarded as a ‘fully functional’ facility. Similarly, facilities performing less than nine signal 
functions belonged to the group of ‘not fully functional’ status. From this list, the study 
sampled at least one fully functional and one not fully functional facility from each county 
although this was not always feasible. Among the ten study facilities, six were not fully 
functional while four were fully functional. Hence, the study included total six counties with 
ten CEmOC level health facilities, instead of including all types of facilities within one county, 
imposing some limitations in providing an in-depth, county-specific information. Table 10 
illustrates the level of functionality for ten selected healthcare facilities providing CEmOC.  
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Table 10: Functionality status of health facilities included in the study 
County 
Facility 




Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 7 
Hospital 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Machakos Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Makueni Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Kitui 
Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Hospital 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Narok 
Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Hospital 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Nakuru 
Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Hospital 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Source: MiH database 
Legend: 1= Yes, 0 = No, SF= Signal function 
 
 
Selection of participants for key informant interviews 
 
Given that the focus of this study is the Kenyan health system, the inclusion of key 
stakeholders from each of the three levels of the Kenyan health system is important. 
“Information rich” individuals who could potentially answer the research questions best 
were intentionally selected (Patton, 1990). After identification of the facilities, key 
informants from each facility were selected including at least one Medical Superintendent 
or doctor-in-charge and one matron-in-charge from the maternity ward. These individuals 
were selected based on their job titles and positions as they could potentially provide useful 
information for this study.  
Then, county level participants were selected from participating facilities which included 
Chief Officers for Health (COH) and county health management team under each COH’s 
responsibilities, who were thought to be the individuals most likely to be able to share their 
experiences regarding health policy making and implementation within the newly devolved 
health system. Participants selected from the county health management team were county 
directors of health responsible for clinical services and medical superintendents of county 
hospitals as the director of clinical services falls under the remit of maternal health.  
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Figure 14. County and facility respondents participated in the study 
 
 
At the national level, I was interested in interviewing those in a leadership position for 
planning or managing health services or directly involved in governance activities. The study 
included directors from three service areas: policy, planning and international health 
relations, reproductive health and curative and rehabilitative services as the director of 
curative and rehabilitative services falls under the remit of reproductive health. This study 
also sought to include representatives from multilateral and bilateral organisations who play 
a key role in health policymaking in Kenya. Table 11 outlines the types of participants with 
their positions.  
Table 11: Key informants who participated in the study  
Health system level Institutions Positions N=39 
National (policy 
formulation) 
Ministry of Health; multilateral 
and bilateral organisations 






County Health Department Chief Officer of Health 5 
County Director of Health  5 
Facility 
(implementation) 
Government health facilities 
providing comprehensive 
emergency obstetric care 
Doctor in charge  10 
Nurse in charge  9 
4.4.2 Data collection  
 
There are four main types of qualitative data collection methods: interviews, focus groups, 
observation and document review (Curry et al., 2009). This study used semi-structured 
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Semi-structured interviews are interviews with a loose structure around topics and a series 
of open-ended questions. An interview is a research method in which the interviewer has 
one-to-one interaction with the interviewee to explore their perceptions and experiences in 
detail. Key informants are those with first-hand knowledge of the problem or issue being 
researched (health system governance), chosen for their experience and understanding.  
Interviews are regarded as a powerful tool for data collection as they can provide an ample 
amount of information if the researcher can ask the respondents additional questions to 
clarify their responses during the conversation (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). They are 
useful for exploring attitudes and other content of interest by allowing the interviewer to 
probe and obtain in-depth information. Interviews are very useful if there is no “power 
asymmetry” between the researcher and the participant such as fear or concerns about 
providing negative statements (Creswell, 2013). They can generate substantial amounts of 
information and are used for initial exploratory studies or gaining a better understanding of 
unfamiliar topics (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). They are also useful for the 
conceptualization of new, potentially unfamiliar issues under study particularly if these are 
cross-cultural. Health systems governance is a relatively not a well-understood topic as the 
concept of governance is diffuse, all-encompassing, context specific and complex. Hence, the 
open and generative nature of qualitative interviews allowed the exploration of governance 
as this method did not “force” the participants to fit their answers into the researchers’ 
questions. Instead, qualitative interviews allowed participants to express understandings 
explicitly. The interviewers also have the opportunity to further probe for more information 
allowing a deeper understanding of the topic.  
4.4.2.1 Interview topic guide  
 
This study used topic guide for key informant interviews which were based on the framework 
described in Section 4.2 of this chapter (conceptual framework). Topic guide was adjusted 
according to the characteristics of the participants and the level of the health system they 
were working (Appendix 6).  
Pilot testing of the tools 
Pilot testing of the topic guide was conducted with four non-participating respondents from 
Kenya in advance of field data collection. The participants in the pilot test represented two 
levels: national level policy makers and facility level policy implementers. The aim was to 
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adjust the topic guide as needed by modifying the questions. The pilot testing focussed on 
participants’ understanding of the topic guides and content of the interview.  
The pilot test results were recorded in order to revise the topic guide after each stage of the 
pilot. The initial topic guide was based on the framework developed for this study. During 
piloting, I noticed that explanations along with examples of governance terms were 
indispensable and often needed to be clarified during the discussion. For instance, questions 
relating “understanding roles and responsibilities, measures of performance and non-
performance, existence and use of complaint mechanisms of the health service provision” 
were included under the accountability principle to use them as prompts when necessary. It 
was also noticed that some interview questions required rephrasing for facility level 
participants as participants seemed not to understand the questions. 
The pilot tests served as a preparatory exercise and the results were used to revise the 
wording and sequencing of the questions. They also helped identify places where prompts 
and probes should be added. Prompts were used to direct the interviewee to talk about a 
specific aspect. Hence, the interviewee was given an example or a scenario to reflect on. 
Probes were also used to follow-up questions to elicit more information and the interviewee 
was asked to expand or explain to provide deeper information on what s/he has answered.  
Most importantly, I could conduct one pilot test over Skype in the presence of one of my 





The LSTM in-country research coordinator helped in identifying potential participants for the 
research through phone calls and other contacts. Once individuals were identified, the in-
country research coordinator familiarised them with the study during a telephone call and 
shared the participant information sheet (Appendix 7) by email. Potential participants were 
given a week to consider the information and decide whether or not to participate in the 
research. For those who indicated their willingness, the in-country research coordinator 
arranged a convenient time and place for the interview. The participants also received the 
interview topics (Appendix 8) prior to the scheduled interview time. On the day of data 
collection, the researcher provided them with and explained the information sheet again. 
The researcher then sought consent and moved to the actual data collection. At the 
beginning of each interview, the participants were again asked to read the letter of consent, 
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check their willingness to participate and record it on the consent form (Appendix 7). 
Informed consent to audio record the interview was also obtained (see Section 4.7 on ethics 
below). 
4.4.2.3 Conducting Key Informant Interviews 
A total of 39 interviews were conducted with key informants from three levels of the Kenyan 
health system during two field trips. The first field trip took place in April 2015 when 
interviews were conducted with a total of 11 participants: six from the national level, two 
from county and three from facility. The second field trip conducted in September 2015 after 
an interval of five months in between the two trips, providing the opportunity to reflect and 
analyse the first batch of interviews including adjusting the topic guides. It provided enough 
time to develop and receive feedback from my supervisors on the initial analysis. It also 
allowed for the addition of some prompts and probing questions, removal of statements 
which might confuse the participants, replacement of some questions with specific 
examples. The description of the topic guide modification is in Appendix 9.  
During the second trip, some of the interviews were conducted by a Kenyan research 
assistant who was employed as a field coordinator of an international non-government 
organisation. The research assistant received a one-day formalisation workshop on tools and 
refresher training on ethics followed by a mock interview with a non-participating 
respondent and one formal interview with a facility level participant in my presence. The 
research assistant conducted a total of nine interviews in two counties which were all audio 
recorded. He reported to me about progress on a daily basis and sent me interview 
recordings by uploading them on a shared drive and files were deleted after downloading. It 
provided me with the opportunity to listen to his interviews and provide him with feedback 
as to the areas where he should provide prompts and probes.  
All interviews were conducted in English with an average duration of one hour. Depending 
on the availability and engagement of the participants, the duration of interviews took 
between 30 to 100 minutes. The interviewers ensured that both copies of the consent form 
handed out to the participants at the beginning of the interview were signed. One copy was 
given to participants while the other was kept in the research file in Liverpool.  
During every interview, maximum effort was made to ensure that there was open and free 
dialogue. When time allowed, the notes were read back to the participants before closing 
the interview so that they could clarify or correct the points made. The study has kept a 
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record of recruitment outcomes noting agreement or refusal to participate (with brief 
reasons). In this way, the study could keep track of both the intended and recruited sample. 
Throughout the data collection process, I kept a field memo (Appendix 10) to note down 
facts such as: 
• The time, date and venue where the interview took place 
• The setting in which the interview took place particularly certain significant 
situations such as participant’s reaction and interruptions 
• My feelings and reflections of the interviews 
• The most significant features of the interviews 
• Any modifications required to the topic guide or additional information that should 
be added to the topic guide 
The field memos were organised in brief words and phrases in Microsoft Excel with the above 
observations in order. As May (2001) recommended, the field memo was guided by what 
was relevant to the study rather than used for documenting everything.  
4.4.3 Data management and analysis 
 
The study generated audio files, verbatim transcripts of the interviews, observational notes 
and field memos. In qualitative research, the analysis tends to start at the time of data 
collection (Ritchie et al., 2013), and this is the approach I followed so that I could reflect on 
the emerging data. For the data analysis, I followed a two-stage process: data management, 
and description and explanation (Ritchie et al., 2013). Data management consists of 
transcribing, familiarisation, coding and developing a thematic framework while description 
and explanation involve the use of charts and matrices to look across the data and 
interpretation. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Only one 
interviewee did not allow me to voice record, so I took notes to capture the content of the 
interview. 
All transcribed interviews were cross-checked with the original audio recording to ensure 
accuracy and quality by the lead researcher (myself). Silverman (2006) proposed three 
commonly used approaches to analyse qualitative data: grounded theory, thematic analysis 
and framework analysis. This study uses a combination of framework analysis guided by 
Ritchie et al. (2013) and thematic analysis guided by Braun and Clarke (2006) to analyse data 
relevant to the research objectives 1 and 2. To analyse research objective 3, directed content 
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analysis of Hsieh & Shannon (2005) was used (Section 4.4.3.2) as the theory guided 
operational definitions of key themes.  
4.4.3.1 Thematic analysis using the framework approach  
 
Thematic analysis is suitable for this study as it is very relevant for applied policy research 
when the research question is well defined at the beginning. The approach is both inductive 
(concepts are identified from the data) and deductive (use of existing thematic framework- 
governance assessment framework). By using the thematic framework approach, the study 
could identify, analyse and report themes (patterns) within the data (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). From the themes emerging from the data, the study could capture interesting 
meaning about the data relating to the research questions (Braun and Clarke, 2006). With 
this thematic analysis, the framework approach of Ritchie & Lewis (2013) was used to sort 
and display the data thematically (across the themes) and across cases (participants). The 
framework approach provided a transparent process for data analysis while retaining the 
context of participants’ experiences. By using a framework, it was possible to reduce the 
amount of data in an organised and structured way. A matrix was created for each theme 
using Microsoft Excel, and each sub-theme was allocated a column and used to code data. 
Each participant was allocated a row in the matrix. Appendix 11 describes an example of the 
framework.  
Data management  
The sampling strategy was also examined throughout the data collection phase to assess 
whether the types of participants interviewed could, in principle, provide enough 
information to answer the research objectives (or not). By doing so, this could highlight 
potential gaps in the data set and identify limitations in data coverage. This confirmed 
whether there was any need to conduct further data collection or not. The first step of the 
thematic analysis is to become familiar with the entire data set. This involved understanding 
the content of the transcripts, hear what was said, what seemed important to participants 
and how they expressed themselves.  
During and after each data collection field trip, I familiarised myself with the data by listening 
to the recordings and noted down immediate thoughts regarding the recordings while 
waiting to receive the transcripts. The interviews were transcribed verbatim by a Kenyan 
research assistant. The coding process started after identification of the ideas from the data 
set. Initially, I tried to code for as many themes as possible in order not to miss out any 
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important information. The codes included data extracts from interviews either in phrases 
or sentences or paragraphs with surrounding text in order not to lose the context. The coding 
was done directly onto the printout of transcripts and by using post-it notes and later 
highlighting sections of text in the transcripts. 
After a list of codes had been identified, codes that appeared to have a similar meaning or 
describe the same concepts were combined. From this initial grouping of codes, it was 
possible to construct a preliminary thematic framework to organise the data. The approach 
was inductive at the beginning and became deductive as the governance principles informed 
the data groups. The framework was revised from time to time after familiarisation with the 
data and identification of other important aspects.  
After reviewing and refining the thematic framework, a final structure of themes and sub-
themes was developed and applied to the entire dataset. During this stage, the validity of 
the entire series of themes was ensured, and there was an accurate representation of the 
data. This process continued until no additional codes and themes emerged from the entire 
data set. The themes were then defined and named with the description which could provide 
information on the scope and sense of the themes. Microsoft Excel was used to create a 
matrix for each main theme to display columns referring to the sub-themes and rows 
displaying the cases. Appendix 11 provides a worked example of a matrix.  
Each matrix provided a summary of all the data relating to a theme. This was used as a basis 
for writing up the description of each theme. The matrix was used to identify how frequently 
or strongly a view was expressed and any divergent views. The matrices also allowed 
constant comparison across participant groups to identify patterns in the data. The key steps 
of framework analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) used in this study are outlined in Figure 15.  
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Figure 15. Thematic analysis using the framework approach 
 
 
Data description and explanation 
During interpretation of the findings, the results were related back to the research 
objectives. For presenting findings, illustrative quotes were used to best represent the voices 
of the participants and allow for validity and transparency in the analysis. This study used 
three types of quotes described by Richardson (1990): “short, eye-catching” quotes; 
“embedded quotes”; and “longer quotes” to provide more complex understandings 
(Creswell, 2012: 219). Data was presented in visual maps generated from the Mind Genius® 
Business software to show the patterns (see Figures 18 to 27). 
In explaining the findings, two approaches (implicit and explicit explanations) of Ritchie et al. 
(2013:393-395) were used. “Implicit explanations” (Ritchie et al., 2013: 395) were used to 
present most of the findings. That is, the explanations were constructed by the researcher, 
myself, by linking together the evidence stated by the participants. The categories were 
constructed based on the participants’ accounts reflecting what had been reported. For 
instance, in Chapter 5, the themes “devolution” and “contextual factors” were implicit 
explanations constructed by the researcher. These were based on the accounts of 
participants who described the contexts involving the interplay of political and 
socioeconomic factors, devolution and dispositions of the Kenyan health system.  
“Explicit explanations” (Ritchie et al., 2013: 393) were also used in this study. That is, the 
explanations based on the accounts given by the participants, accompanied by illustrative 
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Chapter 6 (Section 6.6.1), where the explicit description was made on what the participants 
discussed about who participated. 
4.4.3.2 Directed content analysis 
In addition to using thematic analysis, “directed content analysis” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) 
was used to analyse data collected to answer research objective 3: to explore whether the 
status of health system governance differs with the functionality of health facilities. The use 
of new institutional economics theory described under Section 4.2 of this chapter has helped 
to identify key concepts for initial coding categories for research objective 3 as it is guided 
by a structured process using the theory (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
Despite the use of new institutional economics theory, the analysis ensured that the theory 
did not hinder the emergent themes which were pertinent to this study. In line with Maxwell 
(2012: 52), the analysis ensured to striking a balance between the insights provided by the 
theory and its limitations. By using the framework approach, the analysis allowed for 
inductive coding within the predetermined themes (deductive coding). Hence, although the 
theory was used to analyse the data for research objective 3, the analysis focussed on 
exploring and describing what was occurring in a given context alongside the established 
themes of institutional arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and incentives and 
motivation.  
The theory provided the main themes (institutional arrangements, enforcement 
mechanisms, incentives and motivation) while codes were derived from the data reflecting 
the participants’ accounts. As analysis progressed, sub-themes emerging from the data were 
coded inductively under the parent themes.  
4.4.4 Analysis of secondary data 
 
To answer Research Objective 3, this study analysed secondary data collected as part of the 
facility records under the Making it Happen programme. The findings from secondary data 
analysis are described in Table 10 (Chapter 4), Table 12 and 13 (Chapter 7). The data analysed 
were collected under the Making it Happen programme at one point in time, December 
2014, 18 months after the health system was devolved from national to county governments. 
The primary aim of analysing secondary data was to purposely select health facilities which 
were designated to provide CEmOC. These included signal function availability, annual 
delivery rates, availability of maternity staff and medical equipment which were required to 
provide the nine signal functions. The functionality of health facility was not intended to give 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
98 | P a g e  
 
statistically generalisable findings. Instead, it aimed to provide a descriptive view of facility 
functionality using nine UN signal functions as proxy measures. 
4.4.5 Document review 
 
Document review was also used in this study, particularly in Chapter 2 (Background) and 
Chapter 5 (Factors influencing governance of health system in Kenya). Document review was 
useful in Chapter 2 as it set the scene for the study, providing background information about 
the study setting in Kenya. For Chapter 5, document review was used to corroborate findings 
from key informant interviews particularly in portraying key contextual factors. This was an 
iterative process between interview data and document review as it aimed to clarify, confirm 
or justify the arguments of key informants, providing a holistic picture of the situation under 
discussion. The documents included policy reports and strategic papers from the MOH as 
well as peer-review publications. Some of the policy reports and strategic papers were 
received from key informants during and after interviews. Other documents were obtained 
through searching reference lists of relevant documents. The list of documents that were 
reviewed in this study is provided in Appendix 14.    
4.4.6 Triangulation of the study results 
The next step of this study involved triangulation of the study results, sources of data, data 
analysis and data interpretation. Triangulation refers to combining two or more methods or 
data sources or investigators in a single study to examine a phenomenon to validate the 
findings (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Triangulation is a process of collecting evidence from 
different sources to highlight a theme or perspective (Creswell, 2012). Triangulation reduces 
the risk of systematic bias and chance associations when using a specific method (Maxwell, 
2012).  
In this study, the information on governance was triangulated with different perspectives 
from three levels of key stakeholders in Kenya. It also involved triangulating the quantitative 
data (facility functionality) alongside the qualitative data on governance. This was 
particularly relevant for research objective 3 to assess whether the status of governance 
differs with the functionality of health facilities. In this way, the study could elucidate key 
issues and factors influencing governance in Kenya resulting in a more comprehensive 
understanding. 
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4.5 Research validity, transferability and reliability 
This section describes a reflection on the research design and methods used in this study 
referring to methodological concepts in qualitative research. In line with Pope and May 
(2006), this study ensured conducting a self-conscious research design and the research is 
systematic throughout the research process (conceptualization, data collection, data 
management, interpretation and reporting). This research considers the following three 
aspects to ensure a good research quality: validity, transferability and reliability.  
4.5.1 Validity 
 
Validity refers to the extent to which a finding is well-founded and reflects the accuracy of a 
phenomenon of a study (Ritchie et al., 2013). Validity is part of the research design which 
considers potential threats to the study and strategies to overcome them and assess if they 
are plausible in the actual research situation (Maxwell, 2012). Validity is also known as 
credibility or authenticity (Glasser and Strauss, 1967 cited in Ritchie et al., 2013). A research 
tool is valid if it measures what it is meant to measure. Thus, validity is traditionally 
understood as “correctness” or “precision” (Ritchie et al., 2013). Qualitative researchers 
address validity threats after the research has begun (Maxwell, 2012).  
 
Creswell and Miller (2000) believe that “validity refers not to the data but to the inferences 
drawn from them”. Creswell (2017) recommends that qualitative researchers should engage 
at least two of the following nine strategies from three different lenses (researcher’s lens, 
participants’ lens and reader’s lens) to improve the validity of their study. They are 1) 
triangulation, 2) clarifying research bias, 3) discovering disconfirming evidence, 4) member 
checking, 5) having a prolonged engagement in the field, 6) collaborating with participants, 
7) external audits, 8) providing a rich description and 9) peer-review or debriefing of the 
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Figure 16: Creswell’s strategies to improve the validity of a research study (2017) 
 
 
In this study, five strategies were employed to maximise the validity of the research. The 
following section describes how these strategies were employed to minimise the validity 
threats from three different lenses.  
4.5.1.1 Researcher’s lens 
 
Triangulation: The information collected was triangulated with data from three groups of 
key stakeholders (national, county and facility participants), documents and reports. This was 
useful for opposing or contradicting information as I could identify how different findings 
corroborate different opinions. This has been described in Section 4.4.4. 
 
Clarifying researcher’s bias or reflexivity: The researcher discloses her own position, 
theoretical standpoint and experiences since the outset of the study. These include her 
personal and professional characteristics such as education, social and professional 
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Discovering disconfirming evidence: Throughout the research process, all evidence was 
given equal attention considering both positive and negative cases. During reporting, both 
cases were highlighted to ensure that different perspectives were incorporated.  
4.5.1.2 Participants’ lens 
 
Member checking: The researchers validated participants’ interpretations during or after 
completion of each interview to minimise the researcher’s bias or errors. If necessary, the 
participants were asked to provide specific examples to make the right interpretation of a 
situation. This approach was indispensable in this research as governance is conceptual and 
principles of governance can sometimes be difficult to understand. Therefore, researchers 
have asked for specific case examples after participants’ explanation where relevant.  
4.5.1.3 Reader’s lens 
 
Rich description: During reporting, a rich description of the findings was provided so that the 
readers can decide on the “transferability” of findings (Creswell, 2017: 263). A clear and 
transparent description of the research process such as data collection, data management 
and analysis is also ensured. For instance, in describing a case, the rich description was 
provided with illustrative quotes where relevant.  
4.5.2 Transferability (external validity) 
 
Transferability is the equivalent of “external validity” or “generalisation” or whether the 
findings are transferable to other settings beyond the context in which the study was 
conducted (Ritchie et al., 2013: 348-353). Among three types of generalisation proposed by 
Ritchie et al. (2013), representational, inferential and theoretical generalisation, inferential 
generalisation is relevant to this study. Indeed, the findings of governance from this study 
can be inferred to other contexts beyond Kenya (inferential generalisation) as this thesis 
report sufficiently presents the reader to judge whether the findings are applicable in similar 
low-and middle-income settings.  
4.5.3 Reliability/dependability 
 
Reliability is generally related to “dependability” or “trustworthiness”, the extent to which 
all methods and decisions are documented in the audit trail. In line with Braun and Clarke 
(2013: 279), traditional quantitative approaches to reliability will not be useful for judging 
the reliability of qualitative research. Therefore, the following four aspects of reliability are 
considered for “dependability” or “trustworthiness” of the study particularly regarding 
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methods of data collection and analysis: appropriate sampling, reliable data collection, 
systematic analysis and reliable interpretation.  
4.5.3.1 Is the sample symbolically representative of the target population? 
 
The study has used stratified purposeful sampling to ensure that the sample symbolically 
represents the target population. The sampling process has been described in details in 
Section 4.4.1.  
4.5.3.2 Was the field work carried out consistently? 
 
This study used semi-structured interviews with a topic guide comprising a list of open-ended 
questions on issues relevant to the topic. The topic guide also included prompts and probing 
questions where relevant. By using appropriate prompts, researchers could direct the 
interviewee to discuss specific aspects by giving an example to reflect on. By employing 
appropriate probes, researchers could follow up on what the participant has said, why and 
how. This allowed the researchers to encourage interview participants to illustrate with 
specific case examples rather than general description. The researchers could also check 
whether the responses were providing standard responses or not. For example, when a 
facility participant described embezzlement, they were asked to provide specific examples 
or case stories of particular incidence.  
By using a semi-structured interview guide, consistency in data collection (questioning, 
emphasis, potential reaction and interview timing) could be maintained although there were 
two interviewers. The researchers also tried their best to be as facilitative as possible to avoid 
the influence of their presence during the interviews. The researchers ensured the 
participants were comfortable and honest in answering the questions by assuring their 
anonymity and confidentiality. Researchers also explained to the participants that they were 
outsiders and could not influence their career paths. Interviews were conducted in the 
absence of their managers or head of departments. There was also a research diary 
throughout the research process, and the researcher reflected her position from time to 
time. The researcher’s perceptions were noted in filed memos reflecting the interviews 
conducted particularly on what she learnt regarding the guiding questions and the responses 
obtained. Bowling (2002) recommends pilot testing of the tools before embarking on the 
study to examine practicability, reliability and validity of the tools.  
The topic guide for this research was based on the framework which was adapted from the 
already validated frameworks of Siddiqi et al. (2009) and Baez Carmago and Jacobs (2011) 
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(Chapter 3. Literature review). Both frameworks have been applied in low-and middle-
income countries, e.g. Pakistan, India, Nepal, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa (for 
Siddiqi et al., 2009) and Uganda (Baez Carmago & Jacobs, 2011). The institutional analysis of 
Douglass North (1990) was used as the theoretical framework of research objective 3 (to 
explore whether the status of governance differs with the functionality of health facilities). 
Bertone & Meessen (2013) have applied the concept of institutional analysis to evaluate the 
implementation of Performance Based Financing in Burundi. 
Nevertheless, the frameworks used in this study were also piloted with non-participating 
respondents. The progress in developing different versions of the interview topic guides 
were documented throughout the process. Replicability of the applied policy research to 
wider context is an important aspect of reliability (Lewis et al., 2013). In this study, efforts 
have been made to ensure that data were rigorously and consistently interpreted and 
inferable to the wider context of the study. 
4.5.3.3 Was the analysis carried out systematically and comprehensively? 
 
Silverman (2006) recommends six approaches to address the reliability of a study using 
qualitative methods: 1) a tape recording of field notes; 2) transcription of the recordings; 3) 
coding by research staff who were blinded to the study; 4) analysis conducted by research 
staff who were blinded to the study; 5) using computer-assisted programme for transcripts 
and analysis and 6) inter-coder agreement. Of these six strategies, this study engaged in two 
strategies: tape recording and transcription to maximise the reliability of the study. Detailed 
description of the analysis can be found in Section 4.4.3. 
4.5.3.4 Does evidence support the interpretation? 
 
The study used a transparent approach to analysis with a rich description of data. Relevant 
quotes are used in the appropriate places and described in the previous section under 
validity (Section 4.5.1). 
4.6 Positionality and Reflexivity 
4.6.1 Positionality 
This study uses qualitative research methods thus it is important to be aware of the presence 
of subjectivity as it is not possible to be entirely objective in qualitative research (Ahern, 
1999). Therefore, I actively reflected on my own stance and how my personal and 
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professional backgrounds may affect the research process. The following section describes 
the issues relevant to “positionality” of myself as a researcher in this study.  
 
I am external to the Kenyan health system, and it was crucial to understand subtleties in 
cross-cultural research (Kvale, 2008: 68). Therefore, I have taken the “emic” approach which 
allowed me to understand the participants’ perspective inductively from their accounts and 
setting get aside my own assumptions and underlying theories (O’Reilly and Kiyimba, 2015: 
5). I might not have a good understanding of the local culture and how things happen in the 
political and socioeconomic environment in Kenya. However, efforts have been made to 
conform to expected social protocols of Kenya by using appropriate means of 
communication and by demonstrating respectful manners. Being a “new face” to Kenya, it 
was difficult to gain access to potential participants, and I was required to obtain official 
permission to approach certain key informants. I had to work through various gatekeepers 
to obtain access to the participants. For instance, some county officials could be approached 
only through their focal reproductive health coordinators while other county officials 
responded directly. However, through the in-country research coordinator from the “Making 
it Happen” programme, some of the potential participants were identified and contacted 
before I travelled to Kenya. I was also fortunate to interview a participant from a multilateral 
organisation who provided me with an updated contact list of international organisations 
which played essential roles in the Kenyan health sector especially regarding governance. 
Indeed, this reduced the time taken to look for contacts of potential participants from 
multilateral and bilateral organisations.  
There are several advantages of being an outsider of the system under study as the 
participants are in an “expert” position while the researcher, myself, is “ignorant” of the 
situation (Berger, 2015). This situation prevents my potential, subjective interpretation of 
the Kenyan health system as I could not impose my experience on participants and could not 
create the potential for bias. This has also made interview participants comfortable 
participating in the study as I was not part of their system and I had nothing to do with the 
progress of their career pathways. This study also benefited from the presence of my 
department in the country to gain access to the right participants for the study. Our 
department is a registered charity in Kenya, operating with approximately ten in-country 
staff based in Nairobi. However, I strictly adhered to research ethics, neutrality and academic 
integrity throughout the whole process. I have made it clear that I was not part of their health 
system. To address my limited understanding of the health system, culture and politics in 
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Kenya, I have been interacting with different health policy makers and implementers from 
Kenya and sub-Saharan African settings so that I could make sense of the data collected.  
I obtained my undergraduate degree from a medical university in a similar resource 
constrained setting. This has helped me to understand how to approach gatekeepers and 
potential participants. Before my doctoral study, I also worked in different low-and middle-
income countries including sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, I am familiar with different health 
systems and governance. All my experiences in health systems and governance have been 
embedded within this doctoral study (see details under Reflexivity). I am also conscious of 
my own beliefs and principles such as the health needs of a population cannot be met 
without strengthening the governance of a health system together with the political will to 
do so.  
During the interviews, I found myself, involuntarily, recounting my own professional 
experiences in public health systems. I believe that this has helped me in discussion with the 
interview participants to solicit meaningful responses rather than to be simply presented as 
a “post-graduate student”.  
4.6.2 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is also known as “self-appraisal” in qualitative research (Berger, 2015). Reflexivity 
helps the researcher to recognise their own situation within the study and its relevant impact 
on the research process from developing research objectives to accessing and recruitment 
of study participants, data collection and interpretation. Reflexivity is an “active 
acknowledgement” in which the researcher recognises their own situation and actions upon 
the meaning and context of the research process (Horsburgh, 2003). Reflexivity is crucial in 
qualitative research as it shapes the nature of the research in three main ways: access to the 
“field”, the nature of “researcher-researched relationship” and the researcher’s 
interpretations (Berger, 2015). The section below reflects the research itself followed by a 
more personal reflection on my role as a researcher in the generation, analysis and 
interpretation of data.  
4.6.2.1 A reflection on the research itself  
 
This section describes some practical reflections related to the research process including 
participants’ recruitment, making appointments for interviews and engagement with 
participants. In general, recruitment of participants was satisfactory as 39 out of 43 people 
shortlisted for interview participated in the study. One common reason for non-participation 
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was unavailability during the data collection period. Among non-participating individuals, 
one was from national level; two from county and one from health facility. The rest of the 
interviews were successfully conducted, although there were some unavoidable 
postponements. Indeed, it surpassed my expectations and overcame the anxiety which I had 
before the field work. I could collect quite a varied set of responses across the three levels 
of the health system; and inclusive of both multilateral and bilateral organisations.  
In general, the study received a high level of interest and engagement from multilateral and 
bilateral organisations. Most of them were keen to see the results of this study as they 
perceived that governance has been instrumental in the development of the country. This 
study had to conduct one interview with a participant from a bilateral organisation over the 
phone as she could not attend a face-to-face interview. However, she felt obliged to 
participate after she cancelled two earlier appointments.  
On the other hand, the experience with public sector participants from national level ranged 
from a participant hurrying me through the discussion to another participant who gave me 
adequate time for interviews, supplied me some useful policy reports and referred me to 
another potential participant who was not on my list. There was also one senior public sector 
official who did not allow me to record the conversation; instead, he allowed me adequate 
time to take notes.  
Most of the county level participants were quite engaging, although most of the 
appointments could be made only after several phone calls either directly or through county 
reproductive health coordinators. The study conducted a total of 10 interviews with officials 
from county health departments, of which, one interview was not very productive. The 
participant was reluctant to express his opinion and hence, asked for the presence of his 
reproductive health coordinator (a subordinate officer to him) during the interview and 
asked her to answer some questions on his behalf.  
Among facility level participants, there were quite noticeable differences in participation 
levels. Some openly expressed their views, as they perceived the interviews as an 
opportunity to present their critical voices, while others were more reserved in sharing 
information. In extreme cases, facility level participants from one county disclosed their 
frustrations and dissatisfaction directed to their county government. Interestingly, this 
happened in facilities where the research assistant conducted the interviews.  
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I did not perceive any differences in the level of engagement due to participants’ positions 
within a health facility, as this study received insightful information from all cadres. One 
common observation was that among the 19 facility level participants, those holding senior 
management positions (such as a medical superintendent) provided information from both 
a health system perspective and an operational perspective, in contrast to mid-level cadres 
who discussed operational aspects with a greater focus. This might be due to that the mid-
level cadres may have less opportunities or experience with independent thinking and 
problem-solving in their jobs which made it difficult to conceptualise answers to less 
concrete questions.  
4.6.2.2 A personal reflection on my role as researcher  
 
This section describes a more personal reflection on my role as researcher. This includes my 
own theoretical starting point and how that shaped and changed over time; awareness of 
the social setting of the research and my interactions with participants; the broader 
sociopolitical context and how these shaped the data collection, analysis and interpretation.   
Before conducting this research, I viewed governance as a concept linked to international 
development. I may have been influenced by my profession as a medical doctor with several 
years of experience in public health. However, the feedback from the peer reviewers of my 
literature review enlightened my thinking on governance (Chapter 3). I realised that it might 
be beneficial to explore governance not only from the standpoint of international 
development but different disciplinary perspectives. Political science, new institutional 
economics and international development have all shaped the concept of governance and 
how it is interpreted in health systems research. Hence, the review shaped this study, 
particularly to consider governance from cross-disciplinary perspectives.  
Field data collection started with interviewing participants from the central level, especially 
during the first round of data collection. During the first round of interviews, a total 11 
interviews were conducted, two of which were at the county level and three at the facility. 
Although I was coming to the interviews with the experience of interviewing participants 
from a similar background within the African context, I was uncertain about the best way to 
frame my questions. Although I had pilot tested the topic guide, I was still anxious about how 
the first interviews would go. Specifically, I found it a bit difficult to frame the interview 
questions for facility level participants at the beginning of the process. I believe that the first 
few interviews could have been better conducted and I note that I gained better insight and 
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feedback as the interviews progressed. I then became quite familiar with the main issues and 
could lead the questions to those areas of interest.  
I had an opportunity to analyse my data before my second field trip and draft some key 
themes which provided me with a chance to review and modify my topic guide. Indeed, I got 
better insights about the subject area and could add probes or reframe the questions to get 
the right information. My supervisor also reviewed my codes which allowed me an 
opportunity to reframe my thinking. Therefore, during my second field trip, I felt equipped 
to collect another batch of data. Also, I was fortunate to receive real-time feedback from my 
supervisor during the second round of data collection on how to rephrase the interview 
questions, particularly for facility level participants and areas to prompt and probe. Hence, 
during interviews, participants were encouraged to illustrate what they meant, not just 
mention or declare the principles of governance.  
I found that reflexivity was very important in this study in order to be aware of the 
circumstances under which the research was conducted. Therefore, I have been regularly 
questioning my own stance and assumptions about how data was collected and analysed. I 
have kept a contemporary research diary throughout the study to record my thoughts and 
feelings. The way in which I approached this study was influenced by my own professional 
background, previous work experiences, my supervisors, peer reviewers of my PhD 
publications and the reaction of participants in Kenya. 
4.7 Ethical considerations 
This study received approval from the LSTM ethics review committee and the in-country 
ethical committee (the Kenyatta National Hospital-University of Nairobi Ethics Research 
Committee) (Appendix 12 and 13). All data collected were managed in accordance with the 
LSTM data policy.  
Four key ethical principles were considered in this study: voluntarism, beneficence, privacy 
and confidentiality (Morse, 2007). The following section describes possible risks or harm of 
this study and how ethical principles were upheld.   
4.7.1 What were possible risks or harm of this study?  
 
The study clearly informed any potential participants that financial incentives would not be 
given for participating in the research so they would not have any immediate and direct 
benefit. It was anticipated that some participants might not be interested in the study as 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
109 | P a g e  
 
there was no financial or other form of assistance offered to take part in the study. This was 
minimised by providing a clear explanation of the potential benefits of the study and 
explaining the lack of information to date. 
It was anticipated that participants might have had problems in taking time off from work to 
participate in the study. To allow for this, all the interviews were arranged at a time 
convenient for the participant to ensure minimum disruption to their work routines. For 
every interview, the researchers ensured timeliness during the data collection. The 
participants were also given adequate notice and information before the interviews so that 
they had time to prepare.  
4.7.2 Which ethical principles do I uphold in this study? 
 
4.7.2.1 Voluntarism 
An essential component of the ethical considerations of the study was ensuring that the 
research participants were not coerced but volunteered freely to participate. They were 
provided with adequate information to participate in the study.  
This study made clear to the participants that the choice to participate depended solely on 
them. They could choose to withdraw from the study at any time during the research without 
any consequence to them. They could refuse to answer any questions they do not want to 
answer and still be part of the study. 
This study used an informed consent form which included study information. This was 
developed to be easy to understand and included all required information about the 
research to make an informed decision. The participant information sheet included 
information on what the study was about, the study procedures and duration, what would 
be involved if they agreed to participate in the study and what would happen to the 
information collected. The information sheet stated that the participants were guaranteed 
certain rights and their rights were protected throughout the study process. The information 
sheet explained that the researcher intended to use some verbatim extracts from the 
interviews in the thesis report and publications in the form of anonymised quotes. The 
information sheet also advised potential participants that they had the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time without giving a reason. Contact details of the principal 
investigator and the two ethical review committees were included if participants had any 
concerns about the conduct of the research and if they did not want to contact the principal 
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investigator. Participants had the option to opt out of the audio recording by indicating this 
in the consent form.  
At the beginning of each interview, participants were again given the information sheet and 
received the explanation from the researcher who sought their consent to move to the next 
step of actual data collection. Sufficient time was taken to explain the purpose of the 
interview and to obtain informed consent at the beginning of each interview. Participants 
were asked to read the letter of consent, check their willingness to participate and record 
that on the consent form. They were specifically asked for consent to audio record the 
interview. During interviews, the researchers focussed on the understanding and content of 
the interview as well as on the personal interactions during the interviews. The researchers 
have tried their best to use a facilitative approach in conducting interviews maturely and 
openly.  
 
4.7.2.2 Beneficence (doing no harm) 
 
Participants’ discomfort during the discussion was also considered. Participants were 
informed that they did not have to answer any questions which they felt uncomfortable 
about or did not want to answer and they could stop the interview at any time. However, it 
was also explained that an open and honest discussion was expected regarding health 
system governance in their country, how key stakeholders perceive, practise and interact 
with good governance. There was no withdrawal or refusal during the interviews, and all 
interviews were conducted completely regardless of the busy participants’ schedules. 
4.7.2.3 Privacy and confidentiality  
 
Maintaining confidentiality was another crucial ethical component considered in this study. 
This study has taken care to ensure that the data collected from research participants were 
appropriately protected. Research participants were assigned a code number so that data 
could be anonymised. After each interview, the voice recording was uploaded to a password 
protected laptop. Every recording was checked to ensure that they were audible the original 
recording was then deleted from the voice recorder. The interviews were stored on the 
laptop and not on a network or shared drive. The shared drive to which the research assistant 
uploaded recordings during his field trip was deleted on completion of data collection. The 
electronic files related to the participants were kept in a separate location from other 
research data with specific password-protected electronic devices. Any electronic files 
relating to the study were stored on one laptop which was backed up and protected from 
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computer viruses. Paper documents were kept in a locked storage cabinet restricting 
accessible only to the researcher. All recordings will be deleted from the laptop once the 
thesis is completed and approved by the University.  
Sometimes researchers experience situations where they may have to breach confidentiality, 
and I thought this through before starting my study since it could touch on topics such as 
corruption or malpractice. I proposed plans to deal with these situations, although I did not, 
in the end, come across any in this study. If I became aware of unethical practices (e.g. 
corruption), I planned to act as an external person to the Kenyan health system. If I thought 
this was appropriate, I might encourage the participants to share the information with a 
relevant colleague by themselves, but I would not do so. If I became aware of serious 
unethical practices or corruption, I would first seek informed consent from the participant to 
seek advice from the senior members/supervisors of the research team. If this was not 
possible or it became necessary for me to share this knowledge with a third party, I would 
stop the interview at that time and immediately report to my supervisors. My supervisors 
would liaise and discuss any serious matters surrounding unethical or corrupt practices with 
the Chair (or other designated person) of the LSTM ethics committee and seek their advice. 
At no point, would I act as a whistle-blower. 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter describes the methodology that was applied in this study in detail and 
summarised in Figure 17 which illustrates the interactive map of the research design adopted 
in this study. The research objectives were central to the research design as it connected to 
other components of the research and closely linked to the research aim. The research 
objectives guided the choice of conceptual frameworks and relevant theory suitable for this 
study. Hence, the upper triangle of the design map was conceptual (Maxwell, 2014) but 
crucial as the research objectives were informed by current knowledge and theory in 
governance which guided the researcher to make informed decisions when choosing the 
relevant conceptual frameworks and theory.  
The bottom triangle of the design map was operational (Maxwell, 2014), guiding and help 
the researcher justify the choice of research methods for data collection. It also reminded 
the researcher to consider potential validity threats and the measures to mitigate them.  
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Figure 17: Design map of the research design 
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1)To explore factors 
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5. Factors influencing governance of the health 
system in Kenya 
This chapter describes an interpretation of the context of health system governance in 
Kenya. The chapter aims to answer the first research question: Which factors influence 
health system governance in Kenya? The chapter seeks to describe the context reflecting the 
accounts of study participants and a further reflection of this account given the context in 
which they operate, by the researcher. Indeed, all interview participants were keen to 
describe the context including the interplay of political and socioeconomic factors, with 
special reference to the devolution and dispositions of the health system even though these 
were not directly inquired in the interview guide. Understanding the context is imperative in 
health system and policy research as it influences the process of policy development 
(Mirzoev et al., 2015; Walt et al., 2008). It is also imperative to interpret the findings on how 
stakeholders view health system governance (Chapter 6) and if and why governance differs 
between fully functional and not fully functional facilities (Chapter 7). 
Hence, the chapter presents five key themes identified in the study based on participants’ 
characterisations of the context which are identified through the thematic analysis approach 
laid out in Chapter 4 (Methodology). These themes were then interpretively analysed in view 
of data that described the context in which the study took place. The themes related to the 
contextual factors were generated from the interview data while the data on pertinent 
factors originated from policy documents and reports. In this regard, documents and reports 
mainly aim to triangulate and provide a contextual understanding of the participant’s 
illustration. Key themes of the findings are presented in Figures 18-22 with different sub-
themes portraying the context: how devolution presents opportunities for good governance; 
how devolution compromises the county health system; political; sociocultural and health 
system context. 
5.1 Governance in the context of devolution 
 
In August 2010, 67% of Kenyans voted in favour for a new Constitution. According to the new 
Constitution, administrative, political and financial functions have been devolved to the 47 
counties. Health and agriculture were the first two public sectors to embrace devolution, 
with most decision making devolved to county level by 2015. The Constitution defines that 
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national government will no longer provide services but will continue to draft health policies, 
provide technical assistance to counties and manage national referral health facilities. Since 
2010, devolution has been a much-debated topic among both healthcare workers and policy 
makers, and all interview participants were keen to discuss it. Based on the accounts of 
participants’ descriptions, two specific areas have been identified: 1) devolution presents 
opportunities for good governance and; 2) devolution compromises the capacity of the 
health system at the county level.  
5.1.1 Devolution presents opportunities for good governance 
 
While the reasons of devolution in Kenya have been diverse, good governance through 
increased local accountability has been central to devolution as it enhances different forms 
of accountability. Devolution also improves allocative efficiency by bringing the functioning 
unit (county) closer to the community with faster decision making process. Figure 18 
illustrates these three key themes of how devolution presents opportunities for good 
governance.   
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5.1.1.1 Enhanced different accountability mechanisms 
 
Strengthening governance through improving local accountability mechanisms lies at the 
heart of devolution as evident from the findings below. From the perspective of national 
participants, devolution has improved both bureaucratic (administrative) and financial 
accountability. Bureaucratic accountability has improved as devolution provides more 
regular oversight than before and many governors gave health a very high priority resulting 
in increased availability of health workers including senior staff and specialists with “removal 
of the ghost workers”. Others described how coordination between the national and county 
governments has improved since devolution, attributing this to improvements in the 
accountability structures with clarification and redefinition of roles.  
National participants perceived that devolution promoted financial accountability as the 
current Constitution included a “Finance Act” providing an overarching framework. At the 
same time, they acknowledged that county governments had challenges to implementing 
this due to limited capacities and resources. There has been an improvement in 
accountability mechanisms as there are structures such as the County Management 
Authority (CMA) which is composed of community members. The community members form 
the board for financial accountability and now approve the budget. The following quote 
extracted from an interview with a national participant from a bilateral organisation 
illustrates this observation:  
"To me, we have a better governance system than before because already the 
devolved structure provides for that. The CMAs are people at the very low level, 
who are chosen by the community. They represent the community. Now, these 
CMAs are the ones who approve the budget." (KI-4. A national participant from a 
bilateral organisation) 
 
The current election system is perceived as a form of a public accountability (Mitchell & 
Bossert, 2010) mechanism as county leaders would not be elected again if they were not 
fully accountable for their services during their term time. Accountability became more 
important than before as devolution allowed county governments to be independent. 
Therefore, county scorecards have been used as a tool to assess their accountability. The 
other accountability measure discussed by the participants was downward accountability 
within the bureaucracy. This is accountability of the county government and county 
department of health to health workers. In the absence of formal feedback mechanisms, the 
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use of social media has increased. For instance, health workers informally disclosed the 
unfair treatment of their county government on social media. The following dialogue with a 
participant from a multilateral organisation exemplifies this point. 
Interviewer: How about for the facility staff, to complain back to their county 
government, are there any mechanisms in place? 
Participant: I don’t think there is a formal, most of the time, we hear is people 
threatening to go on strike. But there are forums because there is structural 
governance because in each facility there is an in-charge, this in-charge is a 
member of the county health, and could be represented there. So there is a 
channel in which they can do this, but sometimes fear of reprimand and 
backlashes and right now people are very sensitive about complaining, especially 
if you complain much and if you do happen, people may read politics in you, or 
maybe you want to, so they tend to restrain if they do complain sometimes they 
sometimes complain in social media or the media. So the health workers 
sometimes complain through that… Some counties have opened the Facebook and 
twitter to get reports, or they have opened channels so that somebody can write, 
a few of them get addressed. A few of them, of course, get reprimanded or 
threatened, I think recently we are hearing of a threat from a CEC that is an 
equivalent of a minister at the county level threatening the staff, the chief officer, 
equivalent of a permanent secretary so to speak threatening health workers…So 
you see, and it went round in the social media. (KI-15, a national participant from 
a multilateral organisation). 
 
For county participants, social accountability (Mitchell & Bossert, 2010) mechanisms existed 
before devolution as management boards (hospital management board, health facility 
management committee, etc.) were in place at different levels of the health system although 
they needed to be strengthened when devolution was introduced. Nevertheless, county 
participants perceived that citizens were more knowledgeable than before and held the 
county government accountable. 
5.1.1.2 Improve allocative efficiency 
Participants from national and county levels were aware of the newly defined roles and 
responsibilities of the two levels of governments. They felt that devolution somehow 
provided opportunities for good governance as it created opportunities to identify local 
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needs and facilitate policy discussions among local government and populations. Devolution 
reduced the previously long decision making processes and provided opportunities for 
decision making and feedback mechanisms at lower (local) levels. Devolution increased 
opportunities for more efficient local decision making, by “bringing the person closer to the 
decision making, closer to the action”. In doing so, county participants believed this had 
increased responsiveness to local needs, needs that would be difficult to identify at the 
national government level. As indicated by a county official below: 
“The government has come down to the people, and now we can serve them 
better, we can now even have personalised attention to the people other than 
when it was centralised. We can listen to the cries of the people and be able to 
respond very fast because we are on the ground.” (KI-20, a county official) 
 
While county participants believed that devolution had improved allocative efficiency in 
managing resources, national participants also perceived that devolution allowed county 
governors to think holistically about health system improvement including non-health 
sector factors such as roads, infrastructure and communication. However, there was a 
different perspective from facility participants as they felt that devolution reduced the 
integration of services at a provincial level which was in place before devolution and 
information sharing at a sub-national level.   
5.1.1.3 Increased county decision space 
 
Greater county control over decisions has been a motivating factor for citizens to participate 
in local decision making processes. County governments received greater control over 
decision making in two key areas of the health system functions: 1) health service 
organisation and 2) HRH (See also Section 2.5.4). County participants observed that they 
received more decision space (Bossert, 1998) to implement required health services 
programmes within the national norms and standards than prior to devolution. The 
following illustrative quote from a county participant portrays the situation:  
Since devolution, we were able to implement that very effectively. We are making 
our decision at this lower level, so it is not very hard for us. Because we get our 
own funds at the county level, we can do our own supervision in our own time 
frame." (KI-35, a county official) 
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National participants confirmed this as the Constitution gave county governments “a lot of 
clout” to develop and implement health policies as they were “like small Presidents of their 
own territory”.  
Regarding HRH, county governments received a wide decision space as they had the 
discretion to recruit and employ staff. These included deciding on basic salaries and 
allowances within the national standards and setting up terms of employment (recruitment, 
appointment, transfer, promotion and termination). Counties could also set their own 
standards of incentives for performance by providing them opportunities for further studies. 
The following quote from a bilateral organisation participant exemplifies this point.  
"County health management team was told to deal with that person, discipline 
cases and dismissal because the county now does hire and fire. So, if there is a 
health worker who is not performing, the county team can do that, or the board 
can come in and say this person is not working well, can you remove them?" (KI-
4, a national participant from a bilateral organisation) 
 
While national and county participants described how devolution had impacted positively on 
the availability of services and performance of healthcare workers, facility participants also 
noted that devolution improved attention, supportive supervision and local monitoring. 
Because previously the national government did not have “enough (capacity) to go around 
the country making sure they [the work] are done” and “governance is brought closer to the 
[functioning] units.” 
5.1.2 Devolution compromises the capacity of the county health system 
 
The previous section presented how participants perceived devolution as an opportunity for 
good governance. There is a consensus that the central authorities are best placed to oversee 
some public-sector functions such as health. This has been described by interview 
participants who provided examples of how devolution compromised the capacity of county 
government to deliver health services. (Figure 19).  
During interviews, both national and facility participants described how devolution 
represented a “big bang” or a “major shift” in political terms. Facility participants thought 
that the country has “rushed into devolution without having proper policies in place”, and 
before assessing the capacities of both county and national governments to manage their 
new responsibilities. Others reiterated that devolution of the health sector “was sudden”, 
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although it was supposed to “happen in phases” and this led to counties being ill-prepared. 
The process was hindered by the limited capacity of the national government to meet all the 
demands from different counties. 
The following section describes the key sub-themes that emerged: the role of national 
government, the capacity of county government, challenges to increased decision space and 
a threat to equity.  
 
Figure 19: Devolution compromises capacity of the county health system 
 
 
5.1.2.1 Role of national government  
 
There were gaps in supporting the counties particularly due to efficiency gaps within the 
health system. Facility participants felt that national government should maintain 
responsibility until counties were ready and the systems were in place so that counties in 
order to limit difficulties, for example, in handling health workers’ payments. County 
participants perceived this as a lack of willingness from the central ministry to provide this 
support as they felt that the national government was “used to the centralised system” 
where they managed all the resources. County and facility participants perceived such 
situations as examples of the national government not willing to devolve the functions and 
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therefore not fulfilling their mandate. The following quotes from a county participant 
illustrate this point: 
“…the Constitution is very clear in schedule two, it has listed what the things the 
county government will do are, and what are the things the national government 
will do, so everybody knows their mandate, but I think it is just the good will, the 
commitment and realising that… if you are used to a centralised system, where 
you have all the resources, where you are the one who calls all the shots, letting 
go is not always easy.” (KI-26, a county official). 
“We think that it might be a calculated move by the national government to paint 
that the counties have failed in taken care of the health needs of the people so 
that the people are agitated. So when a referendum comes, they say counties 
cannot manage the health care for this country, then it is easier for people to vote 
back the health services back to the national government, so I think there is a lack 
of mutual good will from the two levels of government.” (KI-26, a county official). 
 
The national government was criticised for not being more responsible and supportive to the 
county level governments. County participants felt that “little capacity building [was] done 
by the national government”. A participant from a multilateral organisation perceived that 
prioritisation, resource management, standardising the norms across the country and 
leadership capacity of the national government were the key bottlenecks for the 
unavailability of services including those for emergency obstetric care. However, others 
noted that the national government themselves had limited capacity to support the process 
of devolution.  
The other problem raised by facility participants was a lack of clear roles and responsibilities 
among key stakeholders. This undermined the process of devolution leading to tension and 
competition between the county and national governments.  
There has not been adequate implementation rules and regulations to specify roles and 
responsibilities such as those for procurement of medicines and medical products. There 
have also been instances where there was de-concentration (the central level still controlled 
the decision) instead of devolution as the national government did not empower county 
administrative staff and did not create clear roles and responsibilities for county government 
units. Yet, the counties were held accountable when there was a problem.  
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5.1.2.2 Capacity of county government 
 
County governments had variable baseline capacities and historical developmental 
challenges (See also Section 2.5.2), meaning some had more to develop than others before 
they were ready to manage services because “some counties have been neglected for several 
decades”. Planning and financial management were critical administrative capacities that 
county governments required, and also, proper monitoring systems (programmatic and 
financial) needed to be in place.  
National participants noted that some counties could manage to handle the responsibilities 
devolved from the national government while others struggled. There were county 
governments who were not exposed to handling large budgets. Thus they faced challenges 
in planning and absorbing these funds into the budget. This was also compromised by the 
situation as systems and structures were not in place.  
All facility participants from a particular county wished to “go back to the centralised health 
system” as they felt the situation worsened after devolution. Some facility participants 
perceived that their county government did not understand their roles and hence it was 
difficult to discuss with the challenges health workers were facing, therefore “the health 
system since devolution is confusion, a total confusion!” The particular aspect which facility 
participants felt that “there was no positive aspect at all”, was with regard to management 
of HRH and medical supplies though there were some “visible, infrastructural improvements” 
in some areas. The following quote from a facility participant illustrates this observation: 
“For devolution, in terms of facilities and all that you tend to see some 
improvements, some slight improvements. But in terms of human resource, it is 
awful; there is no positive aspect of it at all. There is no positive aspect because I 
am yet to hear someone praising devolution for the human resource aspect of it.” 
(KI-38, Health worker) 
 
Similarly, a national participant perceived infrastructural improvement as “political” since 
“everyone was putting up infrastructures, [rather than] investing in the real needs”. 
Additionally, these challenges were not believed to be entirely due to inadequate capacity 
of the county government but considered them due to lack of will among county 
governments to improve the situation. The following dialogue with a national participant 
from a multilateral organisation exemplifies this point. The participant believed that 
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although the county government had the discretion to discipline their health staff, it was not 
happening.  
Participant: “We felt that devolution was an opportunity to manage their human 
resource for health better, because when it was centralized governance, it was 
very difficult to take action where health worker is misbehaving, beyond giving a 
disciplinary letter, there was very little you could do, all the actions were taken up 
at the central level. But now that function can be done at the county level, so we 
were hoping that it will make the performance of the health worker better, it is 
not quite happening.” 
Interviewer: Why? 
Participant: For me, I feel I go back to capacity again and then the goodwill at the 
county level, you see there is a lot of tribalism, nepotism. (KI-14, a national 
participant from a multilateral organisation) 
 
5.1.2.3 Challenges of increased decision space 
 
Under Section 5.1.2.1 of this chapter, how greater county control over decisions on two 
health system functions (HRH and health service organisation) presented opportunities for 
good governance was discussed. At the same time, participants discussed how these two 
areas of health system functions had been affected as a result of devolution with limited 
health financing.  
Handling HRH was the biggest challenge for counties as they became responsible for 
managing the payroll within a given “resource envelope” set by the national government. 
Hence, any decision of the county on handling human resources was limited by the budget 
ceiling which the county government received. County participants shared their frustration 
regarding a pre-set budget ceiling which did not allow them to expand services because of a 
shortage of human resources. HRH files (information to manage HRH system) remained with 
the national government, even though counties were paying health workers’ salaries. 
Although the national government handed this over to the county governments, they did not 
have the system and structure, causing delays in payment of health workers’ salaries. 
Discrepancies in payroll between the national and county appointed staff also caused 
dissatisfaction among health workers. These factors led to frequent health workers’ strikes 
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which disturbed health service provision compromising the trusting relationship between 
county government and health staff. The following quote from a county participant 
illustrates this point: 
Recently, I went for a governor meeting in Mama Lucy. I found nurses there are 
about to go on strike ten days ago because they had not received their salaries, 
they congregated in the compound say, from today they are not working, so we 
have to call the county headquarters and find out from the human resource. As I 
came here, people had started going on strike. Mothers are lining up in MCH, 
nobody is seeing them. Now we were told salaries would be sent today to their 
accounts so that we talked to them and they said if you don’t receive the salaries 
by the end of tomorrow, we are not coming to work. That is becoming a very big 
problem. If it is not streamlined, it will create a lot of challenges. So, we have 
human resource challenges whereby the delayed salaries and others being paid 
higher than the rest for the same job because of two parallel contract agreement 
and payroll.” (KI-7, a county official) 
 
Some health workers disagreed with the decision to devolve payroll to the county level 
because they felt insecure about their jobs being managed by the counties. The following 
quote from a national level multilateral organisation participant illustrates this observation: 
“It has been very complicated to roll out the devolution of the health sector moving 
out the whole thing from the national government to the counties...it has been 
tough because we had doctors refusing to be paid by the counties. Because they 
were not sure that the counties would be sustainable... The payroll is coming from 
the central government, so they were sure of the continuity...people fear change. 
They are not sure of what is going to happen.” (KI-1, a national participant from a 
multilateral organisation)   
 
Nevertheless, the current Constitution granted a wide decision space to county governments 
to prioritise services and allocate resources to finance devolved functions. Counties had the 
discretion to determine the budget allocation for health. In each county, the County 
Executive Committee and County Department of Health were responsible for providing 
guidance and set the agenda for health service organisation and delivery in the county 
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(KHSSP, 2012). According to the 2010 Constitution, the national government set the 
Equitable Share to allocate national resources to counties (Republic of Kenya, 2010). 
However, this did not guarantee allocation of resources into the health sector as the share 
was not earmarked for a specific sector. As a result, the health sector had to compete for 
resources with other sectors. The following quote from a county participant exemplifies this 
observation: 
“You cannot do more than the ceiling, so it has been a challenge to us. It gives as 
a limit because currently, we are operating at one-third our needs in terms of the 
healthcare service provider. We still have two-thirds to go, so that is a big gap… 
Actually, the Department of Health alone takes around 30% of the entire county 
budget, the health docket, at least 30% is allocated to health, and we have 10 
departments, so that tells you that health is one of the major dockets that have 
been given priority.” (KI-26, a county official) 
 
The 2010 Constitution also allowed counties to generate their own revenue in line with the 
national standards. As described in Chapter 2, the sources of revenue for most of the 
counties were channelled through the national government in the form of proportional 
grants with some local taxes. One of the main limitations of the budget ceiling which county 
governments faced was the inability to recruit more health staff. This bottleneck was 
perceived as limiting the expansion of services as per the needs. This was significant in 
counties with limited resources to generate their own revenue and hence relying solely on 
the national government. The following quote from a county participant illustrates this point: 
“Because we generate about 5-7% of the total budget, is what the county 
generates within itself, that is what we sell a lot is sand, business permits within 
the county, parking fees, such things. But now taxes, we remit to the national 
government, now that is where the challenge is because all the taxes we remit 
nationally and get a few channels which we can be able to collect money within 
the county. Then we don’t have major big towns, industrial zones such that are 
able to generate more revenue within the county, and also our county is semi -arid 
so the agriculture is limited and it slows down the growth.” (KI-27, a county 
official) 
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5.1.2.4 Threat to equity 
 
Decentralisation was expected to have implications on health-related equity as it depends 
on pre-existing socioeconomic contexts. Participants described how the government has 
tried to reduce inequity in different counties as the government has set up an arrangement 
called “equitable share” which accounted for minimum 15% of the national government 
budget. However, due to inadequate resource generation by the county governments, the 
development budget has been allocated to pay health workers’ salaries instead of the 
recurrent budget. With devolution, recruitment of human resources led by county 
governments ensured equal opportunities through the promotion of people from 
marginalised communities. However, in some counties, it was impossible to recruit health 
staff from the local communities due to their level of education. Some counties were quite 
disadvantaged in that they had difficulties in attracting and retaining health workers due to 
the poor socioeconomic situation and lack of health workers originating from their 
communities. Health workers working in the Maasai region stated that they “didn’t have a 
single Maasai doctor working in this county”. Hence, facility participants perceived that the 
MOH should take a leadership role and set standards to regulate facilities across counties as 
counties had different standards since devolution. The following quote from a health worker 
illustrates this point: 
"We should standardise health, in terms of if a patient is to be seen in a level two 
facility. For instance, in Kirinyaga and they go to maybe Turkana they should get 
the same services. Because of devolution, different counties have put different 
measures to achieve their goals. If the minister of health which is the oversight 
ministry comes with regulations and policy to synchronise health, I think we will 
be in a better position." (KI-32, Health worker) 
 
The other challenge was “capture of local elites” as powerful elites or politicians wanted to 
interfere with the management of health workers within the county department of health. 
The following quote from a county participant exemplifies this observation:  
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"The politicians sometimes they interfere because an elected leader will call me 
and tell me there is this patient, why wasn’t this done. Don’t you think you should 
have done it this way… Politicians would want you to do something different which 
might not be ethical; sometimes there is that interference… They have a lot of 
influence, like one time they called the governor and the governor called the local 
minister, so the local minister told us to say what happened, but everything was 
well written, there was no case of mismanagement." (KI-27, a county official) 
 
5.2 Context of governance 
 
Contextual factors consistently influence the way health system govern and how key 
stakeholders interact. Hence, the following section describes macro, contextual factors 
(particularly political and sociocultural context) influencing the health system. Figure 20 
portrays current political context highlighting how it supports good governance with the 
move towards universal health coverage recounted by different level of interview 
participants from the study.  
 
5.2.1 Political context 
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One national participant recalled how Kenya had experienced several political hurdles since 
independence; the one party political regime presented challenges to good governance 
including the collapse of public institutions. Since 2002, government elections have been 
held every five years. Participants from bilateral and multilateral organisations perceived 
that there was “very good political support” to improve governance of the country as the 
government, including high-level government officials, have initiated anti-corruption 
reforms and called for greater accountability. The President himself “has taken a very strong 
stand” against corruption, as illustrated by the report presented to Parliament implicating 
high officials in corruption cases.  
Participants from different levels of the health system suggested that the current political 
environment also favours investment to improve maternal health within the country; for 
example, the Vision 2030 strategic planning document states that every Kenyan should have 
access to free, good quality healthcare services. Participants described how other policy 
statements appeared very supportive of the move towards universal health coverage: the 
government has prescribed two new health financing policies including one which abolishes 
user fees in public primary care facilities, and another which assures free maternity services 
in all public facilities regardless of the level of care. Along with this, there are other high-level 
initiatives such as the “Beyond Zero” campaign led by the First Lady which aims to reduce 
structural barriers for women to access healthcare services by setting up mobile clinics in 
remote areas.  
On the other hand, some facility participants were not satisfied with the government’s 
efforts to improve healthcare as they felt that there were not enough measures taken or 
political will in place to sustain those initiatives in the long run. Health financing was labelled 
as ‘donor dependent’ as donors contributed to about 30% of total health sector budget. The 
government’s actions which divert public resources to other neglected sectors have resulted 
in chronic under-funding of the health sector in the inability to meet the commitments of 
the Abuja Declaration, which specified that 15% of the annual budget should be allocated to 
health. The following quotes of national level participants from multilateral organisations 
exemplify this point:  
“The health sector in Kenya is donor dependent. You study all the reports [and] 
you will discover that it is donor dependent. The education sector is government 
dependent. It’s actually like 5% comes from the donors, but the health sector, its 
majority comes from donors. Kenya has not been able to push the budget to at 
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least 15% of the GDP as it was agreed in Abuja declaration…we are still around 
6%, so health is not as well funded by government”. (KI-1, a national participant 
from a multilateral organisation) 
“Kenya gets external financing supports about 5% of its total budget. But when it 
comes to the health sector, donor funds up to a 3rd of the total health budget. 
What naturally the Ministry of Finance and National Treasury looks at is, which 
sectors are not receiving donor financing so they can compensate and make sure 
that those sectors are not neglected.” (KI-3, a national participant from a 
multilateral organisation) 
 
The government is expected to take more ownership to sustain their interventions they 
pledged to support within existing capacities and country resources. Besides, practical 
challenges were not considered when adopting new health financing policies and initiatives, 
such as the capacity of the health sector to comply with the new financing policies (such as 
user fees abolishment and free maternity services, FMS), and the feasibility and 
appropriateness of vehicles for mobile clinics in places with limited accessibility (for Beyond 
Zero campaign).  
 
5.2.2 Socio-cultural context 
 
Figure 21 illustrates key themes highlighting the importance of the sociocultural context as 
interview participants believed that cultural factors still play a significant role in the current 
health system posting some barriers for community access to health care without adequate 
information. Each sub-theme is described below. 
Figure 21: Sociocultural context 
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Participants from all categories highlighted the importance of sociocultural issues regarding 
care-seeking patterns of women within the communities. Cultural factors such as religion 
and gender still dictated health seeking behaviour of maternal and newborn health. 
Husbands, mothers-in-law or elderly aunts were influential decision makers affecting the 
uptake of delivery and family planning services. The following quote from a participant from 
a bilateral organisation exemplifies this observation. 
“Here it’s not the decision of the mother where she delivers, is the decision of the 
husband or the mother in law, or the aunt… other community members who are 
like TBAs...who have a lot of influence… because normally they are elderly women 
who are respected...the remote areas and this is the only person who they 
consult.” (KI-4, a national participant from a bilateral organisation) 
 
Some cultural beliefs such as “traditional birth attendants take care of women better than 
health workers in a facility” were still prevalent. Communities still believed that facility-based 
nurses were younger and perhaps less qualified to care for women, as suggested in this quote 
from a multilateral organisation participant:  
“They don’t go to the health facility because they think those girls, small girls who 
are not supposed to assist them when they are delivering. You see how the culture 
was and the complications and then when they bring them to the health facility 
they are told to pay something, and that discourages them even more.” (KI-1, a 
national participant from a multilateral organisation) 
 
Therefore, health workers felt that community preparedness and awareness on the use of 
skilled birth attendants is not sufficient. Seeking care from trained healthcare providers was 
further discouraged by the attitude of health workers, user fees (were not abolished) and 
other transaction costs. The following quote extracted from an interview with a facility 
participant illustrates this observation: 
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“So, if the man decides that they are not going or they cannot provide the 
transportation, they cannot provide finances…if it is delivery, the mother would 
prefer to deliver in the village where there are people who know her and she knows 
them. So, they can give social-emotional care while in the hospital, they regard the 
hospital workers to be rude, to be harsh and not to be accommodative enough.” 
(KI-9, Health worker) 
 
5.2.3 Health system context 
Participants discussed two aspects of the health system relating to health financing and HRH. 
Figure 22 Illustrates two key themes describing how financing influences the way the health 
system is governed, how the HRH issue could create grounds for patronage and corruption. 
Each theme is described below.  
 
Figure 22: Health system context 
 
 
5.2.3.1 Health financing 
 
The interview questions did not touch on health financing per se, yet many participants were 
keen to discuss this and emphasised that inadequate health financing had been a critical 
stumbling block to health system progress and caused the health system vulnerable to 
embezzlement. Indeed, long-standing problems in health system financing can affect the 
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way the health system is governed. Participants across health system levels discussed two 
aspects of health financing: user fees and insurance contribution such as National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF).  
Previous sections have described how the health sector was “donor-dependent” as that 
there were insufficient resources to fund the health system and health financing has been 
one of the bottlenecks of the health sector. Facility participants highlighted that despite the 
FMS policy in public health facilities, user fees still exist, stressing that “the patients have to 
pay” and “there is no free medication”. User fees continued to be an important source of 
financing for health facilities as “a system for this health facility to survive, it needs some 
little contributions to make the hospital run”. User fees ensure that facilities can continue to 
provide services even when facilities have no other source of income, for instance, when 
facilities do not receive timely disbursements from the government. On the other hand, user 
fees can become catastrophic expenditures for households. This is why the government 
abolished user fees for all public facilities at primary care level and introduced FMS in public 
facilities. To encourage public facilities to provide FMS, they receive reimbursement from 
the national government based on the types and numbers of deliveries after providing the 
data.  
Participants perceived that the country would only benefit from abolishing user fees if 
facilities adhered to the policy, received timely reimbursement for services provided and if 
there was a strong monitoring system. In reality, there have been challenges in adhering to 
the FMS policy at public health facilities due to the complicated nature of the refund 
mechanism resulting in delayed disbursements from national to county level. The following 
quote from a MOH participant exemplifies this observation:  
“…that money was being delayed. Because it was the facility to provide the 
services and then they get reimbursement after providing us with the data or of 
the women were delivered. But you know, get those reports and all those things 
are usually lengthy and some delayed.” (KI-5, a national participant from the 
MOH) 
 
There was no mechanism to monitor implementation, including how funds have been 
managed, when the policies were first introduced. The situation became complicated when 
the funds given to reimburse a facility for maternity services were not used for the intended 
purposes; similar findings have been reported in the comprehensive assessment conducted 
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by the MOH in 2015 (Ministry of Health, 2015). As a consequence, some public facilities were 
still charging user fees, and some of the maternity services were not free. The following 
quote from a facility participant illustrates this point:  
“Government facilities are supposed to be free. They are charging the patients…it 
is not free. [Patients] pay, they pay some money. I have been to some government 
facilities, they [the patients] have to pay. There is no free medication" (KI-11, 
Health worker) 
In addition to user fees, transport costs were also key barriers to seeking care for 
communities in places where health facilities did not have functioning ambulances. Facility 
participants recounted their experiences when patients did not comply with their referral 
advice because they had to pay for services. The government rushed the implementation of 
the FMS policy without understanding a proper assessment of the health sector capacity. 
Some county officials felt that there were gaps in the new financing policy as they had 
difficulties with the reimbursement arrangement. Hence, health financing policy should not 
be planned in isolation without considering the socioeconomic situation of the population in 
the relevant county. The following quote from a county participant illustrates this 
observation: 
“If we look at health in isolation, the best alternative would be to get everybody 
into a form of cover actually the whole nation. Ideally, if we can get them into a 
form of cover where every individual who is working contributes… But now as a 
county, if we were to address it then probably we need to look outside health and 
try and see how we can create wealth. But we can have the majority of the people 
at least earning.” (KI-27, a county official) 
 
Nevertheless, according to national participants, the government was well aware of the 
problems with the FMS policy and acknowledged its limitations. Thus, the government tried 
to integrate other forms of financing such as the NHIF. Participants from multilateral 
organisations believed that if maternity services were reimbursed within the NHIF scheme, 
it would be more systematic and avoids unnecessary parallel state-centric reimbursement 
process.  
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This study did not make a specific inquiry on HRH, yet almost every participant raised 
concerns and mentioned the current challenges with regard to HRH in the country. 
Challenges related to HRH deterred the progress of the health system, its governance and 
creating grounds for patronage and corruption. Challenges included the inadequate 
availability of health workers with problems in retaining them due to poor infrastructure, 
lack of incentives with delays in receiving salaries and poor remunerations under the 
devolved government.  
Inadequate availability of HRH has been a critical, long-standing problem in Kenya prior to 
health system devolution. The MOH participants were aware of the situation including the 
unequal distribution of health workers and “skewed distribution of health facilities” with 
fewer resources available particularly in hard-to-reach areas. Retention of skilled health 
workers has been an issue as they received little remuneration but worked despite the poor 
infrastructure, inadequate supplies and equipment. Devolution of the health system has also 
brought changes to health workers’ payments. Different payment scheme between national 
and county governments are described in Section 5.1.2.3. This discrepancy caused tension 
among medical staff who felt demotivated working under the county government. For 
example, medical interns who remained under the central MOH were paid more than 
medical officers who were paid by the county government. The following quote from a 
facility participant exemplifies this point. The participant was explaining that remuneration 
from the county government was lower than that from the national government: 
“In the national government, it was 1200 dollars, so they hacked it and in fact, it 
is less. In fact, an intern who is paid by the national government is earning more 
than a medical officer, it is that bad, if I show you the pay slip you feel like an intern 
earns 90 something thousand, a medical officer earns 47 thousand…The county 
remunerations are poor, and it is demotivating, most of the allowances have been 
cut off.” (KI-36, Health worker) 
 
This was compounded by health workers’ receiving late salary payments from county 
governments due to the delay in disbursements from the national government. This has 
affected the lives of health workers as their basic needs have not been met causing periodic 
health workers strikes. Even in health facilities where health workers were in attendance, 
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they failed to deliver the required services as suggested in the following quote from a facility 
participant: 
 
“…other things are also in the healthcare workers. Some of the healthcare workers 
in some institutions because of lack of motivation, lack of good pay and nowadays 
we go slow. They don’t want to work because they have not been paid. So, they 
go to work, but they are just there, they are not attending to patients. A patient 
can come, and they are told today we are not working, so there is that go slow.” 
(KI-11, Health worker) 
National participants from multilateral organisations perceived that it was difficult to address 
the shortages of health workers as counties did not have the capacity to employ enough 
health workers due to their tight fiscal space. County officials also commented that they 
could not realise their plans due to the limited resources allocated by the national 
government as described in previous sections. Continual transfers of health workers were 
also a problem. 
Interestingly, while almost every facility participant was complaining about their workload, 
one participant provided a different perspective as his facility sometimes received twice their 
current workloads. The following quote illustrates this point. The participant is explaining 
that they could still handle the increased workload as a result of proper management of 
health workforce within that particular facility: 
“There are rotations, and we can handle even double, the workload we have now 
a double because most of the times we are not very overworked at this point, we 
have that room of having to review more cases.” (KI-24, Health worker) 
 
One of the long-standing challenges in the health system was inefficient resource 
management as some of the recruitment was not based on identified needs, and a certain 
proportion of the health budget went to non-essential staff causing gaps in critical positions. 
The following quote from a bilateral organisation participant exemplifies this observation: 
“The second area is efficiency in that resource utilisation, because when the little 
resource available is not used efficiently, then we have wastage…Now again 
coming back, to health workforce, the government spends about 70% of its budget 
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worth of wages, salaries…And then you go back and realise almost 70% of these 
workers are non-essential staff. For instance, we have drivers, watchmen, 
cleaners; you see my point who pick up a big chunk… If 70% BUDGET is going to 
that and 70 of them are not essential, then you have critical shortages of critical 
staff that are why they are few, but the money available is not used for them.” (KI-
4, a national participant from a bilateral organisation) 
 
5.3 Chapter summary 
 
The chapter begins with devolution describing how devolution presents opportunities for 
good governance but compromises the capacity at county level government. The process of 
devolving the health sector in Kenya has begun since 2013, and hence, the context is shifting 
from centralised to the decentralised health system. The chapter details how the transfer of 
responsibilities to lower levels in the health sector has impacted the way health facilities are 
governed, and the feasibility of operationalising good governance principles more widely. 
The findings highlighted differing views on devolution from three levels of the health system. 
For instance, county level participants viewed the devolution of the country health system 
positively that devolution allowed them to respond to the needs of their population and they 
could allocate resources efficiently. On the other hand, national level participants highlighted 
the need to strengthen the capacity of the county government to handle the now devolved 
functions as devolution compromised the capacity of the county health system. However, 
county and facility level participants felt that the national government was not willing to 
devolve functions to county governments. 
 
The chapter then illustrates the context of governance highlighting how political; 
socioeconomic and cultural context shapes the way people interact within the health system 
in Kenya. Participants from all health system levels perceived that maternal health was 
recognised as a priority within the current political context as evident from the free 
maternity services policy and Beyond Zero Campaign. Participants from all health system 
levels also acknowledged the importance of socio-cultural context as it influenced the health 
seeking behaviour of the communities. Finally, the chapter ends by describing the two crucial 
aspects of the health system: limited health financing and bottlenecks in managing human 
resources for health (HRH).  
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6. Perception of key stakeholders on health 
system governance 
 
The preceding chapter presented the context influencing the governance of the Kenyan 
health system in regards to one of the major influencing factors, devolution at the 
background. In so doing, the chapter sought to contribute towards answering the first 
research question: Which factors influence the governance of the health system in Kenya? 
In this aspect, the themes developed from participants’ description on different aspects of 
devolution on governance with macro-contextual factors such as political, socioeconomic 
and health system factors.  
This chapter follows the above to further contribute to answering the second research 
objective: to explore the perspectives of key stakeholders on health systems governance. In 
other words, Chapter 5 attempts to explain which factors influence the governance of the 
health system while this chapter focuses on how key stakeholders in Kenya viewed health 
system governance particularly in relation to specific operational principles of governance: 
participation, the rule of law and strategic vision, accountability, equity and control of 
corruption. Hence, Chapter 5 explores “macro” institutional factors while this chapter 
focuses on the gaze on the “meso” and “micro” factors, offering a holistic account of health 
system governance under study. This chapter presents information collected from interviews 
with key stakeholders using the governance assessment framework adopted in this study 
(Chapter 4 Methodology).  
The chapter presents the key five themes identified in the study based on participants’ 
characterisations of operational principles of governance. The themes were identified 
through the thematic analysis approach laid out in the methodology chapter. These themes 
were then interpretively analysed to gather data describing governance. They are presented 
in Figures 23 to 27 where different sub-themes and categories have been identified across 
five key themes of the governance principles: accountability, control of corruption, the rule 
of law and strategic vision, equity and participation.  
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6.1 Understanding governance  
 
National and county participants perceived governance as being useful for the health system 
while some facility participants seemed to be struggling to put governance into a broader 
context. Few facility participants perceived governance as the responsibility of the 
government.  
Facility participants perceived governance to be a function of government management 
systems and regarded governance as the Ministry of Health’s responsibility. To them, 
governance was synonymous with “oversight”; provision of supervision in the field to ensure 
that the policies and standards set by the government were implemented. Therefore, they 
felt that they were not involved in setting the rules of the game, but were involved only to 
ensure the rules were followed.  
National and county participants described governance as one key pillar of the health system 
which had a mechanism to produce the type of outputs that the community required. Some 
national and county level participants explained health system governance in their own 
terms, and their definitions included “quality health services” provided by “accountable 
staff” and resources managed in ways to allow for “equitable access to services” and equity 
in health outcomes. Other national and county participants explained that governance 
implies that “services respond to local needs” through transparent decision making and 
implementation processes that involve service users as well as staff. 
A participant from multilateral organisation noted that good governance improved 
performance of a health system as good governance ensured efficient use of available 
resources using appropriate monitoring systems. This, in turn, led to better health outcomes 
as the health system was “becoming more responsive to the people and their expectations”. 
Another national participant perceived that they “will not see an impact in [the] health sector 
if the governance issues are not properly sorted”. They believed that with time there would 
be differences among counties because of the quality of governance. Other national and 
county participants highlighted that there was a need to build the capacities of county 
governments in areas of management, leadership and governance. The following quotes 
from national and county participants illustrate this point. They were explaining that the 
county governments who were new to their positions required technical support to ensure 
good governance.  
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“Instead of focussing more on buying equipment, making sure the infrastructure 
is there making leadership and management at the county and the national level 
is something very key we need to support the counties that they become better 
leaders, better managers.” (KI-14, A national participant from a multilateral 
organisation) 
“…for good governance within the county, we need to really train the county 
managers on governance and how to be able to interpret things and overcome 
challenges. Because you have brought people, you have brought politicians, and 
you have brought technical people, but they haven’t been trained on governance. 
So, they just read the Constitution on their own, they read the acts on their own, 
but they may not have that general governance approach of doing things...” (KI-
27, A county official) 
 
In addition to the overall understanding of governance, this study can unpack specific 
operational principles of governance described by the participants during interviews. Indeed, 
by applying the framework described in Chapter 4, this study can elucidate how principles of 
governance have been operationalised in the Kenyan health system. The following section 
presents findings on those principles: accountability, control of corruption, the rule of law 
and strategic vision, equity and participation.  
6.2 Realising accountability  
 
Accountability was the most frequently discussed principle of governance during interviews. 
A national participant defined accountability as a process which ensured the “voices” of 
beneficiaries were heard in the “decision making” process. Accountability was defined, in the 
traditional sense, as the obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for 
one’s actions. It was also a synonym for “citizen’s voice”, i.e. a process which ensured that 
the opinions of beneficiaries were heard and had a place in any decision making process. In 
the discussion of accountability mechanisms, the idea of holding government agents 
responsible for acts, behaviours and results did emerge strongly.  
In general, different accountability mechanisms exist in Kenya. Unfortunately, some citizens 
demanded services to which they were not entitled, trying to benefit from the system. The 
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following quote from a national participant from a multilateral organisation exemplifies this 
observation: 
“If I make noise, I know that I will get certain benefits out of the system. So, I am 
making noise, not because I want to improve services but because I want to be 
shut up. So, you see a bit of that going on. Which is not the kind of accountability 
that we are looking for.” (KI-2, A national participant from a multilateral 
organisation) 
 
Indeed, there were even some civil society organisations which tried to leverage patron-
client relationships to obtain services or public resources for their own benefit, rather than 
improving community ownership and social justice. Therefore, in cases where individual 
elected officials might be willing to improve the situation, some patron-client relations posed 
a contextual challenge for good governance. Hence, two sub-themes have been identified in 
realising accountability: accountability mechanisms in place and the presence of challenges 
to improve the accountability. (Figure 23)  
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6.2.1 Accountability mechanisms in place 
Three main accountability mechanisms were identified: financial accountability, 
performance accountability and community accountability. Regarding financial 
accountability, national and facility participants highlighted the importance of developing a 
good tracking system to report on the flow of funds from the national to the county 
governments. The interest in such a tracking system was particularly motivated by stories 
about the misappropriation of funds. The following quote from a national participant from a 
multilateral organisation illustrates this point:  
“…from the newspapers, the counties are still not as good in terms of 
accountability. And…with the time and as the law takes its course arresting some 
who misappropriate and things like those people will now be serious, following the 
guidelines and the rule of law.” (KI-1, A national participant from a bilateral 
organisation) 
 
County governors had limited experience in financial management and did not have the 
mechanisms to administer funds properly and this was perceived as an underlying 
vulnerability. Yet, they were asked to manage resources and conduct procurements. The 
following quote from a multilateral organisation participant illustrates this point: 
“Quite a lot of counties [because they] were not very much exposed to 
management of huge funds. Before they were districts and these things they never 
got managed that huge funds, so we expect a lot of misappropriations here and 
there especially through procurement things like those.” (KI-1, A national 
participant from a bilateral organisation) 
 
In relation to performance accountability, there was no objectively set system to improve 
the performance of public sector staff. There was no system of providing feedback within 
the county system, and facility participants complained that they had repeatedly requested 
feedback from their county governments on a regular basis. The presence of patronage 
further complicated the situation, and lack of enforcement of rules as performance 
accountability depended on individual institutional arrangements which, in turn, depended 
on the fairness of those who did not abuse their authority. For instance, sending a health 
worker to attend a course or conference for appraising one’s performance might depend on 
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favouritism and the individual caprice of managers, not necessarily reflecting the outstanding 
performance.  
As a measure to improve community accountability, community complaint mechanisms 
such as suggestion boxes, health centre committees, service charter and providing receipts 
for every payment were reported. Participants from different levels mentioned that Kenya 
already had such accountability mechanisms at both community and facility levels, even 
before devolution. They described structures such as the village health committee which 
governed the operations at the community unit, facility management teams (including 
health centre committee) at the facility level, sub-county management and the county health 
management teams (CHMT) were all thought to facilitate accountability at different levels of 
the health system, respectively. A county participant nominated them as “organs” critical to 
providing oversight to make the best use of resources. However, the level of functioning of 
those organs was variable, and some depended on external funding to function such as 
funding the organising of regular meetings. There were also cases when the management 
was not willing to have a governing board in place or where there was collusion between 
management and governing boards. The following quote from a national level participant 
from a bilateral organisation exemplifies this observation:  
“If the management is not willing to have a board in place, may be issues of 
accountability, it becomes very difficult to establish one because they can influence 
who is coming into the board. They can influence what decision they make. 
Sometimes we have very weak boards, you may find someone who is very strong 
politically and very vocal in the community but he is not a good leader, and he is 
heading the board. At that level, they are at the mercy of the hospital technical 
team. In some cases, you find that the board and management team being 
together.” (KI-4, A national participant from a bilateral organisation) 
 
6.2.2 Challenges to improve accountability 
 
The lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities, communication gap and lack of incentives to 
be accountable were key challenges to improving accountability. Resistance to being held 
accountable, the presence of patronage, nepotism and tribalism in the system were also 
challenges to improve accountability as a national participant noted: “it became very difficult 
to implement some of the disciplinary measures”. Competitions and professional silos were 
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other recognised challenges undermining the accountability among key actors due to the 
lack of role clarity and responsibility. The following quote from a national level, multilateral 
organisation participant, illustrates this point: 
 “There are a lot of stepping on each other’s toes. You are entering my area this and 
my area that. People look at it as an empire, not as a service.” (KI-2, A national 
participant from a multilateral organisation) 
 
The communication gap between county and facility staff also posed challenges in the 
improving of bureaucratic (internal) accountability. The situation created tension as facility 
participants stated that they did not trust their county government and felt that the county 
government personnel would not act without political gain. Particularly, facility participants 
from one county perceived that their county government was not responsive in meeting the 
needs of the population and they perceived the county governors as “just politicians and 
[who] did not know much about the health system”. 
There was a perception that there was a willingness to improve accountability towards 
citizens in the current environment. However, a participant from a bilateral organisation 
perceived that accountability could only be ensured if leadership (either county or hospital 
management) was willing to be held accountable as people made use of their positions once 
they came into power. The same participant commented that there were occasions when 
the leadership was not sure that they would be selected again after their current term and 
they abused their power while they had an opportunity. The following quote from a national 
participant from a multilateral organisation exemplifies this observation: 
“If I have a devolution system and election system that gave me leadership that is 
fixed over five years, if that leadership is not interested in coming back after five 
years, then they can do whatever they want irrespective of what the end user 
says… The member of the country assembly and so on, some of them know that 
they will not come back. So, they see no reason why they should respond to the 
needs.” (KI-2, A national participant from a multilateral organisation) 
 
There were also instances where the accountability mechanisms were not fully implemented 
due mainly to health system issues such as shortages of funds or human resources even 
though the resources needed to implement the mechanisms have been identified. 
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Therefore, one of the challenges in realising accountability was a limitation of resources 
within the health system. Facility participants shared their frustration regarding the 
difficulty of being able to adhere to the FMS policy within the context of a limited resource 
situation. Under such circumstances, they had to write prescriptions for patients due to 
shortages of medical supplies and equipment in their own facilities despite the promise of 
their provision as part of FMS policy.  
As described in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.3.2), the health system challenges relating to HRH also 
compromised the accountability of health workers. The situation could not provide enough 
technical and administrative oversight to identify and improve the conditions of health 
workers’ absenteeism and embezzlement in the workplace. Health worker shortages and 
poor management also favoured patronage practices as health workers needed to 
“negotiate” with their managers to undertake “private practices” during public office hours. 
The following quote of a national participant from a multilateral organisation illustrates this 
point:  
“All the doctors are doing personal consultancies…Like in Nairobi, our main 
referral hospital is Kenyatta national hospital, it is the biggest government 
hospital where all the sophisticated equipment is. And doctors are there, seeing 
patients a few hours, they leave, they go to their personal practice…I tell you this 
afternoon, around 3, I am going to see a doctor. Doctors come around at three 
o’clock, and they see private patients, but before then this doctor is working in a 
government hospital. All of them are doing that. They are in the government 
facility; they have their salary, and in the afternoon, they go to their own private 
clinics...They must be having an arrangement with the employers that I am coming 
here to serve you at this time.” (KI-1, A national participant from a bilateral 
organisation) 
 
Lack of downward accountability was another challenge to improving accountability. Facility 
participants believed that county governments should have the political will to be 
accountable, but the interests of some county officials were politically driven and far from 
the reality on the ground. Participants highlighted the lack of downward accountability as 
most people were concerned with upward accountability (the accountability towards their 
managers or higher level). This has been illustrated by a facility participant below. The 
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participant stated that the governor visited only when there were important political events, 
and he ensured that there were enough medical supplies only in advance of the visit.  
“The top governance should be able to learn to come low to the level of people 
that are working under them, the employees. They should not remain at that level 
and govern at that level without coming low to know our struggles to know our 
problems. He [the governor] only comes when there is a political function. That is 
when they bring drugs as a show-off.” (KI-36, Health worker) 
 
From the perspective of this facility participant, the governor showed only upward 
accountability neglecting the needs of the facility. Another participant from the same facility 
also experienced inadequate commitment from their county government as the officials did 
not show interest or make efforts to understand the challenges of health workers. This 
situation was seen to be more common among appointed officials, not those who were 
elected as they only showed accountability to those who appointed them; however, they did 
not feel a need to be accountable to the population they served. The following quote from a 
multilateral organisation participant exemplifies this observation:  
“When you come to the appointed one because those are not elected and 
appointed by the elected officials, the loyalty of that appointed official is to those 
whoever has selected him, not to the people.” (KI-2, A national participant from a 
multilateral organisation) 
 
Another challenge to improving accountability is the lack of a formal reward system and 
performance management. The appraisal should be linked to a reward system creating 
incentives for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation such as recognition, career progression, 
promotion and an increase in salary. However, every county and facility participant in the 
study perceived that there was a lack of incentive to be accountable as there was no 
attractive formal reward system in place and the existing performance appraisals did not 
form an important component of the career development of health workers. The promotion 
was not based on performance but the number of years in service. Regarding disciplinary 
action, there were situations where actions had been taken without any repercussion or 
consequences. Yet, participants from one particular county highlighted how county 
government misused their power and threatened health workers who disagreed or argued 
with them. The following quote from a facility participant exemplifies this observation:  
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“These people are always on the defensive side; they want to defend themselves. 
The leadership of the county, and again let me tell you: my brother, when you start 
talking and demanding for these things, next day you are on transfer, so you really 
get tired.” (KI-37, Health worker) 
 
Therefore, different accountability mechanisms exist in the current health system. However, 
to fully realise those mechanisms, the willingness of key stakeholders is required together 
with adequate resources and capacity.  
6.3 Control of Corruption 
The governance principle, control of corruption, was not directly inquired in this study as it 
was not included in the topic guide. However, participants highlighted how the current 
Kenyan health system was vulnerable to embezzlement as there were different drivers of 
corruption within the system. These are described below (Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24: Sub-themes emerging from the theme “control of corruption” 
 
 
Corruption was repeatedly highlighted as a systemic problem, and hence, it was important 
to engage non-health sectors and civil society organisations in the control of corruption. 
Participants reported different corruption control measures such as health facility service 
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charters or the need to provide receipts for any payment made within a facility although 
their effectiveness has not been measured. 
Within the current health system there were various opportunities for abuse. This included 
discretion (autonomous power for decision making); monopoly of information/information 
asymmetry; weak enforcement of rules and lack of accountability among public servants. 
Some county and facility participants expressed their opinion that health workers may feel 
pressure to abuse due to the delay in receiving their salaries. There have been cases where 
facility staff took advantage of information asymmetry by charging the patients using the 
previous user fees rate. There were also service providers who sometimes charged informal 
payments without the knowledge of other staff and the user fees ended up with that 
particular provider. The following quotes from facility participants illustrate the situation: 
“He was a health staff from the theatre. He used to take advantage of these 
patients. So now a patient is coming, for CS, so you are now in the theatre to set 
the theatre. So, surgical spirit, betadine, so now the health staff can tell the 
relative, go and buy me the surgical spirit, betadine, before we operate on your 
patient, or you give me five hundred shillings, but the things are there, he just 
wants to exploit.” (KI-24, Health worker).  
“…some of them are not aware that they are not being paid for. So, it is easy for 
somebody to charge them without this knowledge. For example, somebody may 
say, ‘Your wife had a Caesarean Section, and you are supposed to pay for this 
amount’. If the man says I don’t know or I do not have, they will say, ‘Okay, how 
much do you have?’ So, if they produce a less figure than that, this person can still 
take…You do not know how to tell this one to pay and this other one not to pay. 
But since there are some services which are being paid for, there is a leeway for 
someone to ask for extra money.” (KI-9, Health worker) 
 
Nevertheless, the existence of functioning accountability mechanisms deterred the 
incidence of embezzlement as the staff who abused the system were subjected to 
disciplinary actions such as oral warning, transfer or dismissal of the duties. Unfortunately, 
some facility participants experienced abusive practices by county officials and how they had 
made use of their power and official positions to transfer staff who disagreed with them or 
suggested anything critical of the county government.  
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Hence, different drivers of corruption were weak administrative oversight, ineffective 
mechanisms for citizen complaints and lack of information. In the current system, 
administrative oversight was weak and inspection of health facilities was inadequate. 
Government regulators were also poorly trained or otherwise incapable of doing their jobs 
properly. In addition, unlicensed health workers and establishments exist in the health 
system as illustrated by this quote from a facility participant: 
"So, there are quite a lot of people who have opened clinics, pharmacies, chemists 
and monitoring of such facilities is not very consistent...people land into different 
hands of people who are not nurses or doctors, they are just health workers or 
health professionals but not trained in nursing and medicine." (KI-9, Health 
worker) 
 
Access to the correct information and transparent information dissemination were crucial 
for each group of individuals involved (citizens, healthcare providers, managers and county 
officers). During interviews, participants highlighted the existence of information gaps 
among citizens, healthcare providers and even county officials. Facility participants 
complained about this limitation as they could not access information such as new policies 
and guidelines. Apart from a politically promoted policy like FMS, access to policies and 
guidelines for health workers was limited. The following quotes from a facility participant 
illustrate this observation: 
“Now you see like those big policies, those wonderful or amazing policies; you 
know it is a very big thing, a very big step you have to be told. That one you will 
know definitely in one way or another. It will be all over the news; it will be 
everywhere. But that is very minimal, like for us, like those policies, reproductive 
health policy, how are you supposed to offer family planning method, how are you 
supposed to do this you see those policies, those guidelines on how to provide 
services.”  
“Nowadays there is technology. We have email addresses. The county has the 
master register of all the health workers at the county, they can easily send the 
information to every individual, but I don’t think [they did]”. (KI-24, Health worker) 
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The media has played an important role especially in the disclosure of different forms of 
embezzlements within the public sector. This ranged from small forms of corruption 
(misappropriation of funds by a health worker) to abuse of office by parliamentarians and 
governors. Although formal complaint mechanisms were present, health workers were 
reluctant to use them due to potential backlash or consequences. Instead, the use of social 
media to disclose mistreatment from the higher authority has increased as presented in 
Chapter 5. Section 5.1.1.1.  
Some national participants believe that media could also play a more positive role in policy 
dissemination instead of limiting coverage to revealing wrong-doing. The media could 
disseminate information about important policies such as the FMS policy which have a direct 
positive effect. Indeed, participants believed that the media should play a more positive role 
by raising awareness as indicated by a national participant from a multilateral organisation 
below: 
“Media could play a more positive role. There are a lot of good things that are 
happening in the counties, and it is not coming out, and then the media could play 
a very big role, a more positive role, in really bringing out what are the rights and 
what are the responsibilities of the duty bearers. Those are the things that we can 
be informing the mothers the status of health, the things they can play very 
well...They can play a big role in social mobilisation; they can play very positively 
and contribute very positively to the health of the citizens of Kenya which we don’t 
see happening much.” (KI-14, A national participant from a multilateral 
organisation) 
 
In summary, the participants were aware of and reported that within the current health 
system, there were different opportunities to abuse. They commented the need to improve 
the situation through taking disciplinary action when needed and by putting in place 
functioning accountability and information mechanisms. Most importantly, they have 
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6.4 The rule of law and strategic vision 
 
In the absence of effective mechanisms for citizen to logde complaints and the enforcement 
of the rule of law, citizens cannot hold public agents accountable. Hence, the rule of law 
seems to be the most challenging governance principle. Although certain policies and laws 
were set up with an ambitious strategic vision, enforcement and monitoring were weak. 
Participants highlighted the significance between the two forms of rules influencing the 
current health system: rules in form and rules in use (Figure 25). Participants felt that multi-
sectoral involvement would be needed to remedy the situation.  
To explore whether the policy makers had a broad and long term vision on health; how 
health-related laws were initiated; translated into rules, regulations and procedures; 
whether key stakeholders were consulted for laws/regulations relevant to health; and 
enforcement of laws and regulations, this study has used free maternity services (FMS) policy 
as an example. Therefore, the majority of responses in this section relate to the FMS policy 
implementation. 
 
Figure 25: Sub-themes emerging from the theme-"The rule of law and strategic vision" 
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6.4.1 Rules in form  
 
President Kenyatta announced the abolition of user fees for maternity services in public 
facilities on the 1st of June 2013. Subsequently, the MOH issued a circular about the abolition 
of user fees and the FMS policy. The objective of the FMS policy was to remove financial 
barriers for using maternity services with the goal of reducing maternal and neonatal 
mortality. Participants from all health system levels agreed with the importance and 
usefulness of the policy and described how the implementation process had been put into 
effect. The FMS policy was introduced simultaneously with devolution which significantly 
influenced the implementation of the policy.  
Participants from all health system levels highlighted that there were gaps in the policy 
dissemination when it was first introduced, particularly during 2013. Therefore, different 
facilities interpreted the policy differently in terms of the amount to be reimbursed 
depending on the type of facilities and maternity services covered. Facility participants 
described how it was difficult when the policy was first introduced. Therefore, there was no 
standard interpretation across the country regarding what should be included as part of the 
FMS provision. The following quotes illustrate this situation:  
“For the free maternity, specifically, at the beginning it was more of a Presidential 
declaration, it didn’t have a policy backing it so interpreting it became a challenge 
for the first few months because at the hospital level where they used to be having 
the user fee, and this user fee is what they are using to procure some drugs 
supplies, to employ some casuals, it is what they use to pay some of the utilities to 
improve their facility. So, when now you remove this and maternity services are, 
especially at the hospital level, the highest contributor to the revenue of the facility 
… But this became clarified later by a circular from the ministry of health so even 
right now as we speak there is no policy which has been endorsed.” (KI-15, A 
national participant from a multilateral organisation) 
 
“We have not seen a written circular about it, so it became even difficult for the 
whole of 2013 to know what [was supposed] to be free. We have had a lot of 
problems with the public even today as I am speaking. We still have a lot of 
problems with the public. The public expects that when they walk through the 
gate, everything that is done to them should be free.” (KI-9, Health worker). 
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The FMS was not costed appropriately as it took only healthcare costs into account, but not 
the administrative, investigation and other support costs. Therefore, some facilities lost their 
income when a woman presented with complications after a caesarean section as the 
guidelines for FMS did not cover the cost of the treatment of complications. As indicated by 
a facility participant: 
“It only covers delivery and the care just for three days after delivery when the 
mother is in the hospital. It does not cover antenatal, because ultrasound you must 
pay, blood test you must pay, visits for consultations you must pay and if you come 
to deliver it is free, when you go home, and you come back and say the baby is 
sick, the mother is sick now that you must pay, as the time when you are in hospital 
it is free.” (KI-16, Health worker). 
 
A facility participant perceived that the FMS policy was limited as it only covered public 
facilities although a significant proportion of health care in Kenya was provided by non-public 
(faith-based and private) organisations. The Ministry of Health acknowledged the limitation 
and interviews with participants from the MOH confirmed that the government has been 
trying to find ways to integrate with other forms of financing mechanisms such as the 
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) scheme and the means to include private facilities 
under the FMS policy.  
The other limiting institutional arrangement was the reimbursement process due to the 
complexity of the procedures involved. Facilities submitted the request through the county 
health department who compiled data from every facility within the county which was then 
sent to the National Health Treasury for reimbursement. The National Health Treasury 
verified the requests by triangulating the data with District Health Information System (DHIS) 
data after they received the requests from different counties. The funds were then 
transferred to relevant county health treasuries where further processing took place before 
the funds reached to every facility.  
Participants at all levels of the health system had encountered challenges because of 
inefficiencies in the reimbursement processes including delays in receiving the payment and 
receipt of insufficient funds. These challenges then affected planning at the health facility 
level as indicated by a facility participant: 
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“You cannot give everything for free…and if the government abolishes user fee, 
then they must support the hospitals and give them money to run, but as it is now, 
money does not come, our hospital received money only once, and it was last year 
in January, since 2013 when the President started this policy he has never given 
[our hospital] any money, and maybe it is not his fault, maybe he doesn’t even 
know, but the people below him are sitting on that money.” (KI-16, Health worker).   
 
6.4.2 Rules in use 
Some counties made their own arrangements such as diverting funds from “the county 
budget” to cover the payment under the FMS policy. They also encouraged facilities to 
promote the use of NHIF to alleviate the burden of FMS implementation constraints. 
However, NHIF coverage was not very promising as coverage was very low due in some 
counties to the level of poverty. According to an assessment conducted by the World Bank, 
the NHIF covered approximately 18% of the country in 2010 (Ramana et al., 2013). Women 
under the NHIF scheme were also reluctant to pay as they questioned why they should pay 
for insurance while the services were free for all. The following quote from a facility 
participant illustrates this point: 
“They are using the NHIF, and maybe they are given the prescription to buy the 
drugs, it is a challenge because somebody tells you I am using the NHIF card, and 
you are telling us to buy the drugs, so it is hard to convince that person to tell him 
to go and buy the drugs, but at times they used to buy because there is nothing 
else you can do.” (KI-39, Health worker) 
 
Counties and facilities made their own arrangements to overcome the challenges of 
operating the FMS policy within the context of health system constraints. These included 
hiring locums or post-graduate doctors (whose overtime work was not compensated) to 
cover the shortage of medical doctors and part-time nurses or student nurses to cover the 
shortage of nurses. Regarding shortage of medicines and supplies due of late disbursements, 
informal arrangements with suppliers were made to refund them after receiving the funds 
as noted by a county participant below: 
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“What is happening, for example, the hospital has a lot of debts, you see like we 
have to buy things for them, non-pharmaceutical, you need to buy the gloves, the 
syringes, cotton wool, all those.So, when you ran out of those, you have to borrow 
from the suppliers and promise to pay when you get the money.” (KI-21, A county 
official)  
 
Some facility participants admitted that they had to write prescriptions for patients due to 
shortages of medicines and supplies at facilities. In some facilities where there were severe 
shortages, patients were asked to buy everything “including cotton wool and gloves”. The 
following quote from a facility participant illustrates this situation:  
“Actually, we tell them to buy everything…we should have just told them to pay 
[us] and [we] use that money to buy whatever we need. It could have been better 
than us telling them it is free and we are not able to provide them good quality 
services.” (KI-36, Health worker) 
 
Facility participants also discussed media as an important enforcer playing the role of 
watchdog for accountability of health facilities. The staff at some facilities were concerned 
about the potential loss of reputation and scathing media reports if they were found to be 
charging for maternity services:  
“We cannot charge because we are in Nairobi and if we charge there will be a lot 
of noises, they will know immediately, the media will come immediately, so we 
cannot charge, so we just run the hospital with the little we have until [maybe] it 
closes.” (KI-16, Health worker) 
 
Hence, there was a perception among county and facility participants that the health system 
had not changed “in tandem with devolution” and introducing the FMS policy in this context 
stretched the existing resources as there was an increased demand for services after removal 
of the user fees. This included HRH, supplies and equipment as there was no significant 
improvement in these aspects after devolution. This was further compounded by delays in 
the reimbursement of funds leading to frequent shortages in supplies of medicines and 
consumables. The situation affected the already stretched health workers who were 
frustrated by their increased workloads. 
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The implementation of new policies was dependant on the timely reimbursement by the 
national government to the health facilities through county governments. Strong monitoring 
and supervision mechanisms were also essential to ensure facilities comply with the new 
policies especially facilities in remote places which required more stringent third party 
enforcement mechanisms. Hence, some counties arranged “impromptu supervision” in 
addition to the scheduled supervision to ensure the provision of FMS across the county. The 
following quote from a county participant exemplifies this observation: 
“The rural facilities sometimes are a bit distant. We cannot monitor them on a 
day to day basis, so once in a while, you will have a mother coming to deliver, and 
they are asked to pay. We are aware that happens in some areas, but the way to 
avoid that or the way to mitigate that is to have supervision…they [managers] 
have scheduled supervision visits to those facilities that is one, they also have 
impromptu supervisory visits at the facilities, the suggestion boxes in the facilities, 
service charter.” (KI-26, A county official) 
 
This new partially-enforced rule (policy) with informal modifications, which key stakeholders 
introduced to cope with the situation, also redefined the property rights (decision making 
and earning rights) of health workers. For instance, healthcare facilities used to have their 
own account under the health sector services fund (HSSF) or the hospital management fund 
(HMF) which allowed them to manage their own budget. In the devolved system, budgets 
are managed by the county health treasury, which allocates funds to healthcare facilities 
within their catchment area. Income generated at the health facilities is transferred back to 
the county as county revenue. Hence, health facilities have lost the decision making power 
to manage their own budget under the devolved system, and including the procurement of 
medicines, supplies and equipment. Some facilities have closed their HSSF or HMF accounts. 
Some healthcare providers perceived the new set up as “centralization within a decentralised 
system” while others felt that “everything is meant to be done at the county level.” 
The property rights of the health workers are now diminished because a source of funding 
was lost and not sufficiently compensated, with consequences on the supply of drugs and 
informal charges to patients. Hence, health workers’ incentives are not well aligned with the 
Ministry of Health. This results in a loss of motivation among health workers and therefore 
performance, as well as a series of critical negative consequences for the health system. 
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If stakeholders in charge of implementing the policy (counties and health workers) have 
doubts about its impact and sustainability, the policy will not leverage their intrinsic 
motivation to improve the health of the population. This, coupled with the decreased 
extrinsic motivation (i.e. the policy does not provide financial incentives for them to 
implement it and expand quantity and quality of care), shows why the policy struggles to 
work in practice. Policy implementers also remarked that the policy makers did not 
understand the practical, on-the-ground situation and hence did not anticipate or appreciate 
the operational challenges. The following quotes from a county and facility participant 
exemplify the observation: 
“And we have started experiencing that because in this county for example for the 
past one year, we have delivered mothers and we have not been reimbursed. One 
hospital like Makindu hospital, which is very busy, is owed around 20 million by 
the national government. I think [it] is a challenge because of this thing of just 
giving money and we know the resource purse is very limited, might not be 
sustainable.” (KI-21, A county official). 
“The President just woke up one day, in one of the National Celebrations, he 
decided there is free maternity care.” (KI-10, Health worker). 
 
In summary, participants believed that the country had the strategic vision to improve the 
healthcare of its population, and it had good policies and rules in place, but when it came to 
implementation, there were significant gaps due to the operational reality on the ground 
which undermine the existing health system challenges. Besides, participants were not 
satisfied with the level of political commitment to enforce the existing rules.  
6.5 Inequity is acknowledged as a problem 
 
Equity is an essential indicator of good governance in a functioning health system. It is even 
more important in a country such as Kenya which is undergoing devolution, as this reform 
can itself lead to inequity if not managed well. Figure 26 illustrates key themes highlighting 
the existence of inequity across different counties due to historical consequences, how there 
have been efforts to reduce inequity and the main challenges such as security and health 
workers’ distribution.  
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Figure 26: Sub-themes emerging from the theme “equity” 
 
 
National participants defined equity as a measure of ensuring that previously “marginalised 
groups” were not left out. A facility participant defined equity in the health system as 
“everyone should get quality health care regardless of the class, gender and where they come 
from”. Inequity was a recognised challenge as inequity existed in other sectors in addition to 
the health sector. With devolution, inequity across counties has not improved due to 
historical socioeconomic and cultural factors such as poverty, infrastructure and the 
availability of resources. The following quote from a participant from a multilateral 
organisation illustrates this point: 
“We have like 15 counties, which are contributing to almost 80% of maternal 
deaths. The focus now is concentrating on those 15 counties which hopefully with 
addressing the equity gap. These are counties which have been marginalised for a 
while, a lot of inequities in terms of high vulnerability, there are more exposed to 
conflicts, there’s less development.” (KI-14, A national participant from a 
multilateral organisation) 
 
Inequity in healthcare access has also been recognised as a problem by the national 
government, and there have been efforts to reduce inequity. During interviews, national 
participants from multilateral organisations present me with a copy of communique signed 
by the 15 counties with the highest burden of maternal and neonatal mortality in Kenya. 
Other efforts of the government included the removal of financial barriers, allocation of 
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specific funds, improving infrastructure and training and recruitment of local communities. 
Indeed, the government has been trying to remove financial barriers, one of the most 
important determinants of access to healthcare, with two new health financing policies (user 
fees abolishment and FMS). The following quote from a participant from a multilateral 
organisation exemplifies this observation: 
“The free maternity services policy is an initiative of the current government as per 
their pledge when prior to the elections of 2013 so this in some places has doubled 
the access, so the financial barrier which was there at the facility level is no longer 
there so there has been that increase.” (KI-15, A national participant from a 
multilateral organisation) 
 
However, adherence to those policies require functioning administrative and financial 
management mechanisms; effective technical and administrative oversight; and strong 
monitoring and regulatory systems none of which are currently in place. A further factor was 
the unequal distribution of healthcare workforce as it has been difficult to retain health 
workers. In other words, fewer healthcare workers were ready to work in poor areas as 
indicated by a county participant: 
“There are areas which are very disadvantaged in the sense that a very few health 
facilities are areas which are not popular with people, you want to post people to 
work, and people are reluctant because they are a bit hard to reach and so the 
turnover of the work is very high. People are not willing to work in some of that 
neighbourhood.” (KI-31, A county official) 
 
Security was also a bottleneck, particularly in hard to reach areas. Thus, some temporary 
measures, such as contracting of services by assigning health staff from another region of 
Kenya to work in poorer areas. However, this was difficult to sustain. National participants 
recommended long-term solutions such as developing cadres of human resources from the 
same community as it was difficult to retain health staff from different communities.  
In summary, inequity is a recognised challenge reported by participants from all categories, 
and there have been several attempts by both national and county governments to address 
this. However, participants acknowledge the fact that it will take the time to improve equity.  
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6.6 Participation of stakeholders  
 
Participation in decision making is an essential principle of governance. In principle, both 
citizens and healthcare providers should engage in the decision making process with national 
government actors. According to the current Constitution of Kenya, citizens must be 
consulted widely in both policy making and implementation. Participants from different 
levels of the health system describe who participates, what are the opportunities to 
participate and what are challenges for participation (Figure 27).   
 
Figure 27: Sub-themes emerging from the theme “participation” 
 
6.6.1 Who participates? 
 
All interview participants unanimously agreed that key policy makers were: the Government 
Secretary, Principal Secretary Department of Medical Services, the National Treasury, 
National Parliament at the national level; and the County Governor, County Minister of 
Health, County Chief Officer for health and County Directors at the county level. In addition 
to the Ministry of Health, other ministries such as the Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Devolution, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Environment, and Ministry 
of Urban Planning were also important stakeholders. There were also other organisations 
such as the professional associations (the doctors’ association, nursing council, drug 
regulatory agency and patient associations). According to county participants, international 
organisations including the UN and NGOs also participated in health policy making. However, 
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as one national participant noted in the accountability section, it was not clear whether these 
NGOs represented beneficiaries and spoke on their behalf. 
6.6.2 What are the opportunities to participate? 
 
For participation at the national level, Kenya is quite open with regard to policy making as 
policy documents are available in the public domain where citizens can provide their 
opinions. According to the new Constitution, it is a legal requirement that citizens should be 
consulted widely before a policy is approved into law. However, some county and facility 
participants did not think that “consultation was ever done for free maternity services as it 
was just announced and rolled out”. Indeed, some participants had reservations as they felt 
it was not true participation due to the level of engagement and lack of opportunities to 
participate. The following quote from a multilateral organisation participant illustrates the 
observation: 
“The policy making process has been quite open. I think the government has been 
fairly open in terms of the kind of engagement it has with stakeholders. Now it can 
engage, but it does not necessarily mean to take up everything that people want. 
Those are two different things. So, for some stakeholders, they perceive 
engagement as government doing what they have told. Meanwhile, for me, I will 
look at engagement as an opportunity to be part of the discussions. I think those 
opportunities exist both in the sector and legislatively in the Constitution. You 
cannot pass any policy or any government direction when there is no evidence of 
engagement of stakeholders. It is illegal by now.” (KI-2, A national participant 
from a multilateral organisation) 
 
Regarding participation in county-level policy making and implementation, most facility 
participants felt positive about the devolved roles of county health departments as they had 
opportunities to get involved and their suggestions were incorporated. However, some 
counties seemed to have communication problems with their healthcare providers as facility 
participants perceived that even senior management from their own health facility were not 
consulted for county health planning. County governments were viewed as not 
understanding health workers’ difficulties, nor inviting them to participate in the planning 
process. Therefore, facility participants were not sure whether their voices would be 
considered or get addressed. On the other hand, a different picture was portrayed by the 
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county participants stating, that since devolution, the communication gap had reduced with 
increased feedback from the communities. The following quotes exemplify these 
statements: 
“…they say they want to reduce maternal death in XX county and they don’t come 
to maternity the people working here or in the hospital who really know what is 
the cause of this and this and the people with experience they meet with all these 
challenges every day then you know they can just go and imagine their own things 
there.” (KI-37, Health worker) 
“The success now is that the health systems, this is being addressed closely and 
the leadership is around whenever there are issues, we know who to address 
immediately not like the old system… That gap is reduced, it is easier to 
communicate and get information from the community…They have moved the 
leadership closer to people, so the services are slightly closer. [When] drugs have 
a shortage, if you are told this thing is missing, the guy who is supposed to provide 
the missing gap is closer.” (KI-35, A county official) 
 
6.6.3 Challenges in participation 
 
County participants described how the current Constitution provided various opportunities 
for stakeholders’ participation in policy development forums where they could discuss within 
their constituencies. These were public meetings or “barazas” which were organised at 
county and sub-county levels where the public could discuss the proposed policies and 
provide suggestions to the policy makers. However, information regarding the level of public 
engagement could not be obtained from interviews with county participants. The health 
facility management board was another opportunity where communities could participate 
in health-related policy implementation. However, according to some facility participants, 
management boards were not as engaging as they should be. In their experience, the 
management boards rarely listened to voices from the communities in situations where the 
board members represented the hospital. The following quote from a facility participant 
illustrates the situation: 
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“According to their functions they are supposed to be also actively participating, 
but I don’t think they are active. Because I have not heard of many issues from the 
community. I don’t believe they go to the community or to the opinion leaders to 
look for these things that they feel they can bring. Because if the community 
chooses them, it means they represent the community, so they should be at least 
actively or on periodically report on what has not been done, but I am not sure…I 
have not heard of any issues they have raised about what they think we should do 
to their community to meet their health needs if we are not meeting them. So, I 
think it is the board which should be very actively participating and also interacting 
a lot with the community, going to the community to the people asking their 
opinion about the hospital, but I don’t think they actively participate as they 
should.” (KI-24, Health worker). 
 
Despite the different opportunities to participate, facility participants felt that, in reality, 
participation was not meaningful and policy making was “top-down”. The systems were still 
state-centric or county-centric and provided very little scope for individual citizens to be 
empowered to participate in the decision making processes. The actions of civil society 
groups were either limited or led by a few civil society brokers who abused the system. The 
following quote from a multilateral organisation participant exemplifies this observation: 
“We have many people who are becoming professional civil society people; they 
earn a good living from that. Whenever I want to make money, I just go and make 
a bit of noise and then somehow, I get something out of it. So, you got a lot of 
those merchants, the civil society merchants from the system.” (KI-2, A national 
participant from a multilateral organisation) 
 
There were also county officials who were not satisfied with their level of engagement in 
health policymaking and the way they were asked to get involved. They perceived that 
policies were made at the central level and hence, constant coordination and consultation 
with the counties were essential because “if a policy was made in Nairobi without considering 
the uniqueness of the counties, then it became un-implementable”. Thus, citizens do not 
have enough information and power to participate in policy making and implementation 
processes. A dominant view among facility participants was that the communities did not 
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know their rights and what they should ask for. The national government was aware of the 
situation, and hence, there have been civic education programmes within different counties.  
In summary, there were several opportunities to participate in policymaking and 
implementation of the health system. However, this requires awareness of the citizens and 
their initiative with the opportunities to participate in these processes.  
6.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter illustrates how key stakeholders in Kenya viewed health system governance 
particularly in relation to specific operational principles of governance: accountability, 
control of corruption, the rule of law and strategic vision, equity and participation. 
Participants noted challenges in realising accountability which were strongly related to two 
other principles namely control of corruption and the rule of law. Regarding financial 
accountability, national and facility participants felt that a good financial tracking system was 
crucial for the devolved system. Regarding performance accountability, there was a 
unanimous view among both county and facility participants that the current health system 
lacked incentives for accountability. Indeed, the current health system has opportunities for 
abuse as citizens have limited information and there are power differences and weak 
enforcement of rules. In particular, county and facility participants perceived that health 
workers were pressured to abuse due to the delay in receiving salaries and the different 
arrangements under the county health systems. Regarding the rule of law and strategic 
vision, two forms were highlighted: rules in form and rules in use. Participants from all health 
system levels acknowledged the importance of FMS policy (rules in form) and gaps in its 
policy development. On the other hand, county and facility level participants made their own 
arrangements to implement the policy (rules in use) set by the national government by 
assigning additional health workers, establishing agreements with medical suppliers and 
diverting funds from other departments. There was a prevailed view among facility level 
participants who perceived that the health system did not change in tandem with devolution. 
Participants from all health system levels acknowledged that equity has not improved after 
the first few years of devolution. While national level participants perceived that there were 
more opportunities to engage in the policy development process, county and facility 
participants felt that there was not enough stakeholders engagement in policy development 
at national level. In particular, facility level participants felt that policymaking was still state-
centric or county-centric.  
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CHAPTER 7 
7. Are there any differences in governance 
between fully functional and not fully functional 
facilities? 
 
The preceding chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) presented the context influencing the governance 
of the health facilities and key stakeholders’ perspectives on governance. Chapter 5 
illustrated the “macro” context influencing governance such as devolution, political, 
socioeconomic and health system factors. Chapter 6 described the operational principles of 
governance: accountability, control of corruption, strategic vision and the rule of law, 
participation and equity offering a holistic account of health system governance under study.  
This chapter covers the third research question: “Are there any differences in governance 
between fully functional and not fully functional facilities?”. To do so, facilities included were 
grouped according to their level of functionality using the UN criteria (nine signal functions). 
This has been described in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.1). Using the UN criteria, if a facility 
performed all designated nine signal functions of a CEmOC, it was regarded as a fully 
functional facility. Similarly, facilities performing fewer than nine signal functions were 
considered to be not fully functional. Of the ten healthcare facilities included in this study, 
six were not fully functional while four were fully functional.  
This chapter starts by describing how the two groups of health facilities (fully functional and 
not fully functional) differ in terms of the availability of equipment or if staff have been 
trained to provide signal functions from the secondary data collected under the “Making it 
Happen” (MiH) programme. The aim is to gain an understanding of these two health system 
factors by comparing them with the participants’ accounts. For the assessment of the 
governance of the two groups of facilities, institutional analysis approach described in 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.3.2) was used. 
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7.1 How were fully functional and not fully functional facilities 
different? 
 
In the six facilities that were not fully functional, two signal functions were not available: 
signal function 5 (removal of retained products of conception) and signal function 6 (assisted 
vaginal delivery). The data available through the MiH programme allowed me to explore the 
availability of supplies (medicines, medical equipment and consumables) and human 
resources. However, it was impossible to identify information regarding health financing as 
the MiH programme did not collect that information. Hence, only two health system factors; 
availability of supplies (medicines, consumables and equipment) and human resources were 
considered.  
Regarding supplies, it was impossible to identify the specific medicines and consumables 
required to perform each signal function as some medicines or consumables could be used 
to perform more than one signal function (e.g. oxytocin). However, it was possible to identify 
specific equipment required to perform two signal functions (signal functions 5 and 6). 
Availability of equipment to perform signal function 5 (removal of retained products of 
conception) was not different between the two groups of facilities. But, there were 
differences in the availability of equipment to perform signal function 6 (assisted vaginal 
delivery). Fully functional facilities had at least one of the equipment sets (vacuum or 
forceps) required to perform signal function 6, while this was not the case for non-fully 
functional facilities (Table 12). 
Table 12: Availability of equipment to perform signal function 5 and 6  
  
  
Signal Function 5 – removal of retained 
products 
Signal Function 6 – assisted vaginal 
delivery 
MVA set D&C set At least one Vacuum Forceps At least one 
Fully functional facilities 
Hospital 2 (Nairobi) 
            
Hospital 1 (Kitui) 
            
Hospital 2 (Kitui) 
            
Hospital 2 (Nakuru) 
            
Not fully functional facilities 
Hospital 1 (Nairobi) 
            
Hospital 1 (Machakos) 
            
Hospital 1 (Makueni) 
            
Hospital 1 (Narok) 
            
Hospital 2 (Narok) 
            
Hospital 1 (Nakuru) 
            
Source: MiH database 
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Legend: 
  Available 
  Not available 
 
The other possible influence on signal function performance, for which there was data was 
the availability of human resources to perform signal functions. Medical staff performed an 
average of 25 to 70 deliveries per year, meaning one staff member conducted 2 to 6 
deliveries in a month, except in three facilities (PGH Nakuru, St Mary’s and Narok). In those 
three facilities, staff from both PGH Nakuru and Narok conducted approximately 10 
deliveries a month while staff from St. Mary’s conducted 44 deliveries a month, meaning 
there was at least one to two deliveries a day (Table 13). Hence, some facilities could achieve 
fully functional status even with relatively few staff.  
In summary, although facilities that were not fully functional had staff capable of performing 
those two signal functions, the facilities did not have the equipment to conduct signal 
functions. 
 








Fully functional facilities 
Hospital 2 (Nairobi) 8877 17 522.2 
Hospital 1 (Kitui) 2044 81 25.2 
Hospital 2 (Kitui) 1874 36 52.1 
Hospital 2 (Nakuru) 8496 74 114.8 
Not fully functional facilities 
Hospital 1 (Nairobi) 15821 307 51.5 
Hospital 1 (Machakos) 5572 80 69.7 
Hospital 1 (Makueni) 1875 44 42.6 
Hospital 1 (Narok) 3010 24 125.4 
Hospital 2 (Narok) 1150 19 60.5 
Hospital 1 (Nakuru) 618 24 25.8 
Source: MiH database 
 
The following section explores whether the status of governance differs between fully and 
non-fully functional facilities using the “institutional analysis” theory of North (1990) as the 
theoretical framework (Chapter 4 Methodology). Findings are presented thematically based 
on the three constructs of the theory: institutional arrangements; enforcement mechanisms; 
incentives and motivation. These interdependent constructs of the theory are not mutually 
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exclusive. For example, creating incentives for extrinsic motivation enforces individual health 
worker to comply with certain institutional arrangements.  
7.2 Institutional arrangements  
 
“Institutional arrangements” are the ways by which the health system has been arranged to 
deliver healthcare services in Kenya, in order words, how Kenyan health system has been 
governed. These can be either formal arrangements (in the form of political or legal rules 
such as constitutions, contracts and property rights) or informal (such as codes of conduct, 
behavioural norms and conventions) (North, 1990; Aoki, 2001). The institutional 
arrangements in this study composed of arrangements to improve four principles of 
governance: accountability, control of corrupt practices, participation and equity.  
The sections below start with institutional arrangements for accountability, then the 
exploration of the control of corrupt practices, followed by opportunities to improve equity 
and participate in policymaking or implementation.  
7.2.1 Institutional arrangements for accountability 
 
Two main types of accountability exist in the literature: internal accountability (the 
interactions of facility participants, their managers, the county department of health and 
county government) and external accountability (accountability towards communities). 
Discussions of facility participants focussed mostly on internal accountability such as 
measures to improve the performance of health staff (performance accountability); 
availability of adequate resources; and on understanding of the roles and responsibilities to 
be accountable. Table 14 summarises key differences in institutional arrangements for 
accountability between the two groups of facilities.  
Table 14. Institutional arrangements for accountability  
Institutional arrangements 
for accountability 
Fully functional facilities Not fully functional facilities 
1)Performance 
accountability 
Formal: appraisal for 
performance 
 











Present (training, conference, 








Present (training, conference, 
annual staff party, etc.) 
 
Present (early retirement for 
50+ staff, transfer of younger 
staff) 
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Fully functional facilities Not fully functional facilities 
2)Availability of adequate 
resources (HRH) 
Absent except one participant  Absent 
3)Understanding roles & 
responsibilities, clear line of 
accountability, availability 
of standard operating 
procedures  
Present and followed -Absent or not followed 
-Unclear roles & responsibilities 
with the lack of accountability 
led to a maternal death & a fresh 
stillbirth.  
 
Formal institutional arrangements to improve performance such as a performance appraisal 
system did not exist in both types of facilities regardless of functionality. Participants across 
all health system levels commented about the lack of an objectively set system of appraisal 
to improve the performance of public sector staff. In the current devolved system, 
promotions were handled at the county level, and there was a perception among facility 
participants that “they [the county] didn’t know who was doing what at the facility, so it was 
just the system that after every three years you get promoted”. Hence, facility participants 
felt demotivated due to ‘stagnation’ and the lack of opportunity to progress in the role as 
they did not trust their county governments and public service commission responsible for 
staff promotion. They felt that the responsible authorities were very new to their positions 
and did not understand the health system. Hence, they perceived county governments and 
public service commission were far from operational reality. The following quote from a not 
fully functional facility participant illustrates this point: 
“The reward system is rather demotivating. Because you find someone has worked 
for a long time, somebody works very well, and you find she has stagnated all 
years, she has stagnated in one job group… So, these are things which need to be 
streamlined because now if you are to wait for the public service commission to 
create positions, how would the public commission know that there are people 
stagnating unless they come to the ground.” (KI-19, Health worker from a not fully 
functional facility) 
 
Facility participants also perceived that after devolution, promotion became different among 
counties due to a “lack of uniform standards” and the difference in performance among 
county service boards. Hence, the existing reward system was “demotivating” for some 
participants as rewards were not based on performance and “the appraisal was not very 
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transparent nor objectively set” while they “just gave it for the sake of a requirement”. The 
following quote from a not fully functional facility exemplifies this observation:  
"You want to be promoted, or your friend in another county has been promoted, 
and you have not been promoted. Previously you’d all be promoted, but now you 
find your friend a doctor like you in another county has been promoted and you 
have not been promoted, because the county service board for Kisumu is different 
from the county service board of Nairobi, so the one of Kisumu has sat and the one 
of Nairobi has not sat even for two years they have not sat, so there are no uniform 
standards."(KI-16, Health worker from a not fully functional facility) 
 
Informal institutional arrangements emerged when there were gaps in the formal 
arrangements for rewards or performance appraisal. For instance, facilities set up their own 
form of informal appraisal mostly at their own discretion such as organising an annual staff 
party; sending individual staff members to a conference or workshop; awarding certificates 
or trophies, or words of appreciation from the managers. Participants from both groups of 
facilities appreciated that informal appraisal was as an explicit recognition of their 
management.  
For sanctions against non-performance, some not fully functional facilities had informal 
institutional arrangements such as management asking staff who were over 50 years of age 
to retire while younger staff received an order for transfer as a penalty for not performing. 
There were also instances where “health workers’ salaries were stopped if there was any 
failure in roles and responsibilities”.   
Availability of adequate resources particularly adequate numbers of health staff in a facility 
was another enabling institutional arrangement for facility participants to be accountable. 
Participants from both types of facilities complained about challenges due to human 
resource shortages except for one participant from a fully functional facility who noted that 
their facility could receive double the existing workload. In other cases, despite staff 
availability, lack of staff who were trained to perform signal functions was another challenge 
as not everyone was trained to perform certain signal functions such as manual vacuum 
aspiration, assisted vaginal delivery and newborn care. Frequent staff rotation and staff 
transfer were common challenges in both types of facilities. The following quotes from the 
participants illustrate this observation: 
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"Emergency Obstetric Care, as far as the training is concerned, there are still many 
people who have not been trained; there are about less than 50% who have been 
trained. But you see we are having continuous transfers; so you train somebody 
who is transferred and takes that knowledge to somewhere else. So not many 
people have been trained, and also, people go for the training, and you are not in 
the department where you can practice, then anything that is not used is wasted, 
isn’t it?” (KI-9, Health worker from a not fully functional facility) 
"…the medical officers are not trained because of the high turnover, so we have 
60% of the nurses trained but less than 5% of the medical officers, so because of 
that there is discrepancy so that is why." (KI-18, Health worker from a fully 
functional facility) 
 
The third institutional arrangements for accountability were understanding roles and 
responsibilities; a clear line of accountability; availability of protocols or standard operating 
procedures and proper documentation. Such arrangements were either absent or not 
followed in not fully functional facilities. The quotes below illustrated tragic examples 
resulting in the losses of lives. In the first example, a participant from a not fully functional 
facility highlighted a case of “system failure” when the facility staff lacked accountability due 
to unclear roles and responsibilities among different departments in the facility. In the 
second example, another participant from a different facility highlighted an incidence of 
fresh stillbirth due to a lack of accountability and responsibility: compounded by the tension 
between two health cadres: nurses and intern doctors.  
“We had mortality, maternal mortality of which an audit, our conclusion was the 
system failed the patient and not the other way around…this was a patient who 
followed everything as was advised but the system failed her. She came to the 
hospital, she had a low Hb, we talked to the lab who told us they had blood, so we 
started transfusing. Other patients came who needed blood. Those patients were 
given the blood then blood was over. They did not inform us, we wanted three 
pints because one pint would sustain the patient. The patient went into labour. 
We had a black out the generator was not working. So, the patient delivered in 
the dark, the placenta was not completely out. The person who was taking care of 
the patient at that point did not know, because they were using their own torch, 
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but other than that when the patient kept bleeding. This person kept on doing 
what she thought was supposed to be done which was half right because they did 
not know exactly what they were supposed to do. So, at that point when I was 
called in to see the patient we needed blood. There was no blood. We needed a 
vehicle to refer the patient; there was no fuel. We had just got a new medical 
superintendent, the nearest petrol station where we get the fuel they did not know 
this new medical superintendent. So, they were like they don’t know who they are 
dealing with and they will not give free petrol, and basically, we were resuscitating 
a patient we know was dying, so there was nothing we could do.” (KI-38, Health 
worker from a not fully functional facility) 
“I can give an example. There’s a mother [who] comes, and there is foetal distress, 
and this patient may need a CS. But then the nurse sees the doctor’s plan of 
management. She says she gives syntocins in the next four hours. This intern 
doctor does not have the experience, but the nurse has. The nurse says “well she 
is a doctor, she should know” and just moves on with her work and doesn’t say 
anything then. When we deliver a fresh stillbirth, the nurse says, “I knew, but I 
couldn’t tell her because I expect her to know as she is a doctor.” (KI-36, Health 
worker from a not fully functional facility) 
 
7.2.2 Institutional arrangements to control corrupt practices 
 
Despite the presence of formal rules and procedures to discipline public health staff, there 
was a reluctance to do so as the procedures were perceived to be long and complicated. 
There was a common perception that public servants took advantage of the situation where 
the formal procedure to dismiss them was long and complicated and no action could be 
taken against them even if an individual staff committed some form of embezzlement. This 
was made by the presence of impunity as the system for sanctions or non-performance was 
compromised due to corruption or political affiliation. Table 15 summarises the differences 
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Table 15. Institutional arrangements to control corruption  
Institutional arrangements 
to control corrupt practices 
Fully functional facilities Not fully functional facilities 
Formal: rules & procedures 
to sanctions for non-
performance 
 
Informal norms to sanction 
 
 
Informal norm to charge 

















Present, “charging patients 
under FMS is not corruption” 
 
A participant from not fully functional facility recalled how staff was exempt from 
punishment which further “discouraged from disciplining another person” in future. Another 
participant from the same facility echoed how disciplinary action could be blunted. The 
participant recounted how the proposal of disciplinary action was corroded by the hospital 
management due to the fear of potential consequences or backlash. The following quotes 
from two participants of a not fully functional facility illustrate this point: 
"I have never seen anybody going home because of a problem. Instead, they are 
transferred to another place. So, you transfer the problem to another place. 
Because there was another relationship with the accused, whether you are relative 
or you are relative to their husband or something like that. You never know you 
can be compromised. Also, we are human beings. So, you have done somewhere 
like an incentive; an action is not taken by your senior. As a result, you get 
discouraged from disciplining another person next time."(KI-9, Health worker from 
a not fully functional facility) 
“We may recommend at the lower level, but at the higher level, it may be 
disapproved… We kept quiet… The backlash will be there. That is called impunity, 
will now start doing things with impunity that can happen. Well, I may mention 
only one…a certain doctor has failed to come for duty and in the event, a patient 
has died because there was no doctor to attend. Then, we do a disciplinary 
committee and recommend that doctor’s license be suspended and the 
recommendation goes higher and they refuse to suspend his license. It worked 
negatively for the hospital” (KI-16, Health worker from a not fully functional 
facility) 
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Some informal institutional arrangements such as confusing norms and practices were also 
present in some not fully functional facilities as charging patients to cover FMS was not 
regarded as corruption so long as the money “went into the hospital account”. It was 
regarded as corruption only if the payment went to an individual health worker’s pocket. The 
following quote from a participant from a not fully functional facility exemplifies this 
observation: 
“You see, now we are talking about charging a mother for delivery where it is 
supposed to be free and this money we are saying some hospitals are charging 
goes into the hospital account, does not go into individual pockets. So, I will concur 
with the staff who has told the mother to pay, because the money has gone to the 
hospital account to assist the same mother.” (KI-16, Health worker from a not fully 
functional facility) 
 
Thus, conditions such as the difference in position and power provided the health staff with 
an opportunity to misuse their public positions for private gain. However, in fully functional 
facilities where staff had been involved in corrupt practices, there was evidence that facility-
driven disciplinary actions had been taken. The following testimony from a participant from 
a fully functional facility provides evidence where a casual worker has tried to charge 
patients using previous user fees payment: 
“Participant: last year I had an incidence and we took it up to the office, it was a 
casual worker. 
Interviewer: So, can you explain a bit more of this case? 
Participant: A casual worker you know in the evening, now she was going around 
and telling them [the women] “have you been discharged? You want to go home 
tomorrow give me money.” Actually, it was two thousand at that time and the 
mother was a bit in doubt, why has she asked for money and these are free 
services, so she kept quiet and called the nurse later. 
Interviewer: She paid? 
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Participant: She did not pay, she told the casual I will give you in the morning, but 
she waited till the casual went and asked when the nurse came “how much am I 
supposed to pay?” The sister was like “for what?” It is free. So, she explained there 
was this girl, she described because she did not know the name, she described and 
she was asking me for two thousand, she was telling me I was supposed to pay. It 
was a CS mother, so she was using the charges that we used to. So, she was telling 
her it’s five thousand but if you can look for two, I can help you to go home.” (KI-
25, Health worker from a fully functional facility) 
 
7.2.3 Institutional arrangements for participation 
 
Participation and consensus orientation are other important institutional arrangements to 
actively engage key stakeholders in health policy implementation and development. 
According to the new Constitution of Kenya, it is a legal requirement that citizens must be 
consulted before a policy has been enacted into a law. Table 16 summarises the institutional 
arrangements for participation in both groups of facilities.  
 
Table 16. Institutional arrangements for participation  
Institutional arrangements Fully functional facilities Not fully functional facilities 
Participation in policy making 






Absent because “decisions 




Absent because policy making 
was “top-down” 
 
The country has formal mechanisms for inviting different stakeholder groups to strategic 
planning meetings. However, in practice, participants from both groups of facilities perceived 
that policy making was “top-down” as they were not given opportunities to participate in the 
decision making process. They only received information after the decision had been made 
at the central level as “donors came and discussed with the Ministry people; it was all at Afya 
House [where the Ministry of Health is]”. There was a perception that private and faith-based 
organisation should have been involved in policy dialogue as the faith-based organisations 
provided a significant proportion of health service provision in the country. The following 
quote from a participant from a fully functional facility illustrates this point: 
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"The amount of health care that is provided by the Faith-based organisations; but 
we are hardly represented, even on the medical board. I think we need to have a 
voice because we really are on the ground and there are communities where it is 
really the faith-based organisations that provide the health care." (KI-10, Health 
worker from a fully functional facility) 
 
7.2.4 Institutional arrangements to improve equity 
Table 17 summarises differences in institutional arrangements between the two groups of 
facilities.  
Table 17. Institutional arrangements for equity  
Institutional arrangements 
for equity 
Fully functional facilities Not fully functional facilities 
Barrier in access to care due 
to distance 
 
Barrier in access to care due 
to finance  
 







Present (politicians wanted 
to influence county 







Present “county government 
was partial in providing the best 
services to their relatives” 
 
The barrier in access to care due to the long distances necessary to travel to health facilities 
or financial reasons were present in both types of facilities. Both groups made their own 
arrangements for people with disabilities in order to improve access to care. The following 
quotes from a participant from a not fully functional facility exemplifies this observation: 
“The hospital receives everybody and even we are disability friendly, even for the 
disabled there is a bed which is low enough which a disable can climb, we have 
even trained staff on sign language.” (KI-16, Health worker from a not fully 
functional facility) 
 
However, facilities in remote counties had challenges in getting health staff to provide 
healthcare to different population groups as it was difficult to recruit health staff who 
understood e.g. sign language to communicate with disabled women. The following quote 
exemplifies this observation: 
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“In my catchment area, we do not have someone with sign language, so I would 
say the policy is saying for all Kenyans and even people with disability. But here, 
this is a patient with disability and I am not able to serve them fully.” (KI-25, Health 
worker from a fully functional facility) 
 
The other barrier to access care was user fees as economic reasons were still a barrier for 
target populations from both groups of facilities. The following quote from a not fully 
functional facility participant highlighted this point:  
“In terms of equity, we have three groups of Kenyans, the upper class, the middle 
class and the lower class. So now the upper class do not come [to] public hospitals, 
they have their own hospitals, the rich and the middle class they don’t come to 
public hospitals, they go to private hospitals because they have insurance which 
pays for them, there the health system is fantastic. Everything is fantastic, the 
equipment is good, there is no crowding, there is good food, there are a good 
ambulance system and everything. So, we are talking about the public hospitals… 
Your maid, your house girl, your house boy, your relative from the rural area who 
do not have money are the ones we have been talking about.” (KI-16, Health 
worker from a not fully functional facility) 
Furthermore, “capture of local elites” was present in both types of facilities. A fully 
functional facility participant recalled how politicians wanted to interfere with the 
management of health workers within their county department of health (Also discussed 
under Chapter 5. Section 5.1.3.4. Threat to equity). Another participant from a not fully 
functional facility similarly experienced that their county government provided “the best 
services for their relatives” while they ignored the requests from health facilities. When 
health workers failed to comply with the county’s request, the county has used their power 
to take action against health workers. Hence, facility participants felt that equity should also 
exist within the county health system. The following testimony from a not fully functional 
facility participant provides evidence for this observation: 
Participant: “Politics play a very big role when it comes to management nowadays 
management of clients in the hospital you can imagine if it is a politician’s relative, 
he would want the best for that relative they even make a follow-up. But once you 
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go to complain that we need this and this in the hospital because we have patients 
suffering from this and this, they will not bother. But the day they will have their 
own relatives wanting the same services, they will come in very first. They will 
come in very first. 
Interviewer: And if you don’t have these materials? 
Participant: They want it done.    
Interviewer: Failure to do that? 
Participant: Failure to do that, we have had cases where people have been given 
letters to show why you should not be disciplined just because of ABCD. There is a 
day, we had a very bad road accident, we did not have so many things in the 
hospital so were referring everybody to Kenyatta. Even small fractures cut 
everything. So, it happened we had one of the relatives of the people in the county, 
they just called there and big people came and started saying why don’t you have 
this and this. We told them, we don’t have. They rushed to town to buy, this time 
they bought because they had a client. But when we have a problem with people, 
they don’t know, it is not a big thing to them, they just tell you to refer, manage 
or do what you want to do. You know that is not equity. It should be equity for all, 
if you don’t have, let us buy for everybody.” (KI-37, Health worker from a not fully 
functional facility) 
7.3 Enforcement mechanisms  
 
Enforcement mechanisms for good governance ensure individuals and organisations adhere 
with and abide by the interest of the institutions (Aoki, 2001) (Bertone and Meessen, 2013). 
This can occur via self-enforcement such as common beliefs, reputation, kinship or via third 
party enforcement such as legal sanction, contracts, rules, laws or policing (North, 1990). 
Reviewing the makeup of institutions, observing their adherence and understanding 
motivation could also enforce institutional arrangements (Bertone and Meessen, 2013).  
In this study, self-enforcement were initiatives by facility participants for service delivery 
despite limited resources while third party enforcement comprised supervision, 
strengthening existing regulatory systems and enforcement across other sectors outside 
health. 
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The section below starts by explaining how facility staff used their own initiative to improvise 
with the available resources, then highlights the situation of the existing third party 
enforcement mechanisms such as supervision and regulatory system in place. (Table 18). 
Table 18. Enforcement mechanisms between the two groups of facilities 
Enforcement 
mechanisms 
Fully functional facilities Not fully functional facilities 
Self-enforcement 
To perform 
Present and initiatives to  
-Improvise with available resources 

















Present but weak 
 
 






Present but weak  
 
 
Require as corruption “exists in 
other sectors outside health” 
 
7.3.1 Self-enforcement  
Participants from fully functional facilities demonstrated self-initiative in performing their 
duties as they improvised with the available resources to provide health services even 
though the equipment and supplies required to perform certain procedures were 
insufficient. The following quote from a fully functional facility participant illustrates this 
point: 
“We also do the emergency CS or deliveries at night. This is even a bigger challenge 
even if you want to send the patient for the drug which is not available in the 
facility and even if you send the patient to go and get the drug, they cannot get 
the drug because most of the pharmacies have closed… [What] we usually do are 
other measures to control bleeding. Other methods that I do after uterine 
massage, oxytocin, give the oxytocin at the third stage of labour, then again you 
can add the oxytocin and go to a limit of 60-80 syntocinon IV. If that doesn’t work 
and we don’t have sytotec I usually do the balloon tamponade, which most of the 
time it sorts me out, the improvised one. You know we don’t have the Rouche 
catheter, the ideal one for tamponade, but I just use the Foley with a condom.” 
(KI-24, Health worker from a fully functional facility) 
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Participants from fully functional facilities also took their own initiatives to look for the 
information within the context of the policy dissemination gap while it was not mentioned 
by participants from not fully functional facilities. Facilities, both fully functional and not fully 
functional facilities, set up their own forms of enforcement in agreement with the county 
department of health to control embezzlement. In some facilities where staff were involved 
in corrupt practices, there was evidence that facility-driven disciplinary actions had been 
taken. This was described in the previous “institutional arrangements” section as both formal 
and informal institutional arrangements were instrumental in avoiding further incidences.  
7.3.2 Third party enforcement 
Supervision was the most common form of third party enforcement, and facility participants 
felt supported during those supervisory visits which allowed them to interact with their 
supervisors and learn from those interactions. The following quote from a fully functional 
facility participant illustrates this observation:  
“People from the central government should see how you are doing and what are 
your challenges. Even that in itself is motivating? So, that it doesn’t appear like I 
have been dumped in some remote corner, somewhere.” (KI-10, Health worker 
from a fully functional facility) 
 
Participants also highlighted the importance of third party enforcement to control corruption 
as corruption existed in other sectors, not only health and control measures for corruption 
were not enforced within the system. The existing regulatory system was weak as “a lot of 
people tend to think that health care is like a business”. Together with stringent third party 
enforcement and responsible action, corruption could be eradicated from the current society 
in Kenya. This includes cross-sectoral actions going beyond the health sector as corruption 
is systemic. The following quotes from a not fully functional facility participant exemplify this 
observation. In the first quote, the participant highlighted substandard maternity facilities 
could be allowed to continue to function in a corrupt system. In the second quote, the 
participant wanted to highlight how corruption was systemic and how it also existed in other 
sectors outside health. 
“I believe corruption or money can take anybody anywhere. Some of these things 
I am sure, they are bought. They are bought as when you want a permit to run 
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maternity; if it has a requirement that you should have qualifications for you to 
run maternity, then what if you give them money, these people may protect you.”  
“There is no fairness in anything. That’s why we go on. Our system we have 
problem…like in the education system, you find that a child is not supposed to 
attend that school because he has not attained the marks that are required to join 
the school, and then you have another one who has met the requirement to join 
the school; but the parents of the child who has not attained the marks pays the 
principal. The result is the one with the requirement will miss joining the school. 
Those are the things that you will see everywhere either in the health system or 
the education system." (KI-9, Health worker from a not fully functional facility) 
 
There was a perception that third party enforcement such as oversight mechanisms were 
present in both types of facilities but weak. Under these condition, self-enforcement was 
also important in remote facilities where third party supervision was a challenge. Indeed, 
even if a facility had formal rules in place to provide receipts for every payment, enforcing 
these rules depended on staff’s adherence, community awareness and having disciplinary 
measures in place. In the previous chapter (Chapter 6), participants shared their experiences 
regarding how people could “bend the rule” as there were reported cases of non-adherence 
of FMS policy such as writing prescriptions to buy medicines under the policy instead of 
providing them free of charge. 
7.4 Incentives and motivation  
 
Incentives and motivation were important for health workers to achieve service delivery 
objectives. Incentives involved different types of benefits accrued to individuals because of 
institutional arrangements (Bertone and Meessen, 2013). Two types of motivation were 
discussed in this study: intrinsic motivation (the health worker adhered to the facility 
arrangements as s/he valued it) and extrinsic motivation (the health workers expected to 
benefit something by adhering to the facility arrangements). These two types of motivation 
were difficult to differentiate as providing extrinsic motivation for health workers might have 
affected intrinsic motivation as health workers might revise their preferences and choice 
(Bertone and Meessen, 2013).   
In this study, facility participants described two reasons for intrinsic motivation and three 
causes of extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic factors included a moral mission to save lives as 
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participants felt accountable to the populations served but demotivated to work due to the 
lack of opportunities to participate in policy making. Extrinsic factors were meeting their 
basic needs and supportive working environment, for instance, collaboration/coordination 
among co-workers and presence of facility-driven staff support system. The section below 
first describes intrinsic factors followed by extrinsic factors. (Table 19). 
Table 19. Incentives and motivation between the two groups of facilities 
Incentives and motivation Fully functional facilities Not fully functional facilities 
1)Intrinsic motivation 
Accountability (moral mission to 
save life) 
 














Basic needs (e.g. receiving regular 
salaries in time) 
 
Coordination among colleagues 
 








staff support system) 
 
Delay in receiving salaries 




Absent (facility-driven staff 
support system) 
 
7.4.1 Intrinsic motivation 
Most intrinsic factors were related to health workers’ moral mission and ethical principles 
to treat and hence, they felt they were accountable for their work, practised in line with 
facility arrangements, even in resource-constrained situations and in private facilities. For 
example, despite the lack of resources to perform emergency obstetric care (the equipment 
and trained health staff to perform signal functions), participants from both types of facilities 
continued to providing services. In another example, a fully functional facility participant 
could act on ethical principles even in the private sector, resisting the temptation to 
recommend caesarean sections to make more money. The following quotes from 
participants from each group of facilities exemplify this observation:  
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“In the delivery room, we deliver mothers on a mackintosh. It increases sepsis 
because another mother has just come from there you delivered a mother over 
there then you bring another mother. Fine, you have carbolised but it is not 
sufficient… Delivery packs are never sufficient; they are never enough. Most of the 
time, even if you went there now, they are delivering with either a blade and that 
is what they use for episiotomy is what they use for cutting the cord.” (KI-36, 
Health worker from a not fully functional facility) 
 
“In private facilities, you know private most of the time is about making money, 
so where I work I usually tell them I have to review the patient before I do any CS, 
when they call me for emergencies I review the patient I make sure the indication 
is there then I perform then do the procedure, but in other areas the intent is just 
to make money, it could be exploited a bit.” (KI-24, Health worker from a fully 
functional facility) 
 
Some facility participants were demotivated due to a lack of opportunities to participate in 
policymaking. There was a perception that they were left out of policy development and the 
decision making process and this “lack of voice” led to demotivation. Participants from both 
groups of facilities shared similar opinions as they were not invited for the development of 
important policies. A fully functional facility participant gave an example regarding the 
“Beyond Zero” campaign and how it was impossible to reach this in some counties. A not 
fully functional facility participant also highlighted that as the FMS policy did not involve 
health workers in policy development, this had resulted in significant gaps in payment 
structures and impeded its implementation. The following quotes of participants from a fully 
functional and a not fully functional facility illustrate this observation: 
"Beyond Zero; but think of taking this ambulance to Turkana where there is no 
road. Then you are called that there is an emergency, how does the ambulance 
get there, how does it get back. The decisions are being made on the centre 
without really looking at specific challenges of each [county]." (KI-10, Health 
worker from a fully functional facility) 
“The government pegged 5000sh for delivery, and they did not know that there is 
a difference between normal delivery and a CS… They should have said if you 
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deliver normal, we give you 5000sh. If you deliver CS, we give you 20,000sh 
because the two are different, the cost of anaesthesia is different from normal 
delivery… We were not called to craft the payment structure; we were not 
consulted, it was just pushed down our throat that you will get 5000 and you 
cannot say no because it is the government, so you just work with what you have.” 
(KI-16, Health worker from a not fully functional facility) 
 
7.4.2 Extrinsic motivation 
 
Facility participants seemed to highly value the humanitarian aspect of their work, 
particularly their moral mission to save lives. This passion was one of their motivating factors 
though they were working with limited resources. This was observed in both groups as they 
felt satisfied that their services still benefit women and children. However, those intrinsic 
factors would only function when basic needs of the health staff were met (for instance, 
receiving regular salaries in time). Participants from some facilities (not fully functional) 
noted that generally, motivation in their workplace was low as their basic needs were not 
met. This was observed in some not fully functional facilities as some staff who did not 
receive their salaries on time and in the worst case, salaries were delayed “for months” with 
no information. Besides, some staff in those facilities felt insecure in their jobs as there were 
rumours regarding the laying off some health staff. In one of the not fully functional facilities, 
there were even reports of losses of medical equipment compromising the trusting 
relationship among the staff. This could be seen from the following example of how working 
with very limited resources put a strain on health workers.  
“There was a time when a lot of equipment was getting lost from the hospital, and 
there was a lot of blame game…And there was a policy, when you are leaving, you 
are asked to show what is in your bag… There has been a lot of issues concerning 
salaries, and some county says they want to lay off some people. Some people 
salaries have not been paid for months, some people have not been promoted, 
and you see there is a lot of hardship among the people who provide care in the 
hospital. Especially the support staff, they come to work, but some of them have 
not been paid for months and months.” (KI-38, Health worker from a not fully 
functional facility) 
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A positive working environment such as collaboration/coordination and collective support 
among colleagues also motivated facility participants to perform. Some participants from not 
fully functional facilities commented that the lack of both vertical and horizontal 
coordination with insufficient support from the county government were significant barriers 
to productivity and the accountability of health workers. The following quotes from not fully 
functional facility participants exemplify this observation: 
“…because the hospital does not liaise with the county government, so you find 
that there is a gap, the hospital needs if it is presented to the county 
government…We get to meet only when there is an issue and even when we meet 
when there is an issue. Usually, you find there is no unity though most likely if we 
meet, we call for a meeting usually the medical officer interns, clinical officer 
interns will come but the nurses may not come. So, you find that still, the meeting 
is not effective, is counterproductive.” (KI-36, Health worker from a not fully 
functional facility) 
“…they [the county] have been buying for us, but they are still to bring some of the 
things that we require, they are yet to respond, but before devolution, actually 
from the minister of health we used to receive a recurrent funding that we could 
use to purchase food for patients, fuel our vehicle for such, we used to receive a 
number of things even equipment’s and so we are waiting for the county to do the 
same.” (KI-33, Health worker from a not fully functional facility). 
 
Another extrinsic motivator was supportive working environment as participants from not 
fully functional facilities highlighted that it was missing in their workplaces. The following 
quotes from facility participants illustrate this observation as fully functional facilities 
supported and felt supported by their colleagues while it was not present in not fully 
functional facilities: 
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“We had someone who was drunk, he was an alcoholic, and the facility was able 
to enrol them in a rehabilitation centre, and now actually they are back to work. 
So, I think that is a success, that is an example.” (KI-32, Health worker from a fully 
functional facility) 
“It is really pathetic. We once had such a staff, when it comes to work he is very 
perfect but he was an alcoholic, the case was forwarded to the county. Instead of 
us really having a support system to support this individual, he was transferred to 
a rural facility, where he went, and he became worse, I think that’s our weakness, 
we need to have such a system in place to help these staff some welfare.” (KI-37, 
Health worker from a not fully functional facility) 
7.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter examines how governance arrangements differ between the two groups of 
health facilities with different functionality. The facility functionality was explored in the 
form of the availability of signal functions. Governance arrangements were considered from 
institutional analysis approach looking at what and how institutional arrangements for 
different governance principles have been enforced and what was the motivation to enforce 
those arrangements. The findings suggest that staff responded to problems with formal 
institutions by creating informal arrangements that sometimes circumvented and sometimes 
supported the goals of the formal system. Fully functional facilities had accountability 
mechanisms that were self-enforced. By contrast, not fully functional facilities lacked both 
self-enforcement and effective third party enforcement mechanisms. Norms and practices 
for controlling corruption were clear in fully functional facilities but confused in not fully 
functional facilities. Both groups of health workers highly valued the humanitarian aspect of 
their work. However, staff from not fully functional facilities were demotivated as they could 
not meet their basic needs and the working environment was unsupportive. Other 
institutional factors that might have explained the difference between the two groups of 
facilities did not seem to be significant. All facilities were subject to top-down policy decisions 
which hindered dialogues between citizens, civil society and government. A general lack of 
transparency and the absence of structured information dissemination also reduced the 
chances for accountability to citizens via participation and engagement. 
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The aim of this chapter is to position the findings of this study within the body of empirical 
and theoretical evidence from the literature. To do so, the chapter first briefly recaps the aim 
and objectives of the study, the methods employed and the theoretical framework used in 
the study. Following this, the chapter will discuss how the study findings are similar or 
different from findings from other studies, and how they advance the understanding of 
health system governance.  
 
The aim of the study is to explore the situation of health system governance at three health 
system levels in Kenya focussing on health facilities designated to provide comprehensive 
emergency obstetric care (CEmOC). The following specific research objectives were 
formulated to achieve this aim:  
1. To explore factors influencing health systems governance in Kenya 
2. To explore the perspectives of key stakeholders on health systems governance 
3. To explore whether the status of health system governance differs with functionality 
of health facilities 
While the subject of governance has been studied across different disciplines, few studies 
have generated a comprehensive understanding of governance at the operational level. 
Chapter 3 (Literature review) of this study discussed governance from a cross-disciplinary 
perspective. It provides an in-depth critique of the frameworks available to assess 
governance in health systems. There are ten studies in the literature which assessed 
governance at the operational level. This is one of the very few studies which have assessed 
governance at health facility level. Specifically, one of the analyses conducted in this study 
was informed by the institutional framing of governance in which governance is defined in 
terms of the rules that distribute roles among actors and shape their actions, decisions and 
interactions.  
Considering that governance refers to the rules (both formal and informal) of collective 
action and decision making in a system with diverse players and organisations, it was 
important to adopt a suitable framework to guide the exploration of factors that may 
influence governance. Two frameworks were adapted: the frameworks of Baez Camargo and 
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Jacobs (2011) and Siddiqi et al. (2009). Three main attributes characterise the framework: in-
depth understanding of key operational principles of governance; a focus on institutional 
analysis and analysis at multiple levels of a health system.  
This chapter is presented in five parts as below. The first section of this chapter summarises 
the main findings of the study. The second section relates the findings to the literature. The 
third section explores the strengths and limitations of the study. Within the section, key 
strengths of the study have been highlighted in two key sections: methodological 
contributions and relevance to Kenya. The fourth section points to the areas for future 
research in health system governance. The fifth section provides strategic recommendations 
for Kenya. The final section presents the overall concluding remarks on the study and the 
topic.   
8.1 Summary of key findings 
 
The following section provides an overview of key findings of this study in relation to the 
research questions described in Chapter 4. (Table 20).  
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-Devolution has brought the Kenyan health system into a decentralised structure of governance, presenting opportunities for 
governance as the system of elected county government promoted public accountability. Challenges (threats to accountability and 
equity) outweighed the opportunities of devolution as it compromised the capacity of county government.  
-Rapid “big bang” devolution did not allow Kenya health system and structures to be in place. This was compounded by the limited 
capacity of county governments to handle their newly devolved functions and limited capacity of national government to support 
county governments in devolution.   
-Health financing was still a challenge to the Kenya health system as public health facilities were struggling to adhere to the new 
financing policy (FMS). This was compounded by HRH shortage and health workers’ strikes due to health workers receiving late salaries 
and different payment schemes between the two levels of government.   








-Financial accountability was considered to be essential due to lack of control mechanisms with different opportunities to abuse within 
the Kenyan health system. The current health system required incentives to improve the performance of public sector staff due to 
lack of formal performance appraisals.  
-Different mechanisms to improve community accountability existed although their functionality was variable. This was compounded 
by limits in citizens’ access to the right information and weak enforcement of laws. The country had good policies in place, but 
discrepancies existed between the formal and informal rules due to weak law enforcement, lack of resources, inappropriate costings 
and problems with reimbursements.  
-Although the current Constitution allowed stakeholders’ participation in policy making, there were not enough engagement in policy 
development due to inequity among different groups and power differences.  
-Equity across counties has not improved with devolution. There have been small steps to address it, and it would take the time to 
improve the equity across the country.   








-Both groups of facilities lacked formal institutional arrangements for performance appraisal. Informal rules for accountability and 
control of corruption did differ such as understanding roles and responsibilities, following standard operating procedures and 
coordination among the health workers were missing in not fully functional facilities.  
-In not fully functional facilities, facility enforcement measures were hindered by influential people, and health workers felt 
discouraged or reluctant to discipline other staff. 
-The presence of incentives and motivation to be accountable was another observed difference between the two groups of facilities. 
Participants from some not fully functional facilities felt demotivated as their basic needs were not met in the unsupportive working 
environment such as coordination/collaboration among the colleagues. 
-Other institutional factors such as participation, transparency and equity between two groups of facilities did not seem to be 
significant. All facilities were subject to top-down policy decisions which hindered dialogues between citizens, civil society and 
government.  
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The overall aim of this study was to explore the situation of health system governance in 
Kenya. Previous studies sought to establish quantitative linkage between governance and 
health system performance or health outcomes. This study made a departure from that as it 
sought to understand, in addition to that linkage, how stakeholders perceived governance. 
To be specific, this study explored each operational principle of health system governance. 
Indeed, the main contribution of this study to the knowledge on governance is in its 
exploration of how and why stakeholders are accountable; how they control corrupt 
practices; how rules have been enforced; and how stakeholders engaged and participated in 
achieving equity in access to health care.  
8.1.1 Factors influencing health system governance in Kenya 
 
Chapter 5 describes how the government of Kenya has supported the improvements of 
governance, by taking a strong stance against corruption while the country is trying to 
achieve universal health coverage through different initiatives. Two prominent health 
financing initiatives introduced in June 2013, the abolishment of the user fees policy and the 
adoption of the FMS policy, are constitutional milestones for the country. In addition to the 
political context, the socio-cultural context played a significant role as it influenced and 
explained why and how individual health workers interacted with their communities and 
their roles in adhering to health system rules. For instance, it highlighted the importance of 
social and public accountability mechanisms as socio-cultural norms still dictated how people 
sought health care. In other words, it highlighted the inadequate use of skilled healthcare 
providers and power difference between community and healthcare providers.   
Simultaneously with introducing new financing initiatives, the country has undergone a 
process of devolution as the majority of Kenyans voted for decentralisation in August 2010. 
The health sector was one of the public sectors to embrace devolution. Consequently, 47 
newly elected county governments became responsible for the implementation of essential 
health services while the national government provides technical support to the counties, 
manages provincial general hospitals and drafts health policies. Although a Transition 
Authority was formed to facilitate the transition period, county governors asked the 
President to devolve authority more rapidly than initially planned, soon after they had been 
elected (within a six-month time frame).  
Indeed, services have been devolved quickly while several outstanding questions remain 
unanswered for Kenya’s health sector. Participants provided different examples of how 
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devolution compromised the capacity of county government to deliver care. They perceived 
that it was “big bang” devolution with inadequate support from the national government. 
Counties have different baseline capacities due to historical development challenges and the 
limited decision making power (counties can decide but have no resources to realise) 
received through the devolution. Even though counties can design health service delivery at 
their own discretion, they receive limited resources from the national government, and very 
few counties can generate their own revenues. Thus, the lack of adequate financing to 
achieve their vision is a real problem. Another common frustration shared by participants is 
the management of the health workforce, as counties struggled to manage the payroll while 
human resource management systems and structures were yet to be put in place; 
compounded by frequent health workers’ strikes due to late salary payment. Some 
participants felt that the health system had not changed quickly enough to respond to the 
devolution goals.  
Nevertheless, this study highlights that devolution provided opportunities for good 
governance as it created opportunities to improve different forms of accountability. 
Devolution helped to promote community accountability as local government officials risked 
not being re-elected if they did not respond to community needs. It also helped to avoid 
unnecessarily prolonged decision making as counties could respond with a shorter 
turnaround time. Devolution facilitated ownership and responsibility of county governments 
as it provided them with adequate decision space to implement health service delivery. The 
devolved Constitution provided county governments “a lot of clout” to implement health 
policies. Devolution also allowed county governments to think holistically, involving other 
sectors such as roads, infrastructure and communication to improve the health system.  
8.1.2 Perspectives of key stakeholders on governance 
 
Besides devolution, Chapter 6 explored specifically how key stakeholders perceived the 
governance of Kenya’s health system. The study used a governance assessment framework 
described in Chapter 4 to examine different principles of governance. Participants reflected 
mainly on five interrelated principles of governance: accountability, control of corruption, 
the rule of law and strategic vision, participation and equity. Indeed, there were challenges 
in realising accountability which was influenced by other principles of governance.  
Among the three accountability mechanisms (financial, performance and community 
accountability), financial accountability was considered to be the most important by 
national participants as counties became responsible for decision making related to health 
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service delivery. An additional perceived vulnerability was that county governors had limited 
experience in financial management with no proper mechanisms in place to manage 
resources. For facility participants, the current health system did not have visible incentives 
for performance accountability as there was no objectively set system of penalty or 
appraisal to improve performance while patronage, favouritism and individual caprice could 
limit performance accountability. Furthermore, downward accountability (i.e. 
accountability towards subordinates or lower levels) was also a neglected agenda within the 
health system hierarchy, as different officials only cared about accountability towards their 
managers or higher level. 
This study found evidence of community accountability mechanisms being put in place, 
including suggestion boxes, health centre committees and facility service charters, although 
their functionality was unknown. Two commonly cited reasons for using community 
accountability were to create public awareness and to empower communities despite the 
existence of accountability brokers and abuse of the system. This was evident from the 
example of citizens who demanded services to which they were not entitled but were trying 
to benefit from the system. 
The findings seem to suggest that the current health system has different opportunities for 
abuse, some groups had used the power and information to abuse public resources for 
personal benefit. For example, some facility staff took advantage of the limited 
understanding and knowledge of clients such as asking women for payments for maternity 
care, even though user fees had been officially abolished. Participants reported experiencing 
unfair treatment by some county government officials who made use of their power. Hence, 
corruption was perceived as a systemic problem while transparency and the rule of law 
helped reduce the incidence of possible corrupt practices. Although there were increasing 
means to make information more available, citizens’ access to the right information at the 
right time was still an issue within the Kenyan health system. Additionally, weak 
enforcement of laws was another key driver to abuse, as citizens could not hold public 
agents accountable.  
This study identified two forms of rules influencing Kenya’s health system: rules in form and 
rules in use. This study was conducted two years after the introduction of two new financing 
policies: abolishment of user fees and FMS. Therefore, this study used the FMS policy as an 
example in discussions related to the rule of law and strategic vision. Participants perceived 
that the country had very good policies in place, but when it came to implementation, there 
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were significant gaps due to weak enforcement of the rules. This was compounded by 
inefficient policy dissemination, inappropriate costings and a complex reimbursement 
process. The situation was further complicated by health system challenges such as 
shortages of staff, supplies and equipment. Sometimes policy implementers (facility and 
county participants) made their own arrangements to adhere to the prescribed rules: for 
example, slightly bending the rules to provide maternity services by writing prescriptions. 
This partially-enforced policy redefined the property rights (decision making and earning 
rights) of health workers with a loss of one source of funding which was not adequately 
compensated. Hence, the FMS policy struggles to work in practice due to discrepancies 
between the rules in form and the rules in use. One reason for such discrepancy noted by 
county and facility participants was that they were not invited to participate in developing 
the policy. 
This study considered opportunities afforded to stakeholders to participate in the policy 
making and implementation process. Although the Constitution allowed for their 
participation, in fact, participants did not perceive that they could participate in policy 
making which remained “top-down” and the systems were state-centric or county-centric, 
allowing little room for participation. Additionally, citizens were not sufficiently empowered 
to participate in these processes due to power differences and inequities among different 
population groups.  
Participants across all categories acknowledged the existence of inequity in access to care 
and inequity across different counties has not reduced after devolution. The national 
government did put in place measures to reduce inequity, such as the removal of financial 
barriers by abolishing user fees, equitable sharing of resources among different counties, 
removing distance and geographic barriers by improving infrastructure and the referral 
system, and training and recruitment of local communities. On the other hand, participants 
acknowledged that issues of inequity could not be solved overnight.   
8.1.3 Differences in governance between fully functional and not fully functional 
facilities 
 
Chapter 7 of this thesis answers the third research question: “Are there any differences in 
governance between fully functional and not fully functional facilities?” UN signal function 
availability was used to determine the functionality of health facilities designated to provide 
CEmOC. Among ten purposively selected facilities, four were fully functional, and six were 
not. Signal function 5 (removal of retained products) and 6 (assisted vaginal delivery) were 
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the two signal functions most commonly unavailable. Secondary data highlighted that fully 
functional facilities had at least one of the equipment sets (vacuum and forceps) required to 
perform signal function 6, which was not the case for not fully functional facilities. However, 
there was no difference in the availability of equipment between the two groups of facilities 
according to the interview participants, as none of the groups had enough equipment. But 
staff from fully functional facilities improvised with available resources while both groups 
faced challenges due to a shortage of skilled staff who were trained to provide signal 
functions, due to frequent staff rotation and transfer.  
The analysis adopted in this chapter used the institutional framing of governance as 
described in Section 4.4.3.2 and directed content analysis (described in Chapter 4). The 
findings highlighted that staff responded to lack or weakness of formal institutions by 
creating informal arrangements that may circumvent or support the goals of the formal 
system. Fully functional facilities had self-enforced accountability mechanisms; by contrast, 
facilities that were not fully functional lacked both self-enforcement and effective third party 
enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, norms and practices for controlling corruption 
were clear in fully functional facilities but confused in some that were not fully functional. 
Other institutional factors that might have explained the difference between the two groups 
did not seem to be significant. All facilities were subject to “top-down” policy decisions 
which hindered dialogues between citizens, civil society and government. A general lack of 
transparency and absence of structured information dissemination also reduced the 
opportunities for accountability to citizens via participation and engagement. 
It is important to note that the overall findings presented above modified the framework 
(Table 7) exploring governance which was presented in the Methodology Chapter (Section 
4.2). During the analysis process, it became apparent that governance principles were 
interrelated and the same finding could be classified under different governance principles. 
Particularly, the two principles: strategic vision and the rule of law have been combined into 
one as the responses related to strategic vision were mostly related to the FMS policy and 
how they have been enforced by laws. Besides, there was not enough information on the 
principle “responsiveness”. Instead, there was information regarding the “control of 
corruption” principle which was not considered initially. Indeed, a modified conceptual 
framework incorporating the key findings from this study is needed. The revised conceptual 
framework (Figure 28) recognises the importance of contextual factors influencing health 
system governance such as on-going devolution, political and the socio-cultural context, 
health financing and human resources for health. It also integrates the institutional framing 
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of governance, highlighting how different intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of frontline 
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8.2 Findings in relation to the literature 
 
This section discusses key findings in the context of the broader literature on health systems 
governance in four sub-sections according to the revised conceptual framework (Figure 28). 
They are 1) contextual factors influencing health system governance in Kenya, 2) institutional 
arrangements of governance, 3) enforcement mechanisms and 4) incentives and motivation. 
In discussing the linkage with the literature, both the health system literature and findings 
of governance from other disciplines such as international development and new 
institutional economics are discussed. 
8.2.1 Contextual factors influencing health system governance in Kenya  
 
Within the context of devolution, the health system in Kenya faced challenges with limited 
health financing and resources which did not change in tandem with devolution. The findings 
highlighted that devolution could be an opportunity to improve county governments’ 
responsiveness to their population due to the emergence of public accountability 
Figure 28. Revised conceptual framework of the study 
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mechanisms and stakeholder opportunities to engage in policy development process. 
However, rapid devolution hindered these opportunities as the counties did not have 
systems and structures in place. This can be observed in Chapter 5 which highlights how 
governance is instrumental in shaping the newly devolved (decentralised) health system of 
Kenya. This is in line with Hope (2014) who highlighted that decentralisation brought changes 
in governing the health system. Ciccone et al. (2014) also noted that decentralisation 
improves the responsiveness to local health needs and values.  
The central aim of devolution in Kenya was political to respond to ‘distributional grievances’; 
in other words, inequity (Ndii, 2010). Two out of the nine stated objectives of devolution in 
Article 174 of the Constitution were related to economic development: 1) Article 174 f. ‘to 
promote social and economic development and service delivery’; and 2) Article 174 g. 
‘equitable resource distribution’ (Ndii, 2010:6). The implications of devolution on improved 
public sector performance depends largely on positive collaboration between the two levels 
of government, the capacities of the two levels of government, and, the accountable use of 
resources. As the primary purpose of decentralisation was to respond to inequity, 
participants expressed concern that little progress had been made in achieving equity goals. 
The lack of progress may not be unusual: evidence linking decentralisation to improvements 
in equity is scant (Sumah et al., 2016). 
Devolution has brought the Kenyan health system into a decentralised structure of 
governance. Chapter 2 (Background) has described how the devolved governance structure 
transfers the responsibility of financing and managing health service delivery (except 
national referral facilities) to county governments while the national government is 
responsible for providing policy, technical oversight and support to county governments. 
Therefore, a positive collaboration between national and county governments is crucial, and 
depends on the incentives and motivation of key stakeholders at each of the two 
government levels. County governments received only a moderate decision space in 
financing while they received a wide decision space in two other key health system functions: 
1) organisation of health service delivery and 2) HRH. Decision space is essential in a 
decentralised governance as it dictates how devolved government could influence or 
participate in the decision making processes (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002). Allowing wide 
decision space is often used as a means to hold devolved government accountable (Bossert 
and Beauvais, 2002). A wide decision space also allows the devolved government an 
opportunity of “learning-by-doing” as they become increasingly more comfortable in making 
independent choices (Bossert et al., 2015). The principal-agent theory postulates that the 
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decentralised units (county governments) with wide decision space may choose not to take 
advantage of the new powers received if they are entrusted with accountability and 
responsibility (Bossert, 1998). The agents also tend to innovate by making new choices if 
their interests are in line with the objectives of the principal (the national government) 
(Bossert, 1998).  
According to a survey conducted in 2002, Kenya was already in the top quartile for five 
components of decentralisation (political, administrative, financial, upward accountability 
and downward accountability) among its African peers even before devolution (Ndii, 2010). 
However, the decision space for those functions, in reality, was restricted by the limited 
resources the county governments received. This can be observed from interviews of county 
level participants who shared their frustration that the capacity of county health services was 
somehow limited due to the “resource envelope” received. Under the current system, the 
national government allocated only 15 percent of its total revenues to county governments. 
This funding is then divided between different counties based on population, poverty index 
and land area. Consequently, counties struggled to fulfil their mandates with the limited 
budgets received. These findings echo Abimbola & Olanipekun et al. (2015), illustrating 
limited resource allocation does not allow devolved governments to function adequately. 
Sumah et al. (2016) highlighted a similar observation in their systematic review on the impact 
of decentralisation, noting that devolved governments were rarely independent.  
Together with limited financing, the county governments were also facing another health 
system challenge, that is, shortage of health workers to deliver services at public health 
facilities. Frequent health workers’ strikes since devolution compounded this. The Kenyan 
government has been struggling to resolve this issue as the numbers of strikes have 
increased. During the first quarter of 2017, a nationwide strike involving approximately 5000 
health workers brought Kenya’s public health system to a halt. Medical staff from the public 
health system protested to the national government as the government failed to fulfil their 
2013 commitment to raise health workers' salaries, provide adequate resources (equipment, 
medicines and supplies) and opportunities for training and professional developments. The 
situation was compounded by health workers receiving late salary payments. This 
highlighted the national government’s failure to successfully decentralise its health care to 
county governments related to the lack of distribution of the needed financial resources to 
implement this.  
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In Kilifi county, Tsofa & Goodman et al. (2017) similarly observed that delays in the payment 
of health workers’ salaries resulted in increased health workers’ strikes and resignations 
after devolution. Some of the health workers from Kilifi county asked for re-centralisation as 
they did not experience any positive effects from devolution (Tsofa & Goodman et al., 2017). 
On the other hand, improvements have been observed in the supply of essential medicines 
and commodities after devolution (Tsofa & Goodman et al., 2017). Unfortunately, the 
improvements focused on publicly visible commodities like ambulances rather than investing 
in essential medicines required for primary health centres (Tsofa & Goodman et al., 2017). 
Similarly, previous analysis of decentralisation in developing countries had unintended 
effects on HRH (Abimbola & Olanipekun et al., 2015; Scott, 2009). Abimbola & Olanipekun et 
al. (2015) documented the attrition of primary healthcare workers in Nigeria which was 
influenced by the consequences of decentralisation as the primary healthcare governance 
falls under the weakest and least powerful level of the government, the local government.    
Most importantly, frequent health workers’ strikes jeopardised civilians’ lives due to the lack 
of services at public health facilities as many of these were unstaffed during the strike period 
(Kenya's nurses strike takes its toll on healthcare system, 2017). This was due to the 
consequences of devolved governance arrangements under the existing health system. 
Njuguna (2015) conducted secondary data analysis using service utilisation data from 
hospitals within Mombasa county and highlighted that two-week health worker strike in 
August 2014 resulted in a 26.3% increase in patient deaths, 53.5% decrease deliveries at 
health facility level, 57.8% decrease in inpatient admissions, 64.4% decrease in outpatient 
admissions and 74.2% decrease special clinics attendance. In such occasions, Kenyans had to 
choose private service providers which the majority of the population were unable to afford 
(African Research Bulletin, 2017; Kenya's nurses strike takes its toll on healthcare system, 
2017).  
The other challenge highlighted by this study was how the limited capacity of county 
governments (to manage the newly devolved health system functions) undermined health 
system governance. Unclear roles and responsibilities in devolved systems limit 
accountability and threaten equity. Similar findings were reported in Kilifi county, Tsofa & 
Molyneux et al. (2017) highlighted the lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities among 
different health system levels, compromising accountability of the country health system. 
Regarding capacity of county governments, existing reports are in line with the views 
expressed by the participants in this study. For instance, Williamson & Mulaki (2015) 
highlighted that county governments had limited legislative experience and lacked the 
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required systems to manage resources efficiently. Tsofa & Molyneux al. (2017) also 
spotlighted the lack of capacity at county government level (Kilifi county) with re-
centralisation of financial management under decentralised government. Therefore, the 
World Bank (2017) commented that Kenya’s devolution is “one of the most ambitious 
implemented globally” (World Bank, 2017). Williamson & Mulaki (2015) also noted that 
capacity gaps within decentralised units were an issue in many developing countries. Kenya 
is no exception as only a few counties had the administrative capacity to absorb the limited 
funds available and plan for effective use of these funds. There was also no plan in place for 
training or mentoring to close the capacity gaps, although the national government had 
originally planned to use the three-year transition period for capacity building (Williamson & 
Mulaki, 2015). 
This study identified how devolution enhanced different forms of accountability (another key 
principle of governance). Chapter 12 of the Constitution on Public Finance required open 
financial accountability mechanisms (Hope, 2014). Mitchell and Bossert (2010) highlighted 
that decentralisation could be used to improve accountability of public policy especially 
downward accountability. Similar findings were observed in this study as participants 
highlighted the increased accountability of the county government to their health 
departments or health workers. This was considered to be due to officials at county 
government level being concerned about re-election.  
Mills (1990) noted that in any decentralised system, there should be a balance between 
different forms of accountability such as upward accountability (county government to 
national government), downward accountability (county government to health workers) 
and horizontal accountability (among the same levels of the health system). Although county 
governments in Kenya still depend on the national government, they are accountable to both 
national government and citizens including the health workers under their management. 
This is highlighted by facility participants on how downward accountability of health workers 
was compromised in order to comply with the orders from their managers (upward 
accountability).   
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8.2.2 Institutional arrangements for good governance 
 
The findings in Chapter 6 and 7 described the institutional arrangements for governance by 
from the perspectives of key stakeholders, highlighting the key principles of governance.  
8.2.2.1 Accountability and control of corruption 
 
Participants highlighted how accountability of key health system actors was influenced by 
inadequate resources and capacities which in turn created a lack of clarity in roles and 
responsibilities among key stakeholders. This finding echoes the critical factors outlined by 
Cleary et al. (2013) which influence health workers’ accountability: resources and capacities 
of key stakeholders; attitudes and perception; and values, attitudes and culture. Participants 
in this study described various challenges in improving accountability such as poor 
communication, lack of incentives to be accountable and resistance to being held 
accountable, patronage, nepotism and tribalism. Competition with resistance to coordinated 
and integrated work were other recognised challenges undermining accountability among 
key actors in Kenya.  
This study also identified one crucial aspect of the health system, that is, the regulatory 
capacity of the Ministry of Health. As discussed in Section 6.3. (Control of corruption),  
participants highlighted two regulatory weaknesses: licensing and regulation of health 
workers within the Kenyan health system. Sheikh et al. (2013) termed this situation as 
“regulatory capture” as professional medical associations were reluctant to take action 
against their own members due to conflict of interests, power differences and unclear roles 
and responsibilities. 
Other literature on corruption highlights that individuals sometimes used their public 
position to pursue their personal objectives or interests (Vian, 2008). This was observed in 
cases of health workers (KI-24, KI-9 in Section 6.3; KI-25 in Section 7.2.2), as the facility staff 
perceived that they had opportunities to manipulate or influence patients who sought to 
receive services from them. Asymmetry of information and power, and monopoly (i.e., 
being the only organisation providing care, so patients could not choose alternatives to signal 
their discontent with services) provide opportunities for the public officials to abuse their 
power (Vian, 2008). This was highlighted in this study when health workers illustrated how 
county officials assumed that health workers (according to their positions in the health 
system hierarchy) had no means to voice the unfair treatment received from the managers 
and the system.  
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Access to information is crucial for a well-governed health system (Vian, 2008). Between the 
two parties in the health system, when one party has more information than the other, it 
creates a difference in power that can provide an opportunity for the party with more 
information to exploit the other (Bloom et al., 2008). In this study, participants highlighted 
the existence of information gaps among citizens, health workers and even county officials. 
Improving social accountability requires increased opportunity to listen to its citizens. This is 
in line with the literature. For example, Bjorkman and Stevenson (2009) conducted a 
randomised field experimental study on community-based monitoring of primary health 
workers in Uganda. The study showed that through improving information and community 
participation, citizens made health workers accountable for their performance.  
On the other hand, Booth and Cammack (2013) argue that social accountability and the 
voices of citizen will be powerful only if there are complementary mechanisms in place, 
such as top-down pressure, opportunities to integrate social movements into political 
parties, and interest from professional organisations. Therefore, interventions to improve 
accountability and fight against corruption should be complemented by such activities. Even 
though individuals may disapprove of corrupt practices and are aware of the consequences 
for the society at large, they have few incentives and motivation to fight against it (Booth 
and Cammack, 2013).   
At the facility level, the findings from Chapter 7 showed that both groups of facilities lacked 
formal institutional arrangements to improve performance accountability such as 
performance appraisal for health staff. Alande (2014) conducted a study on the role of 
human resource management in five technical areas (recruitment and selection, training and 
development, change management, human resource policies and procedures and 
performance management) in Mombasa district of Kenya which highlighted that human 
resource development was a neglected area for which there was no system for developing 
county officers to further the agenda of devolution. The county also lacked a performance 
management system and some of the county staff were hired not based on their capacity 
but due to political affiliations (Alande, 2014).  
Despite the lack of formal institutions, the two groups of facilities had different informal 
institutional arrangements for accountability and the control of corruption. These included 
understanding roles and responsibilities, following standard operating procedures and 
coordination among the health workers. These arrangements were absent in facilities that 
were not fully functional. Other studies conducted in Nigeria reported the consequences of 
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poorly defined roles and responsibilities together with the lack of coordination among the 
co-workers. This compromised accountability among health workers and affected the 
achievement of health system objectives (Erchick et al., 2017; Garuba et al., 2009).  
Informal institutional norms, such as charging patients to recover fees for the facility, were 
not regarded as corruption in facilities that were not fully functional. While there was 
confusion as to which components of the FMS were free and which could be charged for, the 
informal institutional norms further confused the health workers and patients, providing 
health workers opportunities to abuse the situation. In a similar vein, Mkoka et al. (2014) 
highlighted the importance of institutional arrangements in implementing an emergency 
obstetric care programme in a rural district of Tanzania. The authors pointed to the lack of 
accountability arrangements such as clear roles and responsibilities with minimal inclusion 
of health workers in policy development which hampered the successful implementation of 
the programme. 
8.2.2.2 Strategic vision and the rule of law 
Section 6.4 of Chapter 6 pointed out to the discrepancies between the rules in form and the 
rules in use with a specific example of the FMS policy implementation. Participants believed 
that the FMS policy was prescribed in 2013 without ensuring that the necessary 
preconditions for its success, including financing, were in place. The FMS policy 
superimposed a functioning health insurance programme called the NHIF, even though in 
practice, the coverage of NHIF was limited to the formal sector and covered only 18% of the 
total population. The FMS policy also ignored the fact that user fees had been an important 
source of facility income for non-salary funding; the new policy had no provisions for 
replacing this revenue source with other sources of funding. Lack of adequate resources to 
realise the FMS policy frustrated health workers in their workplaces which, in turn, fuelled 
health workers’ strikes.  
When the FMS policy was introduced in Kenya, health workers felt that they were given an 
opportunity to be part of an important mission: to help reduce maternal and neonatal 
mortality and morbidity. However, many facility participants perceived the arrangement of 
reimbursement mechanisms for the FMS policy as a disincentive, as health facilities lost their 
property rights (i.e., decision making rights and earning rights). Thus, the FMS policy was met 
with resistance at both county and health facility levels. Some were concerned with the 
operational challenges while others felt uncertain due to the lack of clarity regarding the 
content of the maternity services package. Some health workers also did not see any 
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incentives to participate as they were already working at full capacity. Both facility and 
county level participants had doubts regarding the impact and sustainability of the FMS 
policy, as they encountered many operational challenges. A recent study of Gilson et al. 
(2017) conducted in Kilifi county of Kenya reported how facility managers re-introduced user 
fees in response to funding shortfalls. Olivier de Sardan et al. (2011) made similar 
observations in Niger during a period when the country introduced the free primary health 
care policy for children under-five in 2006. The study Olivier de Sardan et al. (2011) found 
that the free primary health care policy weakened the functioning health insurance 
mechanism as health facilities lost significant health workers’ incentives in the public health 
sector. At the same time, health facilities lost their reliable source of non-salary funding due 
to “policy-induced institutional incoherence”.  
Booth (2011) also spotlights how the “institutional shortcomings” of local and sub-national 
governance were associated with inadequate provision of public services in a multicountry 
research programme in seven African countries (Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and Tanzania). These shortcomings were due to “policy-driven institutional 
incoherence” where some policies were prescribed based on political popularity but without 
considering the capacity of organisations and institutional arrangements (Booth, 2011). On 
the other hand, Booth (2011) described the success story in Rwanda when the country 
introduced a new health insurance policy due to institutional coherence (synergy between 
the rules in form and rules in use). Because the reform incentives were consistent with clear 
mandates from all line ministries and there was intense political pressure to comply with the 
reform process, those institutional factors facilitated the reform process. However, 
institutional coherence in introducing the FMS policy was not observed in this study from 
Kenya.  
Another “institutional incoherence” identified in this study was inconsistent formal and 
informal institutional arrangements for public health staff working at private facilities. 
Informal institutions tend to emerge when there are problems with formal institutions 
(Bertone & Witter, 2015). Participants in this study highlighted how health workers 
negotiated with their managers (informal institutional arrangements) to work at private 
facilities during public working hours. Blundo & Le Meur (2009) and Olivier de Sardan (2008, 
2015) described such arrangements as “informal privatisation” of public services because of 
institutional incoherence between the public and private sectors. Informal privatisation 
results from a lack of coordinated efforts among key health system actors and policy makers 
to develop consistent incentive structures (Blundo & Le Meur 2009, Olivier de Sardan 2008, 
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2015). This highlights a gap in the stewardship role of the government to protect the public 
interest, as there is no clear boundary between the two sectors (Balabanova et al., 2008).  
8.2.2.3 Participation in decision making  
 
Section 6.6 of Chapter 6 highlighted how current context provides citizens with different 
opportunities to participate in policymaking and implementation. Participants described 
different opportunities to participate in policy implementation such as barazas, health facility 
management committees (HFMC) and hospital management board. However, citizens’ 
engagement in these processes requires awareness and initiatives to participate. Similar 
findings were observed in studies conducted in Kenya (Lipsky et al., 2015; Barasa & Molyneux 
et al., 2017). In the study of  Lipsky et al. (2015),  the authors did not observe any involvement 
by citizens or civil society organisations in county policy and programme selection processes. 
Similarly, Barasa & Molyneux et al. (2017) did not observe participation and transparency in 
budgeting and priority settings in their case study hospitals. Indeed, although county 
participants mentioned that they had public hearings or barazas where the public could 
provide suggestions to the country government on a proposed policy, actual public 
opportunities to provide such suggestions were varied. Among three counties studied by 
Lipsky et al., only one county held such an event to receive feedback from citizens, while in 
another county, a single official developed the health sector budget without additional input.  
Similarly, some facility staff who participated in this study did not believe that the hospital 
management board represented their community, as they did not ask for feedback from the 
communities. This finding is in line with the results of Lipsky et al. (2015) as the selection of 
HFMC among their study counties was politically driven, with little representation from the 
communities. Their study highlighted the “capture of local elites” in facility management, as 
most HFMCs were powerful bodies able to make staffing and operational decisions. This 
supports the position of Booth and Cammack (2013) who argue that participation without 
other complementary measures will not result in improved social accountability.  
8.2.2.4 Equity 
 
Participants in this study pointed out that equity has not improved after devolution and 
different counties had different socioeconomic baselines. This was compounded by the 
counties’ limited capacities to generate their own revenue and dependent on national 
government while the current formula to determine the distribution of resources does not 
consider specificities of the counties and health system functions. Equity is operationalised 
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as improving access to healthcare services with reduced socioeconomic and geographic 
barriers in accessing care. Facility level participants pointed out that the remoteness of some 
areas make it difficult for users to access services. The shortage of staff to provide services 
was another barrier to access care. The situation was worsened by “skewed distribution” of 
health workforce as counties in remote places did not have resources to attract and retain 
health workers. Similar findings were reported by Wakaba et al. (2014) through statistical 
analysis of secondary data from the Kenyan health workforce information system. Wakaba 
highlighted the public-sector nursing densities were positively associated with urbanisation 
(p value=0.376), immunisation rates (p value= 0.0018) and health expenditure per capita (p 
value=0.0028).  
8.2.3 Enforcement mechanisms for good governance 
 
The outcomes of a system depend on how these rules/institutional arrangements are 
enforced and hence, “institutions without enforcement are not institutions at all” 
(Gustafsson, 1998: 18). This was evident at operational level as observed in Chapter 7 as  the 
difference in enforcement mechanisms was observed in the two groups of facilities. As 
noted by participants from not fully functional facilities, some of the facility enforcement 
measures were hindered by influential people and that participants felt discouraged or 
reluctant to discipline other staff. Similar findings were reported by Nigerian government 
officials involved in a routine immunisation programme as they highlighted that enforcement 
for non-performance required supportive environments to function properly (Erchick et al., 
2017).  
Similar findings are highlighted in the study by Cammack (2011) showing how law 
enforcement resulted in improved service delivery (public safety and safe deliveries) in 
Malawi. Enforcement of rules such as imprisonment or heavy punishment to rule breakers 
deters individuals and groups from committing crimes (Cammack, 2011). Cammak (2011) 
provides another example regarding the introduction of a policy to ban the use of traditional 
birth attendants (TBAs) in Malawi in mid-2009. The Malawi government also created other 
measures to improve the use of skilled birth attendants instead of TBAs. Yet, TBAs were 
found to be active in all research sites (Cammack, 2011). Cammack (2011) argued that even 
though the intention of the policy reform was right, officials were unwilling and unable to 
enforce the policy; and other socially rooted factors compounded this failure, including the 
attitude of health workers themselves.  
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
204 | P a g e  
 
On the other hand, the introduction of an institutional delivery initiative in Rwanda was 
successful due to more rigorous enforcement of the rules (Cammack, 2011). The Rwandan 
government used a combination of financial penalty and social mobilisation to achieve public 
compliance with the new rule. Those activities were complemented by disciplinary actions 
against staff engaging abusive practices towards women (Booth, 2011). These 
complementary efforts (institutional arrangements being enforced and sanctions which 
were backed up by the political pressure) resulted in the fruitful and widespread adoption of 
institutional delivery in Rwanda.  
8.2.4 Incentives and motivation for good governance 
 
Though governance includes arrangements set out at national and county level, everyday 
practices of key health system actors dictate how a health system is governed (Gilson et al., 
2017). Hence, the incentives and motivation of frontline health workers are instrumental as 
they enforce the institutional arrangements on good governance (for instance, 
accountability and control of corruption).  This was observed in Chapter 7 as there were 
differences in the incentives and motivation to be accountable between the two groups of 
facilities. Health workers from both groups of facilities appreciated informal recognition for 
their performance and held ethical values and professional moral principles in high regard. 
In contrast, conditions such as patronage and favouritism demotivated health workers from 
not fully functional facilities: they did not feel motivated in the fight against corruption, as 
participants felt that “there was no fairness in everything” which they “see everywhere either 
in the health system or the education system”.   
Some participants from not fully functional facilities were demotivated to work as their basic 
needs were not met. This coupled with the decreased extrinsic motivation as the FMS policy 
did not provide financial incentives. Under such constraint conditions, they could not create 
a supportive working environment such as coordination/collaboration among the 
colleagues. Erchick et al. (2017) reported similar comments from Nigerian government 
officials working in a routine immunisation programme as they highlighted two factors of 
motivation: the presence of incentives for high-performers, and, a supportive working 
environment. Erchick et al. (2017) emphasised that just ensuring the basic needs of health 
workers (receiving sufficient salaries in time) was crucial to motivating health workers to 
carry out their responsibilities. Gilson et al. (2017) also pointed to the importance of a 
supportive working environment and the everyday resilience of health workers at Kilifi 
county in Kenya. The authors highlighted that frontline health workers should be trained and 
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supported on how to manage unpredictable staff as they had to work within the context of 
unstable responsibilities, challenging community expectations and the ever-changing policy 
environment in Kenya (Gilson et al., 2017).  
 
8.3 Strengths and limitations of the study 
8.3.1 Strengths of the study 
 
This is the one of a few studies in Kenya to assess governance with an in-depth exploration 
of factors influencing health system governance at the macro (national), meso (county) and 
micro (health facility) levels. In so doing, this study effectively used different conceptual 
frameworks of governance and different theories of governance (from various disciplines) to 
develop a robust way of assessing and analysing governance in a health system and at an 
operational level, under the field of health systems and policy research.  
Beyond its specific findings, this study contributes to the current knowledge on how to 
conceptualise and assess governance at both the national and operational level in resource 
constrained health systems. This contribution is not only consistent with but also expands 
the existing theories of health system governance. While I was working on this study, some 
governance studies have been conducted (for example, Petersen et al. 2017, Abimbola & 
Olanipekun et al. 2016, Erchick et al. 2016, Abimbola & Ukwaja et al. 2015). Moving beyond 
the traditional approach to assessing governance, those new studies also considered the 
process (the interactions between the rules and players of a system), including the 
operational level of a health system. Thus, this study of governance in Kenya was timely and 
consistent with those at the forefront of this field. 
This study in Kenya contributes to the knowledge of governance in health system, 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, this study uses institutional analysis approach to 
interpreting findings on health system governance which confirmed the usefulness of this 
theory and extends its use/application to the field of health system governance. Empirically, 
the findings of this study provide relevant recommendations for the Kenyan health system 
and health policy by testing a validated governance assessment framework. The study also 
identifies areas for future research, not limited to Kenya. Hence, the sections below describe 
two key areas of strength of this study: 1) methodological contributions 2) relevance to the 
current Kenya health system.  
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8.3.1.1 Methodological contributions 
 
This study identified a range of frameworks to assess governance of a health system and 
critically evaluated these in a systematic review (subsequently published) which is useful for 
health system research (Appendix 1.). Hence, one main strength of this study is its use of a 
theoretical framework to assess health system governance at the county level and below in 
Kenya. As the concept of health system governance is complex, all-encompassing and 
context-dependent, this study has used a theory-driven approach to health system 
governance. In doing so, this study provides a methodological contribution to health system 
research through 1) the development of a new integrated framework (Figure 28) to assess 
governance which was then applied in Kenya, and 2) assessing health system governance 
using the institutional analysis approach.   
The framework used in this study is based on two frameworks which originate from the new 
institutional economics and international development. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 3 
(Literature review), the framework used in this study is a combination of Baez-Carmago and 
Jacobs (2011) and Siddiqi et al. (2009). The framework of Baez-Carmago and Jacobs (2011) 
draws on the "institutional analysis" theory of North (1990), originally derived from the 
discipline of new institutional economics. The institutional approach to governance helps 
shed light on the formal and informal rules set by organisations and health system actors. 
Through institutional analysis, it is possible to identify power distributions between the main 
stakeholders who influence major decisions within the health system.  
The traditional approach to assessing governance focuses on indirectly assessing the 
performance of the Ministry of Health, based mostly on the essential public health functions 
(Siddiqi et al., 2009). Direct assessment of health system governance requires a different 
approach using an analytical framework based on the operational principles of governance 
(Siddiqi et al., 2009). This is the approach adopted in this thesis. Other methods to directly 
assess governance have been limited to quantitative as the assessment focuses on ranking 
or scoring governance principles which are usually presented as summary measures (for 
instance, World Bank Global governance indicators, UNDP, Ibrahim Index). The quantitative 
approach has received criticism as ranking governance scores does not bring insight into a 
system unless specific findings highlight the strengths and weaknesses of governance in a 
system (Fryatt et al., 2017; Siddiqi et al., 2009).  
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There are a growing number of frameworks adopting qualitative methods (interviews and 
focus group discussions) to provide an in-depth explanation of the governance (for instance, 
Mikkelsen Lopez et al., 2011). This study confirms the value of qualitative research methods 
used in the exploration of health system governance as also highlighted by other governance 
studies (Abdulmalik et al., 2017; Marais & Petersen et al., 2017; Mugisha et al., 2016; 
Petersen et al., 2017; Hanlon et al., 2017; George et al., 2016; Abimbola et al. 2014).  
An increasing number of frameworks also borrow concepts from other disciplines outside 
health systems research such as the concept of new institutional economics (e.g. Abimbola 
et al., 2017, 2016, 2015; Baez-Carmago & Jacobs, 2013; Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2008, 2013). 
Adopting the institutional analysis approach in this study highlights that the health system is 
complex and includes both “hardware” and “software” (Abimbola et al., 2017). Sheikh et al. 
(2011) defines “hardware” as the approach used in international development, key building 
blocks such as HRH, financing, supplies and equipment and “software” as the approach used 
in new institutional economics such as formal and informal rules which are enforced through 
self-enforcement and third party enforcement because of motivation of individual key 
stakeholders.  
The framework of Siddiqi et al. (2009) originates from development studies which tend to 
unpack the different operational principles of governance, rather than assessing governance 
in general. This is the approach adopted in this study which makes the study distinct, as it 
explores specific principles of governance in Kenya. Applying qualitative research methods 
with pre defined principles of governance allowed for the collection of rich contextual data 
on governance principles. The approach used in this study highlights how each principle of 
governance operates at different levels of the health system.  
Ostrom (2005b: 28) stated that a “framework” is an analytical tool which can be used to 
identify elements and relationships among those elements that can be considered in an 
analysis. The intentions of using a framework in this study were two-fold: 1) as a thinking 
guide in developing the topic guides for key informant interviews, and 2) as a conceptual 
guide to the analysis of governance. Therefore, in analysing interview data in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6, inductive analysis (i.e. the analysis did not use any prior formulated theory or 
hypotheses as codes and themes could emerge freely from the data) was used. During the 
institutional analysis of data from facility participants (signal functions performance and 
interview data) in Chapter 7, a deductive approach (guided by the theoretical framework) 
was carefully used. Despite the use of the theory, the analysis ensured that the theory did 
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not hinder the emergent themes which were pertinent to the study, allowing for inductive 
coding within the predetermined themes (deductive coding). 
Developing a comprehensive framework to assess governance of a health system remains a 
challenge to the health system and policy research as there is no universally agreed 
framework and governance is a diffuse and context-specific concept. While other 
approaches to assess health system governance may be developed in the future, this study 
contributes to the methodological approach of the assessment of governance of a health 
system. This study adds to the knowledge of health system governance by confirming the 
value of qualitative research methods and by borrowing approaches from other disciplines. 
8.3.1.2 Relevance to the current Kenya health system 
Despite slow progress in maternal health outcomes within the last decade, there has been 
no study on governance focussing on maternal health care in particular. This study is the first 
to explore the views of key stakeholders from maternal health care settings using a multi-
disciplinary framework.  
To put this research in sociopolitical context, it is important to mention that field work for 
this study was conducted during 2015 two years after devolution. Indeed, Kenya had started 
devolution of the public sectors including health in June 2013. This influenced the way in 
which the Kenyan health system was governed, and it was essential to explore the effect of 
devolution on health system governance in Kenya. Chapter 5 contributes to ongoing 
discussions of devolution in Kenya, and, more importantly, to decentralisation of health 
systems across the world.  
Devolution in Kenya is an ongoing process and systems and structures have changed over 
time. For instance, the health workers’ strikes became more frequent and intense, crippling 
the public health system of Kenya. Citizens who cannot afford private health care were 
mainly affected by the strikes (Kenya’s nurses strike takes its toll on healthcare system, 
2017). Health workers strikes in Kenya not only affected health service delivery, but it also 
caused increased absenteeism at health facilities and low morale among health workers 
(Njuguna, 2015). Although peer-reviewed publications on the impact of health workers’ 
strikes on mortality and morbidity are not yet available, the local media reported instances 
of women in labour being left stranded in front of hospitals (Elszasz, 2017; Africa Research 
Bulletin, 2016). Recent strikes in early 2017 gathered much attention as the strikes were 
national and reported to involve approximately 5000 health workers (Elszasz, 2017). 
Therefore, managing the health workforce has increasingly become a political agenda at both 
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national and county levels. This challenge county and national governments in providing 
health service delivery in addition to the challenge of devolution.  
The situation was further complicated when health workers were asked to provide free 
maternity services when they did not have the means to do so. This study points to the 
importance of a broader consideration of implementing a health financing policy to ensure 
that the system is ready to achieve health system objectives. This study highlights the 
implications on health system governance because of implementing a new financing policy 
within the context of devolution.  
It is important to capitalise on the lessons learnt from this study to put in place a proper 
rearrangement of devolution and review of essential national policies such as abolishing user 
fees and FMS policies. To do so, the findings regarding FMS policy implementation and its 
implications on governance have been arranged for dissemination through publication as the 
manuscript is now under review in a peer- reviewed journal.  
8.3.2 Limitations of the study 
The section below presents important limitations of this study with measures to mitigate 
them. They are grouped into different research phases: conceptualisation and design; data 
analysis and data interpretation. 
8.3.2.1 Limitations related to conceptualisation and design  
 
There is no universally agreed way to define, measure or assess health system governance. 
However, a comprehensive systematic review was conducted and published which identified 
suitable frameworks to assess health system governance. Based on the review, this study 
chose a widely, but not universally, accepted definition and frameworks for assessment. The 
frameworks adapted in this study have been applied/validated in eight low- and middle-
income countries (Table 5). Topic guides to assess governance were also based on the 
framework which were pilot tested with non-participating respondents before field data 
collection. 
There are different ways to determine the functionality of a health facility using different 
criteria. This study has used the functionality of a facility based on the presence of the signal 
functions of comprehensive emergency obstetric care (CEmOC). This assumes that a facility 
designated as a CEmOC facility would be fully functional in service provision if it has all the 
preconditions for functionality (in this case, signal functions). This limitation was explicitly 
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acknowledged since the conceptualization of this study. The choice was determined for the 
pragmatic reasons that this research was embedded within the Making it Happen 
programme which focused on competency based training of health workers’ capacity to 
deliver EmOC. The UN signal functions are biased against health facilities with the capacity 
to provide EmOC services. The facility which does not perform one signal function can be 
due to: lack of trained staff, lack of equipment, low facility attendance and/or distance and 
costs. Hence, some challenges might relate to health facility leadership, management and 
governance but some were beyond the control of the health facility staff. Identification of 
these factors on signal function availability was beyond the scope of this study. Most 
importantly, this study has used UN signal functions only to group facilities into different 
functionality group. The analysis adopted in this study did not aim to attribute facility 
functionality with governance. 
Purposeful sampling of key informants in this study has some limitations. The samples are 
limited to ten facilities and six counties with the inability to generalise findings outside the 
six counties in Kenya. However, the primary aim of adopting the qualitative research 
methods is to gain in-depth insights of governance that can be considered in similar settings. 
Interviews were conducted with at least two facility level participants from each facility, 
giving at least three to four participants per county. Interviews were also conducted with 
national level participants which allowed the researcher to examine country-wide issues 
when interpreting the findings from the six counties included in this study. In addition, 
although the findings of governance in this study are from maternal healthcare settings, the 
insights are transferrable to other health programmes as governance is systemic and cross-
cutting. 
In addition, the inclusion of six counties and ten facilities could be critiqued as a broad-brush 
approach as it did not allow more in-depth analysis by including all facilities from one county. 
However, it was believed to be the most suitable approach despite its limitations. The 
decision to include six counties and ten facilities was inevitable as the sampling started from 
CEmOC level facilities supported by the Making it Happen programme. A CEmOC level facility 
was a minimum district level facility which could provide caesarean section and blood 
transfusion for maternal health complications. Hence, there were not many CEmOC level 
public facilities supported by the programme. Within each county, every effort was made to 
include at least one fully functional and one not fully functional facility. However, it was not 
always possible. Hence, the sampling resulted with ten CEmOC level facilities within six 
counties.  
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
211 | P a g e  
 
The other limitation is that the sampling did not include community representatives, users 
or beneficiaries of the Kenyan health system. While including community groups was beyond 
the scope of this study, it would have enriched the findings particularly regarding their 
experiences of community accountability and participation. 
8.3.2.2 Limitations related to data analysis 
 
Directed content analysis was employed to analyse data to explore how governance differed 
with the functionality of health facilities (Chapter 7). This theory-driven analysis has 
limitations as the researcher approaches the data with an informed bias (Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005). It has been argued that theory can blind researchers to contextual aspects of the 
phenomenon under study, influencing neutrality and trustworthiness (Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005). Nevertheless, the analysis allowed for inductive coding within the predetermined 
themes (deductive coding). An audit trail of the analysis and transparent approach to 
reporting has been carried out throughout the analysis process to mitigate these limitations. 
These include explanations of the theoretical constructs of the framework to increase the 
accuracy of predetermined categories. Furthermore, as explained in Section 4.6, reflexivity 
was exercised throughout the research process.  
8.3.2.3 Limitations related to data interpretation 
 
The findings of this study may not be generalisable to other low- and middle-income 
countries beyond Kenya. However, the results are certainly valid within the context of the 
counties studied in Kenya and the insights are transferable. In particular, the findings are 
transferrable within the health system in Kenya, regardless of the medical specialities as 
findings related to the governance of a health system could be applied to maternal health or 
other specialities. For instance, accountability challenges due to lack of role clarity as 
highlighted by maternal healthcare providers could also happen in other health specialities. 
In qualitative inquiry, the goal of the analysis is “inferential generalisability”, “transferability” 
or “naturalistic generalisability” which is different from conventional (representational) 
generalisability used in the quantitative inquiry (Ritchie and Lewis, 2014). The insights gained 
from this study might provide insight on health system governance in other contexts if they 
have similar structure. This study described the context in detail (Chapter 5) so that readers 
can judge the transferability of the findings to similar settings. This study also provides “rich” 
description on different operational principles of governance by offering inferential 
generalisation to draw out potential lessons for policy development elsewhere. Indeed, the 
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health system and governance situation will not be substantially different from those in 
other low- and middle-income countries (Ensor & Witter, 2001).  
The focus of the study was on the governance of a health system in an ongoing process of 
devolution; the situation may change over time. This study was exploratory, providing a 
snapshot of the governance situation in Kenya adopting a descriptive, qualitative approach.   
Hence, the findings of this study would require considering those practical limitations in 
mind.  
8.3.3 Areas for future research 
 
This study highlights the importance of and need for a clearly defined framework to assess 
governance of a health system and to monitor governance over time, particularly in a context 
such as Kenya where there may be rapidly changing political, social and economic 
circumstances. However, the focus of this study was limited to six counties (and ten facilities 
within those counties). Extension to other counties within Kenya using the same framework 
would be helpful to strengthen or refine the conclusions of this study. Using mixed methods 
research may allow for representational generalisation. This can be achieved by national-
level governance assessment using a quantitative approach by assessing key public health 
functions with county level process descriptions and perceptions. The insights gained from 
this study might provide insight into the health system governance in other low-and middle-
income country contexts considering the similarities of how the health system in Kenya is 
organised. 
It will be useful to include the private sector when assessing Kenyan health system 
governance as private service providers play an important role in Kenya. A recent Kenyan 
healthcare sector analysis reports that 38% of all officially registered health facilities in Kenya 
were owned by private-for-profit and an additional 14% by private not-for-profit 
organisations while only 48% belong to the public sector (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 
2016: 32). Public health staff are working in both the public and private sectors. An 
institutional analysis to assess how the private health sector has been enforced and 
monitored would be useful for the MOH to find a means to maximise its public health impact 
by effectively engaging with the private sector.   
It is also important to conduct studies on how devolution influences retention of public 
health workers in particular after several health workers’ strikes have occurred in Kenya, 
given the fact that devolution has changed HRH management, including salary, incentives 
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(financial and career progression) and service delivery arrangements. According to a local 
newspaper, 24 health workers’ strikes had taken place by March 2017 since the country 
underwent devolution in 2013 (Elszasz, 2017). Hence, it will be necessary to understand the 
push factors (factors that encourage health workers to leave) and pull factors (factors which 
attract health workers to stay in the post). Future studies may benefit from the insights of 
public health workers and policy makers to better understand those push and pull factors 
influencing health workers’ retention and their motivation to work in the Kenyan public 
health system.  
It is timely and crucial to conduct a national scale evaluation of the implementation of the 
FMS policy including economic evaluation as the policy directive has been in place for four 
years (since 2013). Although different small-scale evaluations in purposively selected 
counties exist (Lang'at et al.,2015; Kenyan Ministry of Health, 2015; Chuma et al.,2014; 
Bourbonnais, 2013), a nationally representative evaluation of the FMS policy adherence will 
be strategic for Kenya. Using a mixed methods approach, comprising representative samples 
of counties and facilities with purposive samples of key stakeholders including service users 
will provide a comprehensive understanding of if and how the FMS policy is effective in 
Kenya. It is also timely to conduct a social cost analysis, particularly social return on 
investment to measure the true cost of implementing the policy to the population that 
incorporates social, environmental and economic impacts (Banke-Thomas et al., 2015). 
The findings related to institutions governing the health system in Kenya highlight the 
importance of context in implementing health system devolution. Similar assessments in 
other low-and middle-income countries could use the “rich description of context” obtained 
in this study to assess whether the findings apply to their own settings and make judgements 
on the transferability of findings to their settings. A common assessment approach using one 
framework could potentially provide a cross-country comparison of governance (Siddiqi et 
al., 2009, Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2013). The Emerald project funded by the European Union 
has proved the feasibility of cross-country assessment of governance in six low-and middle-
income countries in Africa and South Asia by adopting the frameworks of Siddiqi et al. (2009) 
and Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. (2011).  
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8.4 Recommendations 
8.4.1 Strategic and national level 
Devolution:  
1. Devolution is best implemented using a phased approach and ensuring adequate 
capacity at a devolved level.  
2. Establish a monitoring system to ensure that county governments commit the 
allotted budget to health. This study highlighted that county governments had 
different priorities in addition to health. Even when county governments had initially 
prioritised health in their budgets, they focussed on the infrastructural development 
while other areas such as HRH, commodities and maintenance of existing facilities 
were neglected (Bigmore et al., 2012).  
FMS policy implementation: 
1. Lack of participation in policy formulation can be one reason for non-adherence to 
the FMS policy implementation in Kenya. A “bottom-up” approach to policy 
development that ensures that health workers, facility management committees 
and county health management teams are engaged throughout the process involved 
in policy formulation, and implementation is likely to be more successful.  
2. Define the components of the main policy initiatives (for instance, the FMS policy) 
by specifying the amount received, facility level and type of services provided which 
public facilities are supposed to receive by providing free maternity services.  
3. Integrate FMS policy into other health financing strategies such as NHIF and HSSF so 
that financing components do not contradict each other.  
4. Review the details of the FMS policy elements and consider how they might need to 
be reformulated to strengthen their links with the aim of health system performance 
and improved health outcomes. To ensure that the policy is in line with the country 
context, the prevailing institutional arrangements may need to be aligned with each 
other. It is evident from this study that poor policy design and dissemination process 
are significant barriers to adhering to a new policy initiative. This is complicated by 
other operational challenges leading policy implementers to modify at their 
discretion to suit their settings. Effective information dissemination and public 
awareness raising to overcome attitudes that may not be conducive to successful 
policy implementation.  
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Underlying/pre-existing socioeconomic inequity:  
1. Support county governments in developing and implementing strategies to improve 
socioeconomic conditions for development across different counties. This will 
subsequently improve maldistribution of the health workforce and health service 
facilities. 
8.4.2 Operational level (county and facility) 
Capacity: 
1. County governments should assess the capacity of their health sectors regarding the 
availability of key resources such as HRH, infrastructure, medicines, supplies and 
equipment. This will help them redefine strategies to improve readiness to provide 
services and highlight the need for capacity building, availability of infrastructure, 
medicines, supplies and equipment.  
2. Strengthen leadership and management capacity of county and health facilities 
managers as it is now acknowledged to be instrumental in the Kenyan health system 
strengthening (Gilson et al., 2017; MOMS/MOPHS, 2008-2009).  
3. Strengthen the capacity of county and health facility managers in supply chain 
management so that they could efficiently forecast, quantify and manage medical 
commodities.  
Incentives and motivation: 
1. County governments should develop incentive schemes to attract and retain health 
workers by simply ensuring their salaries are paid on time. Incentives should not only 
motivate the health workers but also cater to the needs of their families (education 
and housing facilities for their children and work opportunities for their spouses). 
2. Institutional arrangements can be strengthened by specifying enforcement 
characteristics, for example, the incentives to comply with the rules should be more 
pronounced.  
Accountability: 
1. The county department of health should support hospitals in developing and 
following procedures, guidelines and standard operating procedures to improve 
accountability through clarifying roles and responsibilities among different staff.   
2. Strengthen existing formal rules by enforcing sanctions for the abuse of power or 
neglect of duty and identify locally adapted reward system to motivate the best 
performing staff. It is also critical to identify informal norms which support 
improvement in performance by cultivating ownership through a supportive working 
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environment and collaboration among colleagues with clear roles and 
responsibilities.   
Resources: 
1. Study participants highlighted that one reason for non-adherence to the FMS policy 
is a lack of sufficient medicines, supplies and equipment. Hence, county 
governments should ensure continuous and sufficient supplies of commodities. 
2. County governments should actively look for collaboration with different partners to 
create opportunities for development of their counties.  
8.5 Concluding remarks 
This study contributes to the field of health system research, particularly health system 
governance in low-and middle-income countries, by providing an in-depth exploration of 
what factors influence institutional arrangements for good governance and how these were 
enforced or not. Specifically, the study enhances the understanding of governance at 
different levels of a health system in a lower-middle income country context. This is one of 
the few studies in Kenya which has used a theoretical framework to assess health system 
governance at the county level and below since devolution in 2013. This study highlights, in 
particular, the perspectives of key maternal health stakeholders in Kenya. Despite slow 
progress of maternal health in Kenya within the last decade, there has been no study of 
governance focussing on maternal healthcare settings, and this was the first one to explore 
the views of key stakeholders on maternal health.   
The study highlighted different approaches to assess governance and the potential of the 
institutional analysis approach which enforces rules (formal and informal) to improve the 
performance of health facilities and achieve health system goals. The analytical framework 
developed and applied in this study has been useful for providing information on composite 
institutional arrangements and specific principles of governance at the operational level. This 
approach has also helped integrate the findings of governance within wider bodies of 
knowledge highlighting the need to look at governance across disciplines. A theory-guided 
analysis of a diffuse concept with strong emphasis on context is an essential contribution to 
the existing evidence on governance.  
This study has explored a broad range of possible contextual factors influencing the 
governance of the health system at both policy formulation and implementation levels in 
Kenya. Understanding governance at the policy implementation level, that is, facility level is 
imperative as it provides a better understanding, not just policy formulation level which does 
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not capture the essence of how a health system functions. The findings of this study highlight 
that there is no single or uniform approach to assessing governance, given that contexts 
differ in each setting. However, there are broad principles of governance which drive 
towards different forms of governance. 
  
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 




Abdulmalik, J., Kola, L. and Gureje, O. (2016) 'Mental health system governance in Nigeria: 
challenges, opportunities and strategies for improvement', Global Mental Health, 3, 
pp. e9. 
Abimbola, S., Negin, J., Jan, S. and Martiniuk, A. (2014) 'Towards people-centred health 
systems: a multi-level framework for analysing primary health care governance in 
low-and middle-income countries', Health policy and planning, 29(suppl 2), pp. ii29-
ii39. 
Abimbola, S., Olanipekun, T., Igbokwe, U., Negin, J., Jan, S., Martiniuk, A., Ihebuzor, N. and 
Aina, M. (2015a) 'How decentralisation influences the retention of primary health 
care workers in rural Nigeria', Global health action, 8. 
Abimbola, S., Olanipekun, T., Schaaf, M., Negin, J., Jan, S. and Martiniuk, A. L. (2016) 'Where 
there is no policy: governing the posting and transfer of primary health care workers 
in Nigeria', Int J Health Plann Manage. 
Abimbola, S., Ukwaja, K. N., Onyedum, C. C., Negin, J., Jan, S. and Martiniuk, A. L. (2015b) 
'Transaction costs of access to health care: Implications of the care-seeking pathways 
of tuberculosis patients for health system governance in Nigeria', Global public 
health, 10(9), pp. 1060-1077. 
Africa Research Bulletin (2016) Kenya Health Services in Crisis. Workers stage a crippling 
strike to secure wage increase. Available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2016.07388.x/epdf. 
Ahern, K. J. (1999) 'Ten Tips for Reflexive Bracketing', Qualitative Health Research, 9(3), pp. 
407-411. 
Alande, J. 'Role of human resource management in devolution of counties in Kenya'. Scientific 
Conference Proceedings. 
Aoki, M. (2001) Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, Massachusett 
Institute of Technology: MIT Press. 
Avelino, G., Barberia, L. G. and Biderman, C. (2013) 'Governance in managing public health 
resources in Brazilian municipalities', Health Policy Plan, 29(6), pp. 694-702. 
Baez-Camargo, C. and Jacobs, E. (2013) Social accountability and its conceptual challenges: 
an analytical framework. Basel: Basel Institute of Governance. 
Baez-Camargo, C. and Kamujuni, P. (2011) Governance assessment of the public sector drug 
management system: Uganda: Basel Institute of Governance. Available at: 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications/378. 
Balabanova, D., Mills, A., Conteh, L., Akkazieva, B., Banteyerga, H., Dash, U., Gilson, L., 
Harmer, A., Ibraimova, A., Islam, Z., Kidanu, A., Koehlmoos, T. P., Limwattananon, S., 
Muraleedharan, V. R., Murzalieva, G., Palafox, B., Panichkriangkrai, W., 
Patcharanarumol, W., Penn-Kekana, L., Powell-Jackson, T., Tangcharoensathien, V. 
and McKee, M. (2013) 'Good Health at Low Cost 25 years on: lessons for the future 
of health systems strengthening', Lancet, 381(9883), pp. 2118-2133. 
Balabanova, D., Oliveira-Cruz, V. and Hanson, K. (2008) Health sector governance and 
implications for the private sector. Rockefeller Foundation. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
219 | P a g e  
 
Banke-Thomas, A. O., Madaj, B., Charles, A. and van den Broek, N. (2015) 'Social Return on 
Investment (SROI) methodology to account for value for money of public health 
interventions: a systematic review', BMC Public Health, 15, pp. 582. 
Barasa, E. W., Cleary, S., Molyneux, S. and English, M. (2017) 'Setting healthcare priorities: a 
description and evaluation of the budgeting and planning process in county hospitals 
in Kenya', Health Policy and Planning, 32(3), pp. 329-337. 
Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2006) Decentralization and local governance in developing 
countries: a comparative perspective. Cambridge: MIT: Cambridge: MIT. 
Barkan, J. D. and Chege, M. (1989) 'Decentralising the State: District Focus and the Politics of 
Reallocation in Kenya ', The Journal of Modern African Studies 27(3), pp. 431-453. 
Barnett-Page, E. and Thomas, J. (2009) 'Methods for the synthesis of qualitative research: a 
critical review', BMC medical research methodology, 9(1), pp. 59. 
Berger, R. (2015) 'Now I see it, now I don’t: Researcher’s position and reflexivity in qualitative 
research', Qualitative research, 15(2), pp. 219-234. 
Berlan, D. and Shiffman, J. (2012) 'Holding health providers in developing countries 
accountable to consumers: A synthesis of relevant scholarship', Health Policy Plan, 
27(4), pp. 271-280. 
Bertone, M. P. and Meessen, B. (2013) 'Studying the link between institutions and health 
system performance: a framework and an illustration with the analysis of two 
performance-based financing schemes in Burundi', Health Policy Plan, 28(8), pp. 847-
57. 
Bertone, M. P. and Witter, S. (2015) 'An exploration of the political economy dynamics 
shaping health worker incentives in three districts in Sierra Leone', Social Science & 
Medicine, 141, pp. 56-63. 
Berwick, D. M. (2008) 'The science of improvement', Jama, 299(10), pp. 1182-4. 
Bigmore, K., et al. (2012) Priorities for Successful Devolution of Health Services: A Briefing 
Note., Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Björkman, M. and Svensson, J. (2009) 'Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized 
Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda', The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 124(2), pp. 735-769. 
Bloom, G., Standing, H. and Lloyd, R. (2008) 'Markets, information asymmetry and health 
care: towards new social contracts', Social science & medicine, 66(10), pp. 2076-
2087. 
Blundo, G. and Le Meur, P.-Y. (2009) The governance of daily life in Africa: ethnographic 
explorations of public and collective services. Brill. 
Booth, D. (2011) 'Towards a theory of local governance and public goods provision', IDS 
Bulletin, 42(2), pp. 11-21. 
Booth, D. and Cammack, D. R. (2013) 'Governance for development in Africa: solving 
collective action problems'. 
Bossert, T. (1998) 'Analyzing the decentralization of health systems in developing countries: 
decision space, innovation and performance', Social science & medicine, 47(10), pp. 
1513-1527. 
Bossert, T., Beauvais, J. and Bowser, D. (2000) Decentralization of Health Systems: 
Preliminary Review of Four Country Case Studies. Major Applied Research 6, 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
220 | P a g e  
 
Technical Report No. 1. Bethesda, MD: Partnerships for Health Reform Project, Abt 
Associates Inc. Available at: http://www.phrplus.org/Pubs/m6tp1.pdf. 
Bossert, T. J. (2015) 'Empirical Studies of an Approach to Decentralization: 'Decision Space' 
in Decentralized Health Systems', in Faguet, J.-P. & Pöschl, C. (eds.) Is 
Decentralization Good For Development? Perspectives from Academics and Policy 
Makers. Oxford Oxford University Press. 
Bossert, T. J. and Beauvais, J. C. (2002) 'Decentralization of health systems in Ghana, Zambia, 
Uganda and the Philippines: a comparative analysis of decision space', Health Policy 
Plan, 17(1), pp. 14-31. 
Bourbannais, N. (2013) Implementing free maternal health care in Kenya: Challenges, 
strategies and recommendations. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) 'Using thematic analysis in psychology. ', Qualitative Research 
in Psychology 3(2), pp. 77-101. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2013) Successful qualitative research: A practical guide for 
beginners. Sage. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2004) 'Accountability and health systems: toward conceptual clarity and 
policy relevance', Health policy and planning, 19(6), pp. 371-379. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and Bossert, T. J. (2008) Health Governance: Concepts, Experience and 
Programming Options. Policy Brief: Health System 20/20. Washington D.C.: USAID. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and Bossert, T. J. (2013) 'Health governance: principal-agent linkages and 
health system strengthening', Health Policy Plan, 29(6), pp. 685-693. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W., Fort, C. and Stratton, S. (2009) Good Governance and Health: Assessing 
Progress in Rwanda. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and Goldsmith, A. A. (2004) 'Good governance, clientelism, and 
patrimonialism: New perspectives on old problems', Int Pub Manag J, 7(2), pp. 163-
185. 
Cammack, D. and Kelsall, T. (2011) 'Neo‐patrimonialism, Institutions and Economic Growth: 
The Case of Malawi, 1964–2009', IDS Bulletin, 42(2), pp. 88-96. 
Chhotray, V. and Stoker, G. (2008) Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Approach. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Chuma, J. and Maina, T. (2014) Free maternal care and removal of user fees at primary-level 
facilities in Kenya. Monitoring the implementation and impact: Baseline report: 
Futures Group. 
Ciccone, D. K., Vian, T., Maurer, L. and Bradley, E. H. (2014) 'Linking governance mechanisms 
to health outcomes: a review of the literature in low- and middle-income countries', 
Soc Sci Med, 117, pp. 86-95. 
Cleary, S. M., Molyneux, S. and Gilson, L. (2013) 'Resources, attitudes and culture: an 
understanding of the factors that influence the functioning of accountability 
mechanisms in primary health care settings', BMC health services research, 13(1), 
pp. 320. 
Coase, R. H. (1960) 'The Problem of Social Cost', The Journal of Law & Economics, 3, pp. 1-44. 
Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (2014) Assessment of the 
Implementation of the System of Devolved Government. . Available at: 
http://www.cickenya.org/index.php/reports/other-reports/item/413-assessment-
of-the-implementation-of-the-system-of-devolved-government. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
221 | P a g e  
 
Creswell, J. W. (2012) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches. SAGE Publications. 
Creswell, J. W. (2013) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. SAGE Publications. 
Creswell, J. W. and Clark, V. L. P. (2011) Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. 
SAGE Publications. 
Creswell, J. W. and Miller, D. L. (2000) 'Determining validity in qualitative inquiry', Theory into 
practice, 39(3), pp. 124-130. 
Creswell, J. W. and Poth, C. N. (2017) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing 
Among Five Approaches. SAGE Publications. 
Crichton, J. (2008) 'Changing fortunes: analysis of fluctuating policy space for family planning 
in Kenya', Health Policy and Planning, 23(5), pp. 339-350. 
Crombie IK (1996) The pocket guide to critical appraisal. London: BMJ Publishing Group. 
Curry, L. A., Nembhard, I. M. and Bradley, E. H. (2009) 'Qualitative and mixed methods 
provide unique contributions to outcomes research', Circulation, 119(10), pp. 1442-
52. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2000) Handbook of Qualitative Research. SAGE Publications. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2005) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research. Sage 
Publications. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2011) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research. SAGE 
Publications. 
Dieleman, M. and Hilhorst, T. (2011) 'Governance and human resources for health', Hum 
Resour Health, 9, pp. 29. 
Docherty, M. and Smith, R. (1999) 'The case for structuring the discussion of scientific 
papers', Much the same as that for structuring abstracts, 318(7193), pp. 1224-1225. 
Draude, A. (2007) 'How to capture non-Western forms of governance: in favour of an 
equivalence functionalist observation of governance in areas of limited statehood'. 
Duran, A. and Saltman, R. (2016) 'Area of Health Policy and Governance', in Kuhlmann, E., 
Blank, R.H., Bourgeault, I.L. & Wendt, C. (eds.) The Palgrave International Handbook 
of Healthcare Policy and Governance: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 443-526. 
Echoka, E., Kombe, Y., Dubourg, D., Makokha, A., Evjen-Olsen, B., Mwangi, M., Byskov, J., 
Olsen, Ø. E. and Mutisya, R. (2013) 'Existence and functionality of emergency 
obstetric care services at district level in Kenya: theoretical coverage versus reality', 
BMC Health Services Research, 13(1), pp. 113. 
Erchick, D. J., George, A. S., Umeh, C. and Wonodi, C. (2017) 'Understanding Internal 
Accountability in Nigeria’s Routine Immunization System: Perspectives From 
Government Officials at the National, State, and Local Levels', International Journal 
of Health Policy and Management, 6(7), pp. 403-412. 





European Commission (2008) Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations. 
Brussels: European Commission. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
222 | P a g e  
 
Fattore, G. and Tediosi, F. (2013) 'The Importance of Values in Shaping How Health Systems 
Governance and Management Can Support Universal Health Coverage', Value 
Health, 16(S1), pp. S19-S23. 
Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development (2017) UN Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 16 – importance of participatory institutions & 
policymaking. Available at: http://www.fdsd.org/ideas/sustainable-development-
goal-sdg-16-democratic-institutions/. 
Fryatt, R., Bennett, S. and Soucat, A. (2017) 'Health sector governance: should we be 
investing more?', BMJ Global Health, 2(2). 
Garuba, H. A., Kohler, J. C. and Huisman, A. M. (2009) 'Transparency in Nigeria's public 
pharmaceutical sector: perceptions from policy makers', Globalization and Health, 
5(1), pp. 14. 
George, A. S., Erchick, D. J., Zubairu, M. M., Barau, I. Y. and Wonodi, C. (2016) 'Sparking, 
supporting and steering change: grounding an accountability framework with 
viewpoints from Nigerian routine immunization and primary health care government 
officials', Health policy and planning, 31(9), pp. 1326-1332. 
Gilson, L., Barasa, E., Nxumalo, N., Cleary, S., Goudge, J., Molyneux, S., Tsofa, B. and 
Lehmann, U. (2017) 'Everyday resilience in district health systems: emerging insights 
from the front lines in Kenya and South Africa', BMJ Global Health, 2(2), pp. e000224. 
Government of Kenya (2014) Kenya Service Availability and Readiness Assessment Mapping 
(SARAM). Ministry of Health, Nairobi Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya.  
Gustafsson, B. (1998) 'Some theoretical problems of institutional economic history, 
Scandinavian Economic History Review', 46(2), pp. 5-31. 
Hanlon, C., Eshetu, T., Alemayehu, D., Fekadu, A., Semrau, M., Thornicroft, G., Kigozi, F., 
Marais, D. L., Petersen, I. and Alem, A. (2017) 'Health system governance to support 
scale up of mental health care in Ethiopia: a qualitative study', International Journal 
of Mental Health Systems, 11, pp. 38. 
Hayley Elszasz (2017) Health Workers’ Strike in Kenya: Signs of a Long Road Ahead for 
Decentralization. Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/health-
workers-strike-in-kenya-signs-of-a-long-road_us_58bf732be4b0c3276fb77f08. 
Healthy Action (2011) Health Financing in Kenya: The Case for RH/FP. 
Hodgson, G. M. (2006) 'What Are Institutions?', Journal of Economic Issues, 40(1), pp. 1-25. 
Horsburgh, D. (2003) 'Evaluation of qualitative research', J Clin Nurs, 12(2), pp. 307-12. 
Hsieh, H. F. and Shannon, S. E. (2005) 'Three approaches to qualitative content analysis', Qual 
Health Res, 15(9), pp. 1277-88. 
Huss, R., Green, A., Sudarshan, H., Karpagam, S. S., Ramani, K. V., Tomson, G. and Gerein, N. 
(2011) 'Good governance and corruption in the health sector: lessons from the 
Karnataka experience', Health Policy Plan, 26(6), pp. 471-484. 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2017) Ibrahim Index of African Governance Available 
at: http://iiag.online/. 
Institute of Economic Affairs (2010) Devolution in Kenya: Prospect, challenges and future 
Available at: https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/9383449. 
Islam, M. (2007) A How-To Manual: Health system assessment approach. Washington D.C.: 
USAID. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
223 | P a g e  
 
Johnson, R. B. and Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004) 'Mixed Methods Research: A Research 
Paradigm Whose Time Has Come', Educational Researcher, 33(7), pp. 14-26. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010) The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues World Bank. Available at: 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_wgi_kaufmann.pdf. 
Kelsall, T. (2011) 'Going with the Grain in African Development?', Development Policy Review, 
29, pp. s223-s251. 
Kenya's nurses strike takes its toll on healthcare system (2017) 'Kenya's nurses strike takes 
its toll on health-care system', The Lancet, 389(10087), pp. 2350. 
Kenya Human Rights Commission and Social and Public Accountability Network (2010) 
Harmonization of Decentralization and Development in Kenya: Towards Alignment, 
Citizen Engagement, and Enhanced Accountability., Nairobi, Kenya: KHRC and SPAN. 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2014) Kenya Demographic and Health Survey Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
'KENYA: Health Services in Crisis',  (2017) Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and 
Technical Series, 53(11), pp. 21492B-21493A. 
Kirigia, J. M. and Kirigia, D. G. (2011) 'The essence of governance in health development', Int 
Arch Med, 4, pp. 11. 
Kohler-Koch, B. and Rittberger, B. (2006) 'Review Article: The ‘Governance Turn’in EU 
Studies*', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(s1), pp. 27-49. 
Korir, J., T. Maina, A. Chen, N. Perales, and A. Dutta (2014) Healthcare Financing Options for 
Kenya: FY 2013/14–2029/30. Washington, DC.Futures Group, Health Policy Project.  
(ISBN: 978-1-59560-075-2. 
KPMG (2013) Devolution of Healthcare Services in Kenya: Lessons learnt from other countries. 




Kvale, S. (2008) Doing Interviews. SAGE Publications, p. 160  
Lang'at, E. and Mwanri, L. (2015) 'Healthcare service providers' and facility administrators' 
perspectives of the free maternal healthcare services policy in Malindi District, 
Kenya: a qualitative study', Reprod Health, 12, pp. 59. 
LeCompte, M. D., Preissle, J. and Tesch, R. (1993) Ethnography and Qualitative Design in 
Educational Research. Academic Press. 
Lester M. Salamon (2000) 'The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction', Fordham Urban Law Journal, 28 (5)(5), pp. 1611-1664. 
Levy, B. (2014) Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development 
Strategies. Oxford University Press. 
Lipsky, A., Mulaki, A., Williamson, T. and Sullivan, Z. (2015) Political will for health system 
devolution in Kenya: insights from three counties, Washington DC. 
Lockwood, M. (2006) The state they're in : an agenda for international action on poverty in 
Africa. Viewpoints (Intermediate Technology Development Group): Rugby : Practical 
Action, 2006. 2nd edition. 
Loewenson, R. (2008) Neglected Health Systems Research: Governance and Accountability 
[Technical brief], Geneva: Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, WHO. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 




Lucas, P. J., Baird, J., Arai, L., Law, C. and Roberts, H. M. (2007) 'Worked examples of 
alternative methods for the synthesis of qualitative and quantitative research in 
systematic reviews', BMC medical research methodology, 7(1), pp. 4. 
Luoma, M., Doherty, J., Muchiri, S., Barasa, T., Hofler, K., Maniscalco, L., Ouma, C., Kirika, R. 
and Maundu, J. (2010) Kenya Health System Assessment 2010. Bethesda, MD: Health 
Systems 20/20 project, Abt Associates Inc. 
Marais, D. L. and Petersen, I. (2015) 'Health system governance to support integrated mental 
health care in South Africa: challenges and opportunities', International Journal of 
Mental Health Systems, 9(1), pp. 14. 
Mason, J. (2002) Qualitative Researching. SAGE Publications. 
Maxwell, J. A. (2012) Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach: An Interactive 
Approach. SAGE Publications. 
May, T. (2001) Social research: issues, methods and process. Open University Press, p. 258. 
McGuire, M. (2010) The SAGE Handbook of Governance. SAGE Publications, p. 436-454. 
Mendlinger, S. and Cwikel, J. (2008) 'Spiraling between qualitative and quantitative data on 
women's health behaviors: a double helix model for mixed methods', Qual Health 
Res, 18(2), pp. 280-93. 
Menon-Johansson, A. (2005) 'Good governance and good health: The role of societal 
structures in the human immunodeficiency virus pandemic', BMC Int Health Hum 
Rights, 5(1), pp. 4. 
Mikkelsen-Lopez, I., Wyss, K. and de Savigny, D. (2011) 'An approach to addressing 
governance from a health system framework perspective', BMC Int Health Hum 
Rights, 11, pp. 13. 
Mills, A., Vaughan, J. P., Smith, D. L. and Tabibzadeh, I. (1990) 'Health system 
decentralization: concepts, issues and country experience'. 
Ministry of health Kenya (2014a) Annual health sector performance report 2013/14 and 
priorities for implementation of health services 2015/16. 
Ministry of health Kenya (2014b) Health Sector Human Resources Strategy 2014 – 2018, Afya 
House,Cathedral  Road,PO Box 30016  00100.Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Health 
Kenya. Available at: http://www.health.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Kenya-
HRH-Strategy-2014-2018.pdf. 
Ministry of Health Kenya (2015a) 2014/2015 NATIONAL AND COUNTY HEALTH BUDGET 
ANALYSIS REPORT Kenya. 
Ministry of Health Kenya (2015b) Status of implementation of free maternity services 
program in the devolved health system in Kenya: A comprehensive assessment 
report. Available at: 
http://publications.universalhealth2030.org/uploads/free_maternal_health_servic
es_report_feb_2015_final1_doc_.pdf. 
Ministry of Medical Services and Ministry of Public Health & Sanitation (2013) Accelerating 
attainment of health goals: The Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan 
– KHSSP July 2012 – June 2017. The second medium term plan for health. Nairobi, 
Kenya: Afya House. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
225 | P a g e  
 
Ministry of Medical Services and Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (2010) KENYA 
NATIONAL HEALTH ACCOUNTS 2009/10. 
Ministry of Medical Services and Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (2012) Kenya health 
policy 2012-2030. 
Mirzoev, T., Das, M., Ebenso, B., Rawat, B., Uguru, N., Russo, G., Bymolt, R. and Huss, R. 
(2014) 'Contextual influences on the role of evidence in health policy development: 
insights from India and Nigeria', BMC Health Services Research, 14(2), pp. O5. 
Mitchell, A. and Bossert, T. J. (2010) 'Decentralisation, governance and health-system 
performance: 'where you stand depends on where you sit'', Dev Policy Rev, 28(6), 
pp. 669-691. 
Mkoka, D. A., Kiwara, A., Goicolea, I. and Hurtig, A.-K. (2014) 'Governing the implementation 
of Emergency Obstetric Care: experiences of Rural District Health Managers, 
Tanzania', BMC Health Services Research, 14(1), pp. 333. 
Morgan, D. L. (2014) 'Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Social Research', Qualitative Inquiry, 
20(8), pp. 1045-1053. 
Morse, J. M. (2007) 'Ethics in action: ethical principles for doing qualitative health research', 
Qual Health Res, 17(8), pp. 1003-5. 
Mugisha, J., Ssebunnya, J. and Kigozi, F. N. (2016) 'Towards understanding governance issues 
in integration of mental health into primary health care in Uganda', International 
Journal of Mental Health Systems, 10, pp. 25. 
Munge, K., Mulupi, S., Barasa, E. W. and Chuma, J. (2017) 'A Critical Analysis of Purchasing 
Arrangements in Kenya: The Case of the National Hospital Insurance Fund', 
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 6(x), pp. 1-11. 
Mutale, W., Mwanamwenge, M. T., Balabanova, D., Spicer, N. and Ayles, H. (2013) 
'Measuring governance at health facility level: developing and validation of simple 
governance tool in Zambia', BMC Int Health Hum Rights, 13(34), pp. 9. 
Ndii, D. (2010) Decentralization in Kenya. World Bank.: World Bank. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/257994-
1335471959878/Decentralization_in_Kenya_Background_Note.pdf. 
Netherlands Enterprise Agency (2016) Kenyan Healthcare Sector: Opportunities for the Dutch 
Life Sciences & Health Sector, The Hague. 
Njuguna, J. (2015) 'Impact of Health Workers' Strike in August 2014 on Health Services in 
Mombasa County Referral Hospital, Kenya', J Health Care Poor Underserved, 26(4), 
pp. 1200-6. 
NORAD (2009) Political Economy Analysis of Kenya. Available at: 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-
publications/publications/publication?key=134242. 
North, D. C. (1994) 'Economic Performance Through Time', The American Economic Review, 
84(3), pp. 359-368. 
O'Reilly, M. and Kiyimba, N. (2015) Advanced qualitative research: A guide to using theory. 
Sage. 
Olafsdottir, A., Reidpath, D., Pokhrel, S. and Allotey, P. (2011) 'Health systems performance 
in sub-Saharan Africa: governance, outcome and equity', BMC Public Health, 11(1), 
pp. 237. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
226 | P a g e  
 
Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2008) Researching the practical norms of real governance in Africa. 
Overseas development institute (ODI). 
Olivier de Sardan, J. (2015) 'Practical norms: informal regulations within public bureaucracies 
(in Africa and beyond)', Real governance and practical norms in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
London: Routledge. 
Olivier de Sardan, J. P. (2011) 'The eight modes of local governance in West Africa', IDS 
bulletin, 42(2), pp. 22-31. 
Onsomu E, Muthaka, D., Mwanbu, O., Nyanjom, A., Dutta, T., Manina, C., Barker, C. and 
Muchiri, S. (2014) Public expenditure tracking survey in Kenya. 2012 PET-PLUS, 
Nairobi, Kenya: Future Groups and Health Policy Project. 
Ostrom, E. (1986) 'An Agenda for the Study of Institutions', Public Choice, 48(1), pp. 3-25. 
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2005) 'Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies. 
', in Ménard C, S.M. (ed.) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. : Dordrecht: 
Springer: , pp. 819-848. 
Patton, M. Q. (2014) Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and 
Practice. SAGE Publications. 
Petersen, I., Marais, D., Abdulmalik, J., Ahuja, S., Alem, A., Chisholm, D., Egbe, C., Gureje, O., 
Hanlon, C. and Lund, C. (2017) 'Strengthening mental health system governance in 
six low-and middle-income countries in Africa and South Asia: challenges, needs and 
potential strategies', Health Policy and Planning, 32(5), pp. 699-709. 
Pope, C. and Mays, N. B. (2006) Qualitative research in health care 3rd Edition. . 3 edn. 
Oxford: Blackwell/ BMJ. 
Pyone, T., Smith, H. and van den Broek, N. (2017) 'Frameworks to assess health systems 
governance: a systematic review', Health Policy Plan. 
Rajkumar, A. S. and Swaroop, V. (2008) 'Public spending and outcomes: Does governance 
matter?', J Dev Econ, 86(1), pp. 96-111. 
Ramana, G. N., Chepkoech, R. and Workie, N. W. (2013) Improving Universal Primary Health 
Care by Kenya: A Case Study of the Health Sector Services Fund, The World Bank, 
Washington DC: The World Bank,. Available at: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13291. 
Ramesh, M., Wu, X. and He, A. J. (2013) 'Health governance and healthcare reforms in China', 
Health Policy Plan, 29(6), pp. 663-672. 
Reidpath, D. D. and Allotey, P. (2006) 'Structure, (governance) and health: an unsolicited 
response', BMC Int Health Hum Rights, 6, pp. 12. 
Local Government Act (Cap. 265) of 1977. 
Districts and Provinces Act (Cap. 105A) of 1992. 
Republic of Kenya (2010) The Constitution of Kenya: National Council for Law Reporting with 
the Authority of the Attorney General. 
Republic of Kenya (2013) Legal Notice 137-182. (Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 116). 
Richardson, L. (1990) Writing strategies: Reaching diverse audiences. Sage, p. 71. 
Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M. N. and Ormston, R. (2013) Qualitative Research Practice: 
A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. SAGE Publications. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
227 | P a g e  
 
Rotberg (2009) 'Governance and leadership in Africa: measures, methods and results', 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 62(No. 2.), pp. 14. 
Savedoff, D. (2009) Governance in the Health Sector-A Strategy for Measuring Determinants 
and Performance. Portland, ME: Human Development Network, Social Insight. 
Schneider, V. (2004) State theory, governance and the logic of regulation and administrative 
control Governance in Europe. 
Sheikh, K., Gilson, L., Agyepong, I. A., Hanson, K., Ssengooba, F. and Bennett, S. (2011) 
'Building the field of health policy and systems research: framing the questions', PLoS 
Med, 8(8), pp. e1001073. 
Sheikh, K., Saligram, P. S. and Hort, K. (2015) 'What explains regulatory failure? Analysing the 
architecture of health care regulation in two Indian states', Health Policy Plan, 30(1), 
pp. 39-55. 
Shukla, M. and Johnson Lassner, K. (2012) Governing for better health: a targeted literature 
review. Leadership, Management and Govenance Project Arlington, VA: 
Management Sciences for Health. 
Siddiqi, S., Masud, T. I., Nishtar, S., Peters, D. H., Sabri, B., Bile, K. M. and Jama, M. A. (2009) 
'Framework for assessing governance of the health system in developing countries: 
Gateway to good governance', Health Policy, 90(1), pp. 13-25. 
Sihanya, B. (2011) Constitutional Implementation in Kenya, 2010–2015: Challenges and 
Prospects. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Kenya Occasional Paper, No. 5. . Available at: 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/09857.pdf. 
Silverman, D. (2006) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and 
Interaction. SAGE Publications. 
Smith, P. C., Anell, A., Busse, R., Crivelli, L., Healy, J., Lindahl, A. K., Westert, G. and Kene, T. 
(2012) 'Leadership and governance in seven developed health systems', Health 
Policy, 106(1), pp. 37-49. 
Stoker, G. (1998) 'Governance as theory: five propositions', International social science 
journal, 50(155), pp. 17-28. 
Stoker, G. (2006) Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sumah, A. M., Baatiema, L. and Abimbola, S. (2016) 'The impacts of decentralisation on 
health-related equity: A systematic review of the evidence', Health Policy, 120(10), 
pp. 1183-1192. 
Tama, E., Molyneux, S., Waweru, E., Tsofa, B., Chuma, J. and Barasa, E. (2017) 'Examining the 
Implementation of the Free Maternity Services Policy in Kenya: A Mixed Methods 
Process Evaluation', International Journal of Health Policy and Management, pp. -. 
Tawfik-Shukor, A. and Khoshnaw, H. (2010) 'The impact of health system governance and 
policy processes on health services in Iraqi Kurdistan.', BMC Int Health Hum Rights, 
10(1), pp. 14. 
Teddlie, C. and Tashakkori, A. (2009) Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: Integrating 
Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. SAGE 
Publications. 
Tembo, T., Chongwe, G., Vwalika, B. and Sitali, L. (2017) 'Signal functions for emergency 
obstetric care as an intervention for reducing maternal mortality: a survey of public 
and private health facilities in Lusaka District, Zambia', BMC Pregnancy and 
Childbirth, 17(1), pp. 288. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
228 | P a g e  
 
The World Bank (1989) From crisis to sustainable growth - sub Saharan Africa : a long-term 
perspective study. Washington, DC. Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1989/11/439705/crisis-sustainable-
growth-sub-saharan-africa-long-term-perspective-study  
The World Bank (2003) World Development Report 2004 : Making Services Work for Poor 
People. World Bank. Available at: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5986  
The World Bank (2017) The World Bank and Devolution in Kenya. Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/brief/kenyas-devolution (Accessed: 
13/03/2017. 
Transparency International-Kenya (2011) The Kenya Health Sector Integrity Study Report. 
Tsofa, B., Goodman, C., Gilson, L. and Molyneux, S. (2017a) 'Devolution and its effects on 
health workforce and commodities management - early implementation 
experiences in Kilifi County, Kenya', Int J Equity Health, 16(1), pp. 169. 
Tsofa, B., Molyneux, S., Gilson, L. and Goodman, C. (2017b) 'How does decentralisation affect 
health sector planning and financial management? a case study of early effects of 
devolution in Kilifi County, Kenya', Int J Equity Health, 16(1), pp. 151. 
United Nations (1998) Partnerships for global community: annual report on the work of the 
Organization, 1998. New York: UN Department of Public Information. 
United Nations Development Programme (1998) Human Development Report, 1998. New 
York: Oxford University Press for the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). 
United Nations Development Programme (2012) Discussion paper: Measuring democracy 
and democratic governance in a post-2015 development framework. Available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/OG
C/Post2015%20governance%20metrics%20_14%20Aug.pdf. 
United Nations Development Programme (2014) Governance for Sustainable Development: 
Integrating Governance in the Post-2015 Development Framework, USA: Democratic 
Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations Development 
Programme. 
Upadhaya, N., Jordans, M. J. D., Pokhrel, R., Gurung, D., Adhikari, R. P., Petersen, I. and 
Komproe, I. H. (2017) 'Current situations and future directions for mental health 
system governance in Nepal: findings from a qualitative study', International Journal 
of Mental Health Systems, 11(1), pp. 37. 
USAID (2017) Leadership, management and governance (LMG) Overview. Available at: 
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/leadership-management-
and-governance-lmg. 
Vian, T. (2008) 'Review of corruption in the health sector: theory, methods and 
interventions', Health Policy Plan, 23(2), pp. 83-94. 
Vian, T. and Bicknell, W. J. (2013) 'Good governance and budget reform in Lesotho Public 
Hospitals: performance, root causes and reality', Health Policy Plan. 
Vian, T., Brinkerhoff, D. W., Feeley, F. G., Salomon, M. and Vien, N. T. K. (2012) 'Confronting 
corruption in the health sector in Vietnam: patterns and prospects', Public 
Administration and Development, 32(1), pp. 49-63. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
229 | P a g e  
 
Wakaba, M., Mbindyo, P., Ochieng, J., Kiriinya, R., Todd, J., Waudo, A., Noor, A., Rakuom, C., 
Rogers, M. and English, M. (2014) 'The public sector nursing workforce in Kenya: a 
county-level analysis', Human Resources for Health, 12(1), pp. 6. 
Walt, G., Shiffman, J., Schneider, H., Murray, S. F., Brugha, R. and Gilson, L. (2008) ''Doing' 
health policy analysis: methodological and conceptual reflections and challenges', 
Health Policy Plan, 23(5), pp. 308-17. 
Waweru, E., Nyikuri, M., Tsofa, B., Kedenge, S., Goodman, C. and Molyneux, S. (2013) Review 
of Health Sector Services Fund: Implementation and Experience, Technical Report. 
KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme.Kenya Medical Research Institute 
(KEMRI), Ministry of Health Kenya. Available at: 
http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/id/eprint/2869479. 
Williamson, O. E. (1979) 'Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual 
relations', The journal of law & economics, 22(2), pp. 233-261. 
Williamson, T. and Mulaki, A. (2015) Devolution of Kenya's health system: The role of HPP: 
RTI International. 
Wong, G., Greenhalgh, T., Westhorp, G., Buckingham, J. and Pawson, R. (2013) 'RAMESES 
publication standards: realist syntheses', BMC medicine, 11(1), pp. 1. 
World Health Organization (2000) The World Health Report 2000: Health Systems: Improving 
Performance, Geneva: WHO. Available at: http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/. 
World Health Organization (2004) Making pregnancy safer: The critical role of the skilled 
attendant. A joint statement by WHO, ICM and FIGO. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/documents/9241591692/en/. 
World Health Organization (2007) Everybody's business: strengthening health systems to 
improve health outcomes: WHO's framework for action, Geneva: WHO. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/strategy/everybodys_business.pdf. 
World Health Organization (2008) Health System Governance: Toolkit on monitoring health 
systems strengthening, Geneva: WHO. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/toolkit_hss/EN_PDF_Toolkit_HSS_Introd
uction.pdf. 
World Health Organization, UNFPA, UNICEF, Mailman School of Public Health and Averting 
Maternal Death and Disability (AMDD) (2009) Monitoring emergency obstetric care-
A Handbook. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/monitoring/9789241547734
/en/. 
Yuan, B., Jian, W., He, L., Wang, B. and Balabanova, D. (2017) 'The role of health system 
governance in strengthening the rural health insurance system in China', 






Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
230 | P a g e  
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Abbreviations of search fields used in Medline 
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hw = subject heading word 
kw = key word 
sh = MeSH subject heading 
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Name of the 
framework 
Characteristics of the framework Underlying 
theory if 
applicable 
Purpose of the 
framework 
Analytical focus 
New Institutional Economics 
1 Abimbola 
et al. 2014 
“Multi-level” 
framework  
Multi-level framework composed of 
three levels of a health system 
hierarchy-operational (citizens and 
healthcare providers), collective 
(community groups) and constitutional 
governances (governments at different 
levels). Theoretical underpinning 
borrowed from the concept of 
“governing without government”. 
Under such situations, communities 
with similar interest can develop their 
own rules and arrangement to manage 
the common pool. 
Ostrom’s theory 









To assess governance 





-Focuses on 1) essential role 
where non-state actors can play 
in governance; 2) rules and 
institutions can be formed 
among communities with the 
same interest    
-Analyse formal (“rules-in-
form”) and informal (“rules-in-
use”) actors of governance. 
-Focuses on social interactions 
among different levels of the 









Using the “principal-agent” theory, the 
framework consists of two routes of 
accountability: short (direct) and long 
(indirect) routes. Direct accountability- 
where citizens can “voice” their 
preference or choose other alternatives 
(exit). Indirect accountability requires 
institutional capacity and a functioning 





-Focuses on 1) incentives what 
made people accountable; 2) 
institutional analysis-what are 
the rules set by the institutions; 
and 3) power distribution 






Similar to above Similar to above Similar to above  Similar to above 
4 Balabanov





With increasing role played by the 
private sector, the government should 
take the stewardship role to protect the 
Principal agent 
theory 
To assess the role of 
private sector in health 
system governance  
-Focuses on interactions among 
principals (government or 
donors) and agents (private 
sector).  
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Name of the 
framework 
Characteristics of the framework Underlying 
theory if 
applicable 





public interest by working together 
with the private sector.  
-Focuses on three key 
principles: the rule of law, 







agent” model of 
governance 
framework  
Governance is the result of interactions 
among principals and agents with 
diverse interests. Agents will provide 
services to the principals as long as they 
have some incentives, but they have 
more information than principals. 
Principals will find ways to overcome 
the information asymmetry without 
much transaction costs. 
Principal agent 
theory 
To assess governance 
of a health system-
national level 
-Focuses on interactions among 
principals (citizens) and agents 
(state and healthcare 
providers) of a health system.  
-Using principal-agent 
relationship, analyse 8 
governance principles  






The framework to assess accountability 
pathways among principal and agent. 
The accountability mechanisms are 
sub-divided into three critical factors 
responsible for functioning: resources, 





primary care settings  
-Focuses on 1) incentives and 
sanctions for different actors; 
2) information asymmetry and 
power difference among 









The assessment starts with context 
analysis and stakeholders mapping. 
Among different principles, the 
framework focuses on accountability 
among different stakeholder groups. 
The framework does not include 








To assess governance 
of a public sector  
-Assessment starts with context 
analysis & stakeholders 
mapping 
-Focuses on type of 
accountability among key 
stakeholders (except citizens) 
Political science and public administration discipline 






A framework to identify factors which 
shape the accountability of healthcare 
providers. Social interactions and 
norms operating within the system and 
No theory 
identified 
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Name of the 
framework 
Characteristics of the framework Underlying 
theory if 
applicable 
Purpose of the 
framework 
Analytical focus 
context are prominent features of this 
framework.  







Framework to map accountability using 
components of public accountability: 




To assess different 










Framework to identify reasons why 
clientelistic practices persist and the 
authors use realist evaluation approach 
comprising of context, actions 




-To develop a 










Trust & legitimacy 
The framework to be used by 
donor institutions 
International development 
1 Islam, M  







The framework composed of two 
components: general governance 
based on six World Bank governance 
measures and health sector specific 
governance which is linked to 
stewardship in the health sector.  
-No theory has 
used, but the 
authors adapted 




To directly assess 
overall governance & 
health system specific 
governance at national 
level 
To provide evidence that there 
is a relationship between 
governance indices and health 
system performance or 
outcomes. 







The framework is intended for use in 
Africa, comprises 10 principles and 42 
sub-functions. Using a similar formula 
to the one used by UNDP to calculate 
the Human Development Index, the 
authors developed their own scoring 
-No theory has 
used, but the 
authors adapted 
UNDP principles 
of governance & 
Siddiqi’s 
-To directly assess 
governance at national 
level  
-To provide scoring of 
governance, 
The framework tries to quantify 
governance using rules-based 
measures such as the existence 
of certain policy or guidelines. 
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Name of the 
framework 
Characteristics of the framework Underlying 
theory if 
applicable 
Purpose of the 
framework 
Analytical focus 
from 0% (very poor) to 100% (excellent) 






countries over time  
-To alert policy makers 









The framework uses problem-driven 
approach and considers five health 
system building blocks under five 
proposed principles of governance.  
-No theory has 
used, but the 
authors used 
system thinking 
approach to WHO 
health system 
building blocks 
To assess governance 
of a pre-identified 
problem of a health 
system filtering 
through health system 
building blocks 
-To assess all four levels of a 
health system (national, 
district, facility & community) 





Ibrahim Index of 
African 
governance 
The framework focuses on government 
centred approach. The Index has 57 
variables which can be grouped into 14 
categories summarised into the 
following four dimensions: 1) safety 
and the rule of law; 2) participation and 
human rights; 3) sustainable economic 
opportunity; and 4) human 
development.  
-No theory has 
been used 
To assess governance 
of the government. 
-The original purpose of the 
framework is to assess 
governance of a country from a 
holistic approach. The 
framework considers every 
aspect of the development of a 











The framework starts with stakeholders 
mapping and power distribution (both 
formal and informal actors). The 
framework is presented as a visual 
process map of causal links between 
inputs, processes and outcomes to 











To assess governance 
of a health system with 
a pre-identified 
problem in health 
system performance 
-Analyse governance as a result 
of interactions among different 
key stakeholders (formal & 
informal actors) 
-Assess predefined governance 
principles in terms of inputs 
(strategic vision, participation & 
consensus orientation), 
processes (accountability, 
control of corruption, 
transparency) and outcomes 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 






Name of the 
framework 
Characteristics of the framework Underlying 
theory if 
applicable 
Purpose of the 
framework 
Analytical focus 
(responsiveness, equity and 
efficiency).  





The framework aims to directly assess 
health system governance using the 
hierarchical approach from national to 
policy implementation levels. 10 
governance components are 
disaggregated into 63 broad questions 








of governance in 
developing their 
framework 
-To assess overall 
governance of a health 
system at three levels 




-To provide context 
specific assessment of 
governance of health 
sector 
-To assess different players in 
the health market of a health 
system (government, for-profit 
and not for-profit providers, 
informal networks etc.) 
-To analyse the context of 
institutions (incentives, rules 
that influence behaviour of key 
actors)  




A cybernetic model of leadership and 
governance is a mix of traditional 
hierarchy, market and network types of 
governance. The framework includes 
three governance components: setting 
priorities, performance monitoring and 
accountability. 
System theory A system can self-
regulate through 
feedback mechanisms. 
-Focuses on how systems use 
information and how they seek 
to monitor actions to steer 
towards their goals.  
-Focuses on accountability and 
management of networks. 
 





The framework is based on the 
assumption that key players in the 
health system have certain 
opportunities which are the product of 
formal and informal rules and 
constraints set by the institutions. 
Corruption occurs as a result of taking 





-To guide policy makers 
in examining 
corruption in the 
health sector 
-To identify possible 
ways to intervene 
Corruption from the view point 
of government. The framework 
also considers other factors 
such as socio-interpersonal 
pressures, the rule of law, 
individual and organisational 
level influences and 
interactions and key 
stakeholder’s interests. 




Three counterbalancing axes of 
mutually reinforcing dimensions of 
accountability: the axis of power 




-To understand the 
perspectives of 
government officials to 
Accountability from the view 
point of government officials. 
The framework was developed 
based on literature review with 
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Name of the 
framework 
Characteristics of the framework Underlying 
theory if 
applicable 
Purpose of the 
framework 
Analytical focus 
ability (formal & informal rules) and the 
axis of justice (political leadership, 
community ownership & social equity). 
support accountability 
reforms in Nigeria  
consensus obtained through 
stakeholders’ workshop in 
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How frameworks have been applied Level of 
analysis  
Methods used 
sources of data 








Frameworks using principal-agent theory  





Principal-agent theory (between 
citizens and municipals, healthcare 
providers and Federal government) 
was used to highlight how governance 
has improved through local 
accountability in addition to 




-Interviews with key 
stakeholders 
-Desk review of 
municipal audit 
data and reports. 
Applied at the municipal 
level in Brazil. 










The authors use their own framework 
to assess how principal (government) 
interact with the agent (private sector) 
in three key forms: regulation, 
financing & stewardship 
National 
level 
Not mentioned Applied at national level 
in Afghanistan, India and 
Uganda 
Weak 










To identify how factors influencing 
accountability mechanisms work and 











A literature review of 
district health systems in 
low and middle income 
counties. 






4 Huss et al., 
2011 
A variant of 
Principal-
agent model  
The principal-agent theory was used 
at two levels: principal-agent-client 
and refers the “state” and “collective 
citizens” as “principal” while “public 
service providers” are “agents to 
deliver services for “citizens”. To 
assess the roles and functions of 




-Interviews with key 
stakeholders 
-Desk review of 
reports 
Applied in a State in 
India. 
Use for diagnostic 
purpose 
Medium 
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How frameworks have been applied Level of 
analysis  
Methods used 
sources of data 








the operations of the health sector in 
the State.  






The framework was used together 
with a survey of health workers using 
self-reporting questions on 
governance. Interviews and FGDs with 
key stakeholders on two key elements 






-Interviews with key 
stakeholders 
Applied at facilities in 
Zambia. 
Use for diagnostic 
purpose 
Medium 





Two principal-agent relationships 
(between citizens & government, 
between government & healthcare 
providers, between healthcare 
providers & citizens) to highlight how 
governance has shaped historical 
health system reforms in China.  
National 
  
-Desk review of 
reports 
China 






7 Vian and 
Bicknell, 
2013 
A variant of 
principal-
agent model 
Single principal-agent relationship 
(state-healthcare provider) to assess 
governance at facility level in hospital 
reform process in Lesotho. They 
explore possible contributory causes 
in the failure of reform (performance 
based budgeting/PBB).  




- Desk review of 
budgets, financial 
reports 
Applied at public 
facilities in Lesotho.  










Two principal-agent relationships 
(between citizens & government 
agencies, between government 
agencies & healthcare providers, 
between healthcare providers & 
citizens) to assess anti-corruption 
initiatives in Vietnam health sector. 
The framework was also used to 
propose anti-corruption approaches.  
National -Discussions with 
key stakeholders 
- Desk review of 
reports 
Applied in Vietnam. 
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How frameworks have been applied Level of 
analysis  
Methods used 
sources of data 















To assess government, communities 
and intrinsic health workers’ factors 
influencing retention of primary 
healthcare workers in decentralized 







discussions with key 
stakeholders 
Applied at six states in 
Nigeria 









The framework was used together 
with Williamson’s “Transaction costs” 
theory (1979) to provide 
recommendations for governance 






-Analysis of TB 
survey data from 
healthcare facilities 
in Nigeria. 
Applied at one state in 
Nigeria. 









Under the conditions when there is 
lack of formal national policies to post 
and transfer health workers in Nigeria, 
the authors have used their own 
multilevel framework of PHC 
governance to identify factors 
influencing policies of posting and 





discussions with key 
stakeholders  
Applied in Nigeria. 
No tools included. 
Use for diagnostic 
purpose.  
High 









The authors used health system 
governance assessment framework 
developed by Baez Carmago and 
Jacobs to assess public sector supply 
chain. They started assessment by 
stakeholders and institutional 
mapping to understand powerful 
actors and the political context.  
National -Interviews and 
focus group 
discussions with key 
stakeholders 
-Desk review of 
reports 
Applied in Uganda. 
Use for diagnostic 
purpose. 
Medium 
2 Siddiqi et 
al.,2009 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Using institutional analysis theory as 
the conceptual basis, the framework 
National 
and sub-
-Interviews with key 
stakeholders 
Applied at national and 
sub-national level of 
Medium 
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How frameworks have been applied Level of 
analysis  
Methods used 
sources of data 








was used together with predefined 
sets of ten governance principles to 




-Desk review of 
reports 
Pakistan health system. 
Use for diagnostic 
purpose 
3 Erchick et 
al.,2017 
George et al., 
2016 
Three dimensional axes of 
accountability framework (axes of 
power, ability & justice) was used to 
explore the perspectives of 
government officials involved in 




facility level  
-Interviews with 17 
government 
officials 
Niger state, Nigeria 




et al., 2016 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Siddiqi’s framework was adapted to 
assess mental health system 






-Interviews with 30 
key informants 
from three different 
levels 
 
Applied at national, Oyo 
state and local 
government level in 
Nigeria. Use for 
diagnostic purpose 
High 
5 Hanlon et 
al., 2017 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Siddiqi’s framework was adapted to 
assess mental health system 





-Interviews with 17 
key informants 
from three different 
levels 
 
Applied at national, 
Sodo district and health 
facility level in Ethiopia. 
Use for diagnostic 
purpose 
High 
6 Marais & 
Petersen, 
2015 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Mikkelsen 
Lopez et al., 
2011 
The authors developed a framework 
by adapting the two existing 
frameworks to assess mental health 





-Interviews with 17 
key informants 
from three different 
levels 
Applied at national, 
North West Province 
and Dr Kenneth Kauda 
district level. Use for 
diagnostic purpose 
High 
7 Mugisha et 
al., 2016 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Siddiqi’s framework was adapted to 
assess mental health system 




-Interviews with 18 
key informants 
from three different 
levels 
 
Applied at national and 
Kamuli district in 
Uganda. Use for 
diagnostic purpose 
High 
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How frameworks have been applied Level of 
analysis  
Methods used 
sources of data 








8 Petersen et 
al., 2017 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Mikkelsen 
Lopez et al., 
2011 
The authors developed a framework 
by adapting the two existing 
frameworks to identify barriers of 
health system governance in 
integrating mental health into primary 





-Interviews with key 
stakeholders 
Applied at national and 
sub-national levels of 
Ethiopia, India, Nepal, 
Nigeria, South Africa, 
Uganda 
Use for both diagnostic 
& prescriptive purposes. 
High 
9 Upadhaya 
et al., 2017 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Siddiqi’s framework was adapted to 
assess mental health system 




-Interviews with 28 
key informants 
from two different 
levels 
Applied at national and 
district level in Nepal. 
Use for diagnostic 
purpose 
High 
10 Yuan et al., 
2017 
Siddiqi et al., 
2009 
Siddiqi’s framework was adapted to 




-Desk review of 
policy documents & 
reports 
Applied at national level 




1 Smith et 
al.,2012 
Smith et al., 
2012 
The framework which is composed of 
three key nodes of governance serves 
as the guiding principles in assessing 
hierarchy, market and network 
governance of seven developed health 
systems 
National -Interviews with key 
stakeholders 
-Desk review of 
reports 
Applied at national level 
in seven developed 
health system. 










Ecological analysis of two sub-
indicators of Ibrahim Index namely 
RLTC: Rule of Law, Transparency and 
Corruption and SEO: sustainable 
economic opportunity. 
National -Secondary analysis 
of data 
46 WHO Africa countries Not applicable  
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Appendix 6. Topic guide 
 
General opening 
1. How do you characterise the maternal and newborn health (MNH) services in Kenya? 
(About availability and quality of MNH services nationally. And how about the 
availability of CEmOC nationally?) 
2. What are the main health needs of MNH?  How have those needs been identified in 
the devolved health system? 
Strategic Vision 
1. Are there clear vision and policies for MNH? If yes, what are they? (Probe into “Free 
maternity services (FMS) & user fees abolishment policies”) 
2. Are you aware of how those policies were developed? Who has involved in 
developing those policies?  
3. How do you find the policies in responding to the MNH needs of the population?  
4. What have been the challenges after devolution?  
(Probe into their specific answers if they mention the lack of finance or trained staff or 
equipment or infrastructure. Ask them “How do you overcome them?”) 
Participation 
1. Who are the key stakeholders in MNH policy making?  
2. How do those stakeholders share ideas? Are there regular meetings or other ways 
that they can express their interests (and possibly influence policy or programmatic 
decisions about EmOC)? Did this change after devolution? 
3. Among them, who do you think is the most powerful in MNH policy making in Kenya? 
Who has the greatest influence in the provision of CEmOC? 
4. Tell me about participation in MNH service planning and delivery – who participates 
and why?  
(Probe: Types of engagement or participation of civil society or individual citizens, not 
just in service planning and delivery but perhaps in policy or agenda-setting too. If people 
are engaging a lot, what factors seem to be associated with this? Do they also engage in 
groups for self-help outside of EmOC (prior experience)? Are they actively encouraged 
to engage? Is the engagement positive (a productive interaction) or is it confrontational 
and adversarial?) 
5. What have been the successes and challenges in wider participation since 
devolution? 
The rule of law 
1. Are you aware of the rules for free maternity services? 
2. How are they enforced? (Probe if he mentions non-enforcement of the rules. Why? 
Ask if there are procedures in place for addressing grievances of consumers & 
providers) 
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Accountability 
1. Please tell me about the understanding of roles and responsibilities among key 
stakeholders in the health system since devolution. 
2. What do you think are the consequences of lack of role clarity? 
3. Do any complaint mechanisms exist? Do people feel empowered to use them? 
Why/why not? 
4. What are the measures of performance and non-performance? 
5. Please tell me about the rewards for those performing well and repercussion for 
those performing poorly. 
6. What have been the successes in relation to accountability? What are the 
challenges? 
7. How might accountability challenges affect the provision of MNH services and 
CEmOC, and why? 
8. What can be done to improve accountability?  
 
Responsiveness  
1. What are the challenges to respond to main health priorities in MNH? To respond to 
CEmOC service provision? 
2. How can they be improved? 
Equity 
1. What do you think about equity in access to MNH services in your country? (Probe-
whether devolution has affected equity and responsiveness of government?) 
2. Which population groups are mostly using MNH & EmOC services in your county or 
facility? (only for county or facility levels) 
3. Please tell me about any policies in place to ensure fair access of MNH services. 
General closing 
1. Is there anything else you would like to say about health systems governance? Or 
anything more relating to the governance challenges and opportunities for MNH 
services and CEmOC? 
2. Is there anyone else involved in MNH policy making that I should talk to about 
governance? 
As the meeting comes to an end, the interviewer reads the notes that she has taken to the 
participant so that s/he can clarify the points made. The interviewer thanks the participant 
for her/his valuable contributions and time. 
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Appendix 7. Participant information sheet and consent form 
 
Name of Principal Researcher: Dr. Thidar Pyone 
 
Name of Organisation: Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine 
 
Name of Project: Health systems governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and 
subnational level 
 
This informed consent form has two parts: 
• Participant Information Sheet (to share information about the research with you) 
• Consent form (for signatures if you agree to take part) 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
BACKGROUND 
You are invited to participate in this research project, which is a research study towards the 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) programme at The University of Liverpool, UK in cooperation 
with Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), UK. This study is part of the on-going 
“Making it Happen” programme in Kenya.  The study has been approved by the ethics review 
committee from the LSTM, UK and the Kenyatta National Hospital Ethics and Research 
Committee (KNH/UON-ERC) from Kenya. UK-Department for International Development 
(DFID) funding is being used to support this research.  
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The study is about health systems governance and functionality of a healthcare facility. As 
you are an active player in Kenya health system and implementation of health policy, I am 
interested to hear about your experiences and views on governance. It is up to you to make 
a choice whether to take part in the study or not; participation is entirely voluntary.  
 
STUDY PROCEDURES AND DURATION 
If you do decide to participate, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked 
to sign a consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
Your participation would be through an interview which will take about an hour. The 
interview will take place at your work place or other mutually agreed convenient location.  
 
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
During the discussion, if you come across any questions that you do not feel comfortable or 
do not want to answer, you do not have to; you may also stop the interview at any time. 
However, we would appreciate an open and honest discussion about the health systems 




By participating in this research, you will be contributing towards the improvement of health 
systems although there will be no immediate, direct benefit to you.  
 
COMPENSATION 
No financial incentive will be given to participants. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY 
We hope you will allow us to record the discussion, as it will make subsequent analysis easier. 
Only the principal researcher will work with the transcripts. The records and transcripts will 
be destroyed 5 years after the completion of the study. The study is anonymous and you will 
not be identified in any documents related to the study. However, anonymised direct 
quotations might be used in the final thesis and peer-review publications. The consent forms 
will be stored in lockable cabinets and will only be accessible to the principal researcher. 
Electronic data will be stored on a password-protected computer with only the principal 
researcher having access to the password. None of the data on the computer will have your 
name on it. 
 
DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS 
Results will be published in peer-reviewed journals and in print and e-thesis format. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
The choice to participate in this study depends solely on you. You can choose to withdraw 
from this study at any time during the research without any consequence to you. You can 
refuse to answer any question you do not want to answer and still be part of the study. 
 
CONTACT 
If you have questions regarding the study, please contact Thidar Pyone through e-mail at 
Thidar.Pyone@lstmed.ac.uk or by calling +441517052533.  
 
You can also contact the Ethics committee regarding any concerns you have about the 
conduct of the research in the case when you do not want to contact the principal researcher. 
 
Contact Details: 
Research and Ethics Committee 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine 
Pembroke Place, L3 5QA, Liverpool 
United Kingdom 
+44(0)151 705 3100 
 
KNH-UON-ERC 
Mbagathi Rd. Nairobi, Kenya 
+254 (0)20 2713349, +254 (0)20 2722541, 0722-205901 
 
Please keep this information sheet and should you wish to take part, you will need to sign 
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CONSENT FORM 
The above information was clearly explained to me in English by the administrator of the 
instrument and I understand that language. I was given the opportunity to ask questions 
which were answered satisfactorily. 
 
I hereby voluntarily consent to participate and have received a copy of this form. 
 






Signature of participant / Date 
 
For administrator, 







Signature of administrator / Date 
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Appendix 8. Interview topics sent to participants 
 
Study title: Health systems governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational 
level  
 
Thank you for agreeing to help us with this project.  Below is a list of topic areas which we 
plan to cover in our interview.  
 
1. Your department/organization, and your role within it.  
 
2. Governance: Focuses on political ideology considering health system together with 
other principles which influence the system such as transparent rules governed by 
effective oversight and strong accountability in place. 
 
3. Strategic vision: Strategy for health policy in your country 
 
4. Participation and consensus orientation: Participation in decision-making process 
of the country health system, who involves in decision making and community 
participation in health services provision  
 
5. Rule of law: The legislation process at health facility level; including the 
interpretation of legislation into regulation and policy and the enforcement of laws 
and regulations 
 
6. Responsiveness: The efforts of the institution to try to serve the health needs of 
the population. How does the health system respond to the health needs?  
 
7. Equity: How healthcare resources are allocated and any differences in access to 
care among different population groups?  
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Appendix 9. Memo on topic guide modification 
 
• The way to ask the interview questions 
If the respondent mentioned governance principles from the first question, try to ask them 
what they mean for each principle.  
“T; so How do you understand and would define this (governance) especially within, 
your country health system 
P: Ok, the government is ensuring that there are accountabilities, transparency and 
people participation in decision making in the provision of health services. “(KI-3, p1) 
For instance, I should ask “you have mentioned accountabilities, transparency and people 
participation, can you elaborate a bit?” 
➢ If the respondent got lost with the questions on governance even after giving 
examples on specific governance principles like in the case of KI-10, ask them how 
the situation was in their institution.  
➢ When the respondents answered health system issues (HR, financing) as 
governance, what should I do? Or when the bottlenecks are health system issues, 
how should I relate that to governance? 
 
• Should I remove the word “devolved” from guiding question of my topic guide? I 
found that the respondents mentioned “devolution” so often in the interviews. Will 
that lead towards devolution study but not governance? Devolution is on the agenda 
in Kenya nowadays, so I think they will mention that although I didn’t include 
“devolved” in my guiding questions. But I think I cannot avoid that as devolution is 
on the agenda in Kenya. People will say even if I don’t ask. I think I need to find how 
devolution has improved or worsened the situation of governance in Kenya.  
 
• Before each group of questions, I used to have those opening statements and 
explained that what these governance principles are, for instance, “Let’s consider 
more detail aspects of health system governance and how these could affect MNH 
service provision and availability of CEmOC. First, let’s consider governance inputs, 
such as a strategic vision, participation in decision making and the rule of law (if 
needed, give the definitions).” I thought they are not needed as it complicated the 
participant. So, I have removed them. I will directly ask the questions. 
 
• Under general opening section, I have added “quality” in addition to “availability of 
MNH services” like this “How would you describe availability and quality of MNH 
services nationally?” because KI-4 said “what has happened over time is the facilities 
initially because they didn’t have the money we had so many mothers who came in, 
and then the care was not good because they didn’t have the money at that time”. 
So, I think I need to add quality in addition to availability.  
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• Under strategic vision, I have replaced the question “Is there long term vision for 
MNH? If yes, what is it?” With this one “Are there clear vision and policy goals for 
maternal and newborn health? If yes, what are they?” because everyone mentioned 
vision 2030 when I asked that question, and that is the vision to become Kenya a 
middle-income country by 2030. I think I need to be more specific because everyone 
knows there is vision 2030. 
 
• Under strategic vision, I have added some questions to probe after this question 
“What have been the challenges after devolution?” (Probe into their specific 
answers if they mention lack of finance or trained staff or equipment or 
infrastructure). How do you overcome them as I found that almost all respondents 
gave health system issues? I would like to see specific strategies to overcome them 
and whether it has any consequences on governance. One example from the 
interview with KI-4 “they have this equipment, they don’t have the other, they have 
this health worker they don’t have the other supplies.” 
 
• This has been replaced with two health financing policies prescribed in 2013 and asks 
relevant questions on FMS and user fees abolishment? (addition 27Aug2015) 
 
• Under participation, I have added two following questions to probe: 
1. “Processes before participating i.e. how do stakeholders share ideas? Are there 
regular meetings or other ways that they can express their interests (and possibly 
influence policy or programmatic decisions about EmOC)? Did this change after 
devolution?” I got the idea from my interview with KI-2, as he mentioned that 
there are a lot of constituencies and forums where stakeholders can participate. 
“There are such a lot of forums. So, if you want to engage, and come together 
with constituencies and raised your issue for engagement.” (KI-2, p7) 
 
2. “Types of engagement or participation of civil society or individual citizens, not 
just in service planning and delivery but policy or agenda-setting too”.  Public 
engagement includes a spectrum of activities from passive to very active, i.e. 
being a recipient of information from regulators, providing input through public 
opinion poll, submitting complaints about poor service, joining an advisory 
board, or conducting a social audit. Literature sometimes refers to categories of 
public communication (least active), public consultation, and public participation 
(most active).  “If people are engaging a lot, what factors seem to be associated 
with this? Do they also engage in groups for self-help outside of EmOC (prior 
experience)? Are they actively encouraged to engage? Is the engagement 
positive (a productive interaction) or is it confrontational and adversarial?” I got 
the idea from my interview with the KI-2, as he mentioned that “it can engage 
but it is not necessarily mean to take up everything that people want. Those are 
two different things. So, for some stakeholder, they perceive engagement as 
government doing what they have told. ………The challenges are that the way 
some partners interpret the engagement. If I told you what to do, you refuse to 
do what I told you. Then you have not engaged as a perceptive of some partner. 
Thidar Pyone, PhD thesis: “Health system governance in Kenya: an assessment at national and subnational level” 
262 | P a g e  
 
So, they will come out and say they have very little engagement and you are 
asking why well, because can you see what they are doing is not correct. Why you 
are participating. No, because I know they will not accept what I am saying, so is 
that engagement or not?” (KI-2, p6,7) 
 
• Under accountability, I have added some questions to start with. “Please tell me 
about the understanding of roles and responsibilities among key stakeholders in the 
health system since devolution? What do you think are the consequences of the lack 
of role clarity?” I got the idea from my interview with KI-2, as he mentioned that 
“…because there are a lot of stepping on each other toes. You are entering my area 
this and my area that. People look at it as an empire, not as a service.” (KI-2, p9) 
 
• Under accountability, I replaced my question of “What have been the successes 
regarding accountability?” with this one “Do any complaint mechanisms exist? Do 
people feel empowered to use them? Why/why not?” Because I got unrelated or 
very superficial answers on the success of accountability. Besides, from my interview 
with KI-3, he mentioned that “the accountability also involves the complaint redress. 
It also has that accountability to people complaint redress mechanism which is 
available and functional.” (KI-3, p1) 
 
• Under accountability, I replaced my question of “Do you have non-compliance in 
practising certain policies on MNH services? In such case, which kind of sanction is 
practising in your institution? How are those sanctions enforced and why?” with this 
one “What are the measures of performance and non-performance? Do you know 
what are the rewards for those performing well and repercussion for those 
performing poorly?” Because I got unrelated or very superficial answers on non-
compliance and people cannot specify. 
 
• Under accountability, I found that participant found difficult to answer some 
questions like “among the professions within your facility, on the provision of the 
MCH services, particularly CEmOC, what are the main accountability challenges you 
would see?” She asked me to give an example or explain what I want to know. The 
answers she gave for that accountability challenges are other health system issues 
such as lack of medicines, supplies & equipment, HRH, transportation. 
 
 
• The questions “what are the main health priorities in MNH?  How those priorities 
are identified in the devolved health system?” under responsiveness was moved to 
before strategic vision as this was part of input (i.e. participatory priority-setting as 
part of strategic vision). Initially I had that under responsiveness on how this is about 
measuring responsiveness. But this question has been modified as “needs” rather 
than “priorities”. See below. 
 
• It is sometimes difficult to ask the question regarding “health priorities”. Before 
asking the question on responsiveness, I started my question with priorities in MNH. 
Then, I ask them whether those priorities have been responded or not. I had 
difficulty to make the KI-10 as he couldn’t understand my question on “what are the 
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main priorities on MNH in this institution?” I even got not relevant answers as he 
replied that they were the leading causes of death when I asked him “why do you 
think they are priorities?” He replied, “If you don’t act, the mothers will die”. But 
later I thought, they should be replaced with “health needs”, not “priorities”. 
“Priorities” is not the right word. So, I have modified the question as “If we consider 
for a moment maternal and newborn health (MNH) services in Kenya, what are the 
main health needs in MNH?  How those needs are identified in the devolved health 
system?” 
 
• Regarding participation, it was difficult to ask sometimes at the facility, e.g. the 
nurse in-charge of maternity unit to ask who participates in the implementation of 
the policy. I have asked him using different questions, but I could not get useful 
information.  
 
• When I find out that a particular facility is used by a certain population which kind of 
question should I ask for equity? e.g. Pwmani hospital. I felt that I didn’t ask 
questions to probe equity issue. The matron said certain population groups are using 
that facility. Should I ask whether the county government aware of that? Does that 
facility receive any support from any government institutions?  
 
• Similarly, is that enough to find out information on equity? “Please tell me about any 
policies in place to ensure fair access of MNH services.” 
 
• For facility level topic guide, I should ask something particular in relevance to 
governance and EmOC service provision. Especially when they mention about certain 
signal functions which they can perform and not, then probe further. Anything 
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KI-5 (National level, MOH) 
 KI-8 (County level) 
Date 21/04/2015 24/04/2015 
Time 13-13:45 8:15-9:40 
Interview place 
MOH Health system reform office 
(Afya house) 
Nairobi Provincial Health Quarter-
Nyoya House 
Setting 
The interview was conducted at the 
respondent's office but the door was 
not closed. There were some noises 
from outside the building from time 
to time. There were some 
interruptions during the interview. 
The respondent’s phone rang for 3 
times and one of the calls was 
answered.  
The interview was conducted in the 
respondent's office. The door was close 
but there were some noises from the 
windows. The respondent paid 
attentively to the interview as he 
refused calls by saying that he was in 
an interview. There was one 
interruption as one of his assistant 




I waited for the respondent for an 
hour. Very rich information on 
health policy & planning. The 
respondent is the focal person in 
policy development. Very 
conversant with the system and 
updates on health systems 
governance. The respondent 
mentioned about the Ministry of 
Devolution which was recently 
formed with the merger of more 
than 5 ministries. The respondent 
didn't have the contact details of the 
focal person but promised me to 
send afterwards. I received a copy of 
KHSSP (2014-2018) report. 
I was supposed to meet the boss of the 
respondent but the boss delegated me 
to the respondent. This interview was 
arranged by the county RH coordinator 
who issued the authorization letter to 
collect data within the county. The 
interview went in an amicable way as 
the respondent started a conversation 
about topics outside the interview. We 
discussed my own country and the 
politics for about 10 minutes before 
the interview actually started. I felt I 
got very rich information on the 
particular county before and after 
devolution. I received open and frank 
information on county health system 
after devolution with measures that 
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Appendix 11. Example of a thematic framework 
 
Theme: accountability 
National level participants 
Participant/ 
Sub-theme Financial accountability Community accountability Challenges to improving accountability 
KI-1 
Good tracking system for funds is essential: 
“…from the newspapers the counties are still 
not as good in terms of accountability. 
And…with the time and as the law takes its 
course arresting some who misappropriate and 
things like those people will now be serious, 
following the guidelines and rule of law.” (p-7)     
KI-1 
Perceived vulnerability: “Quite a lot of counties 
because they were not very much exposed to 
management of huge funds. Before they were 
districts, and these things they never got 
managed that huge funds so we expect a lot of 
misappropriations here and there especially 
through procurement things like those.” (p-7)     
KI-2     
Lack of role clarity: “there are lot of stepping 
on each other toes. You entering my area this 
and my area that. People look at it as an 
empire, not as a service.” (p-9) 
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Participant/ 
Sub-theme Financial accountability Community accountability Challenges to improving accountability 
KI-2     
Making use of accountability mechanism: 
"we have empowered our people 
appropriately to demand accountability. The 
kind of demand that you see is a poisonous in 
some instances...if I make noise, I know that I 
will get certain benefits out of the system. So 
I am making noise not because I want to 
improve services but because I want to be 
shut up. Which is not the kind of 
accountability that we are looking for."  (p-
10) 
KI-2     
There are even brokers to make use of the 
accountability and the system: "you have 
professional civil society people, they earn a 
good living because whenever I made money, 
I just go and make a bit of noise." (p-10) 
KI-4   
Collusion between management & 
governing boards: “If the management is 
not willing to have a board in place, it 
becomes very difficult to establish one 
because they can influence who is coming 
into the board. They can influence what 
decision they make... At that level, there are 
at the mercy of the hospital technical team. 
In some cases, you find that the board and 
management team being together.” (p-5)   
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